

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE



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VOL. XVIII. NO. 2

AUGUST, 1933

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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
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CITADEL LA FERRIERE

Stronghold of Henri I of Haiti, crowning the mountains south of Cape Haitien.

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The Western Hemisphere King

BY MAJOR J. C. FEGAN, U.S.M.C.

■ With all the great and proud nations on the western hemisphere, none of them can turn down the corner of a page in their history showing that they were ever ruled by a king; except the little black Republic of Haiti; however, as the nearest contender, Mexico alone can point with pride to the important achievements in national progress under the governing formulae of the great Emperor Maximilian. This Haitien Kingdom climaxed the result of the steady rise of a slave, a French officer's orderly, a general of French Colonial Troops and a natural born ruler—*Henri Christophe*. Strangely not a Haitien by blood or nativity, he came to Haiti on a small trading vessel at the age of twelve from the island of Saint Christopher (hence, *Christophe*), where he was born in 1767. Saint Christopher is one of the British West Indies, about 300 miles South America way from Haiti. He landed at Petite Anse, a village on the outskirts of Cape Haitien, in 1779.

HIS BOYHOOD DAYS

His boyhood days were spend in drudgery, as his father was a mason and believed in bringing up his boys as trowel experts, but his manhood days bulged with adventure, grandeur, and power. It is interesting to pass along Rue Christophe in the quaint town of Cape Haitien and see on the hillside the ruins of the old Cafe Couronne where once Christophe shined shoes, served at the billiard tables, and tended the horses owned by the patrons of the hostelry of his "to-be father-in-law—Codavid." The old Mapu tree to which he tied the horses of the French generals who consumed their cognac in this famous Inn still stands across the street from the Cafe in spite of its years of long service as a hitching post. Perhaps it was because of these chores that Christophe became a lover of billiards and spirited horses and always had them at hand for his amusement.


HIS RISE TO POWER

As the French gradually lost control in Haiti the Haitians stalked about for a leader, especially after the French had tricked the mighty Touissant on board a ship which carried him to France, where he was destined to remain. It was during this time that Christophe stepped forward with the intention of eclipsing Dessalines, another famous Haitien General but from the southern part of the country, and also his old friend Chavannes, in whose heart and head the independence of Haiti was born. Chavannes had soldiered with Christophe

in the siege of Savannah, under the well known French Officer Comte d'Estaing. However, time was not quite ripe for Haitien Generals to quarrel among themselves for their country's leadership, as Haiti was not yet a free country, but there was every indication that it would soon be. The "fever," the same fever that caused the French to lose interest in Louisiana and to abandon the Isthmus of Panama, was drawing heavily upon the ranks and coffers of Napoleon's colonial troops. These disturbing conditions caused much discussion along the boulevards of Paris as to the wisdom of continuing such an army. So we find Haiti in 1804, under the leadership of Dessalines, Christophe, and Petion, who, having driven the French from the country, declared the independence of Saint Domingue, or Haiti, as they preferred to call it. However, they were not without fear that the French would seize the first interval of peace with England to make another effort to reconquer the island. A plan for defending their liberty and lives, in such an event, had been deliberately settled by Dessalines and his chiefs, and the requisite preparations were made for carrying it into execution.

If a suggestion was whispered at the government house, calling in question the policy of such a measure, the doubt was immediately silenced by a reference to Moscow, the destruction of which had saved Russia, and even Europe from the power of Napoleon.

Dessalines, the dictator, and commander chief of the entire army, ordered his generals to prepare the defense as outlined. Christophe, who was second in command and had been given his old post as Governor of the North, with headquarters at Cape Haitien, started to build a cordon of forts, about seven in number, covering the entire northern coast of Haiti—and supporting the Royal Batteries at Cape Haitien, Fort Liberte, Port au Paix. After the assassination of Dessalines at Port Rouge, on the outskirts of Port au Prince, in 1806, Christophe was elected president of Haiti by the Constituent Assembly at Port au Prince. He did not accept that position; and, upon the report by one of his friends, Just Hugonin, a member of the Assembly, that the Constitution gave him very little power, he marched on Port au Prince and the second civil war in Haiti began, this time between the North and the West. Defeated by the valiant defense of Port au Prince, headed by Alexandre Petion, Christophe returned to the North and established a secession government.



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
While celebrating the "Feast of the Kings" in January, 1811, at Fort Dauphin (named Fort Royal by him, and at the present time Fort Liberte), glasses were raised and a toast was offered to the "Fete des Rois." It was at this time that the idea of creating the Royaume de Haiti was conceived. In March, 1811, the members of the Council of State met at Cape Haitien and voted to make Christophe king.

During a fete at Fort Liberte, on Twelfth Day (*Jour des Rois*), he was given the part of the cake containing the special seed which made him king of the Fete.

As Christophe left the fete the paraded company of riders cried out: "Long live the King!" This was how the kingdom of Haiti was born which this genius was to organize and rule with such masterly ability as to cause his name to be written in history among the great chiefs of State, regardless of his tyranny which was at times called barbarous.

CROWNED KING

On Sunday, June 2, 1812, crowns were placed on Christophe's head, by Bishop Cornelius Brelle, as King Henry I, and Marie-Louise, his wife, as Queen, in the Cathedral at Cape Henry (now Cape Haitien). His son received the title of Crown Prince Victor Henry and his two daughters, Amethiste and Athenaire, princesses. The brother of the queen was titled as Prince Noel. Besides the princes of the blood there were 3 princes of the kingdom, 8 dukes, 22 counts, 37 barons, 14 knights, 9 governors of the palaces, 7 governors of the chateaux, 14 chamberlains, 14 pages, heralds and masters of ceremonies. Of these members of the royal family the two most famous were the Count of Limonade and the Duke of Marmalade. The Military Order of Saint Henry was founded and endowed with an annual income of 300,000 gourdes. In 1930 an English lady visited Cape Haitien and by good fortune was able to procure one of the original insignias of this Military Order from the descendants of one of Christophe's royal family. The insignia resembled very much the design of the present French Legion of Honor, being suspended from a red and blue ribbon, the Haitien national colors.



From an old print.

King Christophe in Haiti sentencing a British prisoner to death

his garrison being subsisted without foraging beyond the reach of their guns.

The original plan for the Citadelle was drawn by Henri Besse, a Haitien mulatto engineer who was educated in Paris, but as the work progressed under the supervision of two captive French engineers, La Ferrier, the chief engineer, for whom the Citadelle was named, and another young officer whose name is unknown, the original plan was modified, at the insistence of Christophe. The fortress took the shape of an irregular square, tapering to a gigantic prow that pointed to the magnetic north. The lime and brick for this giant project had to be carried on the heads of slaves from nearby hills, ranging from one to three kilometers in distance, as the Citadelle was built on a rock mountain. In the homes of some of the older and well-to-do Haitien families can be seen crude paintings of thousands of slaves streaming like ants up hill and down ravine carrying loads on their heads to the high walls of this fort. In a chamber at the South end of the main gun corridor could be found thousands of Cheveaux des Frise, a three pointed iron device resembling a crow's foot, which, when thrown on the ground, leaves one point sticking up, thus presenting a menace to infantry and cavalry. These are called by the peasants living in the vicinity of the Citadelle "Tombe Leve" (fall and rise). Almost every visitor carries away with him a Tombe Leve as a souvenir. Several old flint locks have been found stamped with the American eagle and thirteen stars. An old powder container was found several years ago with "Harpers Ferry" stamped on it.

CITADELLE LA FERRIERE

With renewed and defiant vim Christophe pushed the construction of the *Citadelle la Ferriere*, a gigantic fortress on the summit of Bonnet a l'Eveque, an inaccessible cone shaped mountain 3,000 feet above sea level, in the commune of Milot and twenty miles to the south of Cape Haitien. This position was well selected, as it commanded every point of approach from which Petion could march against him and it stood watch over the Bay of Cape Haitien as a silent sentinel.

The sides of the mountain and the ravines connecting them were all cleared and planted with bananas, plantains, and yams, which could produce rations quickly, as he calculated on

There is a tradition that Christophe was accustomed to assign a certain distance which a given number of men would have to move a gun each day, and upon failing to do so killed every tenth man. One morning Christophe watched 100 men; they had come to a halt and were struggling with

a large cannon on the hillside near the peak; they were arguing and were behind schedule. He ordered fifty of them put to death and left the remaining fifty to drag up the gun and put it in place; the work was finished on time.

There was a large wine cellar in the fortress under the King's apartment; it contained the choicest of Madeiras and Sauternes for which the King had swapped coffee. Today visitors can see the large iron hooks that supported the wine hampers. True to his African traits, he went in for food and drink in a big way.

From 1804 to 1812, work on the Citadelle had gone toward completion with a marked degree of progress. But after the Royal Family had been installed in the Palace of Sans Souci, King Henry concentrated his terrific energy towards the consummation of this work and with such persistence that his subjects became convinced that he was afraid that fate would deprive him of the opportunity to complete his monument that he so desired to leave to posterity.

This marvelous fortress was not completed at the time of his death.

The construction of the Citadelle is said to have cost the lives of 20,000 peasants—men and women. It could accommodate 10,000 troops, with a fortnight's supply of water and food in case of a siege.

There were many dungeons. It is a matter of conjecture as for just what purpose they were intended. But it is known that during the lifetime of the King no foreigner was ever permitted to enter its walls except his staunch advisor, Admiral Popham.

An abundant water supply, the premier requisite in withstanding a siege, was not overlooked by Christophe; the roof of the fortress was so designed that every drop of rain



The Ruins of Sans Souci

inside walls of the fortress.

In August, 1817, lightning struck the "Salle d'Artifice." This chamber was blown up and the explosion occasioned considerable damage. A part of the treasure was carried away. Pieces of gold and silver were scattered over the surrounding country. The Prince Noel, brother of the Queen, lost his life in this disaster. The remains of the Prince Noel were placed in a tomb inside one of the rooms. This tomb can be seen by visitors today but it has long been empty—the victim of treasure hunters. The King was absent from the Citadelle at the time of the explosion, but on learning the news he immediately returned with the troops to look after the rebuilding of the damaged parts. He ordered that repairs be made in shortest time possible. He enjoined all the peasants living in the vicinity of the fortress to search for the pieces of gold and silver and report with any found to him or be punished by death. A few days later a considerable sum was returned to the King—for there was no individual who dared to appropriate this money to his own use.

The earthquake of 1842, which laid the town of Cape Haitien in ruins, destroyed the floors in the prow, and cracked the north face of the wall through, vertically. This fissure today is about 100 feet long and at the widest part has opened to a width of at least one foot.

The west side of the prow is covered by a growth of bright red lichen that gives it the appearance of having been painted. From the top of the wall can be seen, on a clear day, the City of Cape Haitien, the Grande Riviere, and also, the towns: Don- don, Limonade, Terrier Rouge, Fort Liberte, the sugar-loaf mountain of Monte Cristi in the Dominican Republic and the sea.



The Church at Limonade

NOT A BAD SPORT

One morning while the quarters of the Council Chamber were being constructed, as Christophe was looking on one of the masons descended the scaffolding and stood before him trembling like a leaf.

"What do you want, my friend?" asked the King.

"Sir, Sir," replied the mason, "I take snuff and have had no tobacco nor snuff for a long time."

"Advance, advance," said the King, handling him his large gold snuff-box full of "*macouba*" of which he had just taken a copious pinch and excited the desire of the sniffing mason.

The latter drew nearer timidly, put his thumb and index finger into the royal snuff-box and took out an abundant pinch which he stuffed into his nostrils.

He bowed very lowly and saluted Christophe in order to withdraw; but the King, still holding the snuff out to him, said:

"Take, take again, my friend." Turning to his light cavalry aide, whose boots were always well stocked with whips, he said: "If he sneezes, beat him to death."

The mason obeyed in inhaling this perfumed tobacco, each time with the satisfaction of a skilled snuff-taker.

Seeing that he did not sneeze, Christophe said to Colonel Presseau, his commissary: "Give him a bottle of '*macouba*' and four gourdes in order that he may purchase for himself a snuff-box." To the mason he said: "Go back to your work."

SANS SOUCI


Shortly after the birth of the only West Hemisphere Kingdom, work was begun in August, 1811, on the Royal Palace of Sans Souci at the foot of the mountain Bonnet a L'Eveque at Milot. It was finished in September, 1812. This palace compared favorably with the finest in Europe in size and grandeur.

It was built by old and crippled men who could not stand the severe work required of the Citadelle. So enthusiastic and proud were the market women of the Commune of Milot over their queen's palace, the site of which she had chosen, that they carried on their heads from the waterfront of Cape Haitien, about 12 kilometers away, the imported marble squares which came over as ballast in the returning coffee ships from France. Smaller ships brought choice shrubbery from other West Indian ports. This shrubbery was skilfully converted into gardens which surrounded the palace grounds. Several cool mountain streams were converged and directed in a zigzag fashion under the palace so as to cool the rooms, finally flowing away through an ornate fountain arrangement which separated the winding stairs leading to the front doors. There were suites set aside for the Ministers of State, the Captain of the Palace Guards, members of the Royal Family and foreign visitors. The varying leveled white and blue marble basins surrounded by French mirrors were popular

retreats in the late afternoon and early morning. The palace itself was of typical French influence and proud of an elaborate Throne Room, in which the Royal Family assembled on both fiscal and social occasions. It was off this room that the Royal Treasury was located, and today visitors can still see signs of the old vaults which one held gold and jewels presented by Napoleon and other crowned European heads. For it is a matter of commercial history that Napoleon's great armies depended largely upon the Haitien coffee to sustain them to reach their battlefields on time; and even today, regardless from which part of Haiti coffee is raised, the sacks bear the trade name "St. Marc Coffee," which means a better price in French markets. The spacious palace grounds contained shops for the Royal Silversmith, the apartments of the Crown Prince.

There was a magnificent chapel-auditorium building, and nearby were the quarters for the Royal Household Guards, while obscured in the foothills Christophe had his Arsenal where he made and kept shot and shell; and here was hand-made by one of his imprisoned distinguished visitors three golden bullets, one of which afterwards was passed through the King's brain by his

own hand. And here also there still remains the well-preserved carriage shop in which he built and repaired carriages, artillery caissons, and gun mounts. His mint, which he could see from his office window, was well guarded by loyal soldiers, and it was in this building he printed the Royal currency and coined a few gold pieces which were used as Royal bestowals upon his



A top view of Citadelle Christophe

favorites, while under the main entrance was located the Death Chamber where political prisoners were given quasi trials always ending in death. Adjacent to this chamber was a dungeon in which the guilty were put to death by drowning or smothering—depending upon the victim's choice.

One day during the construction of this palace, while sitting under the "Caimittier" (Star Apple Tree), or Tree of Justice, where, like Saint Louis, the King used to dispense justice, he noticed an architectural defect in the arches of the chapel. He sent for Mr. Chery Warlock, his architect, called his attention to it, and ordered him to correct it immediately, and time has proven that Christophe was correct in this estimate, as they stand today free from cracks; not so bad for an uneducated slave.

RAMIER AND BELLEVUE

Running true to a monarch's likes, he indulged in pastimes that created choice bits of gossip among his subjects; envy among the men, and jealousy among the women. The mecca for most of these tales centered around the beautiful lodges of Ramier and Bellevue, which place was jealously guarded by the cynical eye of the "Bon vivant" Count of Limonade as it was in the attractive foothills on the outskirts of his Commune. Ram-

ier was the King's favorite playhouse. It was located on a mountain top about two miles further inland than the Citadelle and was a long rambling one-story hunting lodge rather English in style—perhaps originating as a result of some of the may friendly conversations had with Admiral Home Popham, whom England purposely kept in command of her West Indian Squadron long beyond his normal cruise. Ramier's cellars were spacious and twelve in number, each bearing the name of a calendar month. In this way the fastidious King was able to know the exact age of the rum he was serving, for from Ramier, which means wood dove, the sacred bird of northern Haiti, because the king forbade its killing except by royalty, came the elixir of his rum which was toted to Sans Souci, Bellevue, and his Government House in the heart of Cape Haitien, at which place he entertained foreign officials in strictly European fashion. At Ramier, so says the Sans Souci Almanac, subject to the call of the king and his friends dwelt some of the most beautiful specimens of Haitien womanhood whom the king with his friends visited frequently, but longest upon the completion of the harvesting of a bumper coffee crop. A well rounded stock of imported wines and champagnes was constant, of which an ample supply could always be found chilled in a nearby spring, especially basined for such purpose. A stable of sure-footed riding horses was maintained under the supervision of an officer of the Royal Mounted Troops who knew the trails leading to the well-protected feeding grounds of his favorite fowl, the pintade. Visitors today to this famous hunting lodge, which was built concurrently with Sans Souci much against the wishes of the Queen, as the work on her palace was being somewhat retarded, can see the tracings of the spacious rooms once warmed by huge fireplaces and bounded by sweeping verandas. The huge kitchen, with its baking oven and roasting pit, all added to the proof that the King left nothing unturned for every comfort of his lady friends and their visitors.

THE VENUS OF MILOT

Christophe extended his discipline to include his lady acquaintances, according to a tale told by Pere Bellamy, who admired the stern fashion in which the King ran his state affairs. The story is centered around a very beautiful and lightly-shaded girl known as the Venus of Milot because she came from that commune and because she was very close to the King, being a frequent visitor to Sans Souci, much to the protests of the Queen. It seems that upon the occasion of a state dinner, which was well wined, she whispered incautiously in the ear of an attractive young visiting officer certain words concerning the King, which found their way back to his ears, who, with his usual dispatch, edicted a day for her public execution, which ceremony took place



King Christophe

amid the flourish of military trumpets and the tolling of the royal chapel bells, in the presence of an assembly of the entire population of the Commune of Milot, the people with whom she had been raised, and members of the royal household, in the large courtyard entrance leading to the palace. The King in person gave the order for his soldiers to fire upon completion of the reading of the royal fiat by the Captain of the Palace Guards, and so the body of the Venus of Milot fell into the grave which had been prepared for her as she stood in full view of its completion. Shortly afterward, the King showed a softening of his marble heart and caused to be erected over her grave a white marble bust of her chiseled by a French sculptor;

but between and immediately below the breasts was shown another face, thus portraying the fact that she was a two-faced woman and one who was not to be trusted with state secrets. The effect of this execution spread like wildfire over his domain and resulted in the quieting of much spicy gossip against His Highness, and so today visitors to the ruins of Sans Souci pass by the bust of the Venus of Milot en route to the Palace and the Citadelle, while the Haitien women tell the story only in whispers.

AN ADMINISTRATOR

As an administrator he was far in advance of his time. He raised revenues by taxing the Count of Limonade, the Duke of Marmalade, the Count of Terre Rouge and the Count Richard of Cape Haitien, fixed sums which were estimated as the cost of administering the yearly affairs of his kingdom. His famous Sans Souci Almanac, several copies of which are in the possession of the Leconte Brothers in Cape Haitien, constituted and included annual reports of the state of fiscal affairs of his domain; however, only those who were members of the Court saw these reports, as they contained state secrets, royal household affairs, etc. The one striking point recorded is the fact that he ran his kingdom on the budget system, and the trade balance was always favorable to the King.

Because the gourde was the most useful of all native vegetables—it could be used as a container for water, food, etc.—he edicted their gathering and deposit with his communal officials annually, whence they were exchanged for marketed coffee, sugar and beef. The gourde soon became known as the medium of exchange, and later on he named his paper currency after this vegetable, which name continues today. The Sans Souci Almanac was printed on the Palace grounds by French printers.

A commander of the quartier of Petite Anse tendered a luncheon to the King when visiting his command. He spent very lavishly in order to please His Majesty. On the following day the King ordered him to the Cape and said to him:

"How much do you earn as pay?"



The tomb of the Haitien King

"Not much, Sir," replied the commander.

"Not much!" answered Christophe, "and you were able to offer me a banquet. You are dismissed; your small pay does not allow you to offer me such a big reception!"

One day, somebody came and complained to the King that the *cassavas* (large native biscuits made of the Manioca root) which were being sold in the markets were too small. Christophe had orders given and the following week immense cassavas, large like Mars moons and called "the king of cassavas" were to be found in the markets.

Upon one occasion while travelling between the Cape and Milot, in the royal carriage, the king met a cart whose driver urged on the oxen by exclaiming: Gee! Gee! Petion! Christophe had him arrested and asked him why he called the oxen Petion.

Said the driver: "Because that is the name of your enemy who is fighting against you, Sire."

"Impertinent," exclaimed Christophe (and to his guards): "Give him a whipping so he can learn how to respect my comrade who is not a comrade of his."

A UNIQUE DIPLOMAT

When Dauxion Lavayesse and Franco de Medina were sent to Haiti by Louis XVIII to negotiate the independence of the Island, after returning from Port au Prince, where Petion used all his tact and patriotism in the conversations which he had with them, they called on the Monarch of the North.

Christophe gave them a royal reception and invited them to assist at a review on the Place d'Armes in Cape Henry.

All the regiments of the Royal Guard and of the troops of the line marched before the ambassadors of Louis XVIII from morning to afternoon.

They could not be counted because, after passing the King and the French diplomats, they changed their uniforms, a large number of which were placed behind the Cathedral; such cunning was never suspected of an ex-slave.

On the following day, on dismissing Dauxion Lavayesse, Christophe caused to be delivered to him a demijohn filled with seasme and said to him:

"Carry this to your Majesty, the King of France, and tell him that he can come and attack me in my kingdom if he has twice as many soldiers as there are seeds in this bottle."

Only Dauxion Lavayesse returned to France. Franco de Medina, after long imprisonment, left his bones in Haiti and had the pleasure of hand working the three gold bullets, one of which was used by the King to kill himself. Franco de Medina was called and treated as a spy.

The outside wall of the northwest corner of the Citadelle measures 18 feet thick at the top. Looking straight down along the outer edge of this wall one is amazed at the great distance it is to the ravine below, a sheer drop of 600 feet. This ravine is called the Grand Boucan. It is on this wall that Christophe is said to have marched off the troops in demonstrating to a visiting English Admiral, Sir Home Popham, R. N., the perfect discipline of his army, but this is a bit false, as Christophe was not in the habit of frittering away his trained soldiers in such inglorious ways. What

did happen was he had ordered over a hundred slaves who had been sentenced to death, dressed up as soldiers, and soldiers in the rear ranks with bayonets fixed urged the uniformed slaves over the wall. Orders were promptly given which saved the regular soldiers from following. It is recorded that from this point the French engineers met their death. Christophe, in company with these officers, made a thorough inspection of all parts of the structure, and upon arriving at this point ordered both men seized and hurled to their death below, thus forever safeguarding the secrets of the palace.

A POOR LOSER

Mr. Roumage was one of the intimate friends of Christophe. He often went, at night, to the Palace to play games with him.

One night, Roumage was stubbornly lucky while his royal partner was desperately unlucky.

Roumage incessantly won and Christophe, highly irritated, caused to be brought in, one after another, small bags of gold which were going to increase the fortune of his friend.

They were overcome by fatigue and the game ceased long after the hour of midnight. Roumage retired, accompanied by a body-guard who carried the booty which luck won for him from the royal treasury. On the morning of the following day Roumage went to the Palace, as usual, to have coffee with the King. As soon as the latter saw him, and before the customary greetings, he said to him: "I had a bad dream last night, my friend. I dreamt I had your head cut off."

"May the Lord deliver me, Sire, from that lot!" cried out Roumage.

"When I have had a dream," continued Christophe, "I must make it real."

And, without further ceremony, he ordered his friend arrested and carried away to be executed. His house was then plundered.

Upon one occasion a prominent officer was in command of the Artillery Magazine of the Army, at Charbet. Christophe had ordered a certain Colonel Ambroise, who commanded a battery against a position of the enemy, to continue bombarding and to take ammunition from the magazine for this purpose.

This colonel executed only a part of the order, taking the ammunition and delivering a receipt, but did not carry out the other part of the order concerning the bombardment.

Christophe asked him to explain why he did not fully carry out his orders. He told the King he had not received the ammunition. The King, highly incensed, went to the magazine and found Captain Desroches, who was playing at checkers with his friend Etienne Leo, Commandant of that Arrondissement. As soon as he knew of the arrival of the King, Captain Desroches made it his duty to receive him by donning his uniform.

As soon as he came in, Christophe questioned him as follows:

"I ordered Colonel Ambroise to bombard a position of the enemy and to receive the ammunition from you and you have not given him any. What do you mean by that?"

Captain Desroches wanted to prove to the King that he had delivered the ammunition to Ambroise, and

made a motion to reach down into his pocket for the key to his desk in order to produce the receipt of the colonel. Christophe, supposing that he was reaching down for an arm, reproached him and ordered that he be arrested and bayoneted.

He was escorted to a spot under a Bayahonda tree and was pierced with bayonets.

"Make an inventory of the property in the Artillery Magazine," ordered the King. They searched through the pockets of the dead captain, found the key to his desk and opened it. The first papers found were a letter in which Captain Desroches's wife informed him of the birth of his third son, Etienne, and the receipt of Colonel Ambroise for the ammunition delivered.

"Go and call Colonel Ambroise for me," exclaimed the King.

An emissary left running as fast as he could and returned a moment later to inform the King that he had just seen the colonel being carried on a stretcher, both his legs shattered by a cannon ball.

On returning to Milot, Christophe, repenting for having deprived the family of its head, took it under his protection. He sent the eldest of the children to the school of Mr. Hyppolite and later to the workshop of Mr. Ravenchal to become a painter.

He delighted in theatrical presentations. He wanted to have "Robert the Devil" presented; but there was no place suitable for that purpose.

He sent for Mr. Warlok and said to him: "'Robert the Devil' is being rehearsed and may be played within the next forty days. I must have a theater for the purpose."

In forty days Mr. Warlok built the theater which

today is used by the Haitien Masons as their lodge rooms. It stands on Saint-Victor Square, which is adjacent to the Marine Camp at Cape Haitien.

Christophe was assisting at one of these plays when a big shower of rain started. The play ended, he got into his royal carriage escorted by the members of the court and by a squad of cavalry. At the "Etrier" Ravine, the waters, which were rising like an avalanche from the neighboring mountains, caused the torrent to swell up and cut off communications. Christophe, whom nothing could stop, ordered his cavalymen to throw themselves into the torrent and to diminish the force of the current. Men and horses sprang into it and the King crossed it with the members of his court and went home and slept quietly in his government house on the Place d'Armes, without worrying over what might have happened to his squad of cavalymen.

THE ROYAL FAMILY

He had ordered from England a tableau representing the royal family. All the tableaux—pictures of him, Queen Marie-Louise, Princes Eugene and Victor, their sons; of Princess Athenaise and of the First Lady, their daughters—were natural size.

On examining his portrait, he found that one of his eyes was not well drawn. He called Ravenchal, his painter, and said to him: "Daub all over the head of this portrait and paint me another one."

Ravenchal executed the order of the King to his great satisfaction.

Shortly before the death of Christophe he sent \$6,000,000 in gold to be deposited in the Bank of England in the name of Marie-Louise Christophe.



PALACE OF SANS SOUCI

The royal home of Henri Christophe who as King Henri I ruled North Haiti from 1811 to 1820.

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

King Henri suffered a paralytic stroke while attending divine service at Limonade the 15th of August, 1820. Christophe ordered the members of his court to repair to Limonade to celebrate that fete. His attention was called to the fact that there was the "fete" of Cape-Haitien, on the same day. He insisted upon having his own way. They were constrained to yield to his caprice.

Seated upon his throne, at church, he was impatiently waiting for the priest to begin mass and, in a fit of passion, he struck his head against the wall, back of the throne.

Some say that he saw on the altar the spectre of Corneille Brelle, his bishop, whom he had ordered killed but a short time before because he was suspected of corresponding with the King's enemies in Port au Prince, notwithstanding the fact that this was the same priest who ordained him King in June, 1812.

The fact is that, collapsing under a fit of apoplexy, he was taken to his famous palace at Bellevue, and Sans Souci a few days later, in the strictest secrecy. He became paralyzed from his waist down, and in spite of the efforts of his skilled English physician, Dr. Stewart, and the care given him by his family, he continued to remain in that condition notwithstanding the red pepper and rum baths which were given him in desperation to regain control of his legs. So on October 20, 1820, with the setting of the sun, he blew out his brains, realizing that it was physically impossible for him to squelch the brewing revolution at Cape Haitien which had made dangerous progress under the defiant leadership of his old enemy, Duke Richard.

A small avis painted on the left wall, behind the chancel rail, which reads: "Ici Le Roi Christophe tombe, 15 August, 1820," can be seen in the church at Limonade today. News of the King's illness soon spread rapidly. The north soon seethed with revolt. Saint Marc and Cape Haitien revolted. An attempt to rally the household guards to his cause failed. They had joined the insurgents. His only escape was suicide. After calling in his family and making provision for their welfare, he kissed them goodbye and retired to his suite in Sans Souci, where he bathed in bay rum and put on a snow white satin gown. A shot reverberated through the palace of Sans Souci. The King had shot himself with a hand-made golden bullet. His body was carried up the long winding trail to the Citadelle by his wife, two daughters, son and a few loyal generals, where it was hurriedly dropped in a large pile of lime in the center of the Place d'Armes because a long standing and generous reward had been placed on his head by his arch enemy—President Boyer of the remainder of Haiti, whose domain included all lands south of the Philboro Mountains, which today is the political boundary of that country. Boyer would have smiled and strutted with supreme delight could he review the head of the mighty Christophe being paraded

through the streets of Port au Prince on the end of a stick followed by a mob of clarine-soaked peasants, but such a disgrace was not permitted to become Boyer's delight, as the properties of quick lime exercised their destruction of the greatest black man whose feet ever pressed the soil of the Western Hemisphere.

His wife, the beloved Queen Marie, his two legitimate daughters, Athenise and Amethiese, and his son escaped via back trails from the Citadelle to the British Consulate in Cape Haitien, and were, the same fortnight, sent to England never to return, and the Queen, in her wondering distress, although comfortably fixed financially, finally settled in Pisa, Italy, where her sister lived. The Queen died at the age of seventy-two, Amethise at thirty-four and Athenise at thirty-one—all heartbroken for the want of the sound of a tom-tom and the sight of Milot.

The revolutionists, under Governor Richard of the Cape, decided to remove forever all traces of blood claim to the throne of Christophe, so the day following the death of the King, Crown Prince Victor Henry, who was a fat, arrogant dolt, was dragged through the streets from the British Consulate in Cape Haitien, publicly executed, and his remains left for the hogs to devour in a ravine that is immediately back of where the Civil Prison now stands. Thus ended ignominiously the royal line of King Christophe, whose brain and hand have left more monuments and tradition in Haiti's history than any dozen other rulers.

It was not until 1847 that a tomb was erected, by order of President Riche, to receive the remains of the unfortunate monarch. This tomb standing in the center of the Place d'Armes is a crude shedlike masonry structure seven feet long, five feet wide, and six feet high with a peaked red tile roof. As it stands, most of the red tile has disappeared; the door is gone and all that remains within is a pile of broken stones.

However, the Haitien government has restored this simple marker and today it bears a bronze plaque with appropriate readings. It is not necessary to erect a monument to commemorate the name of Henri Christophe, for he has given to posterity the Citadelle, a masterpiece, which will serve to perpetuate his name for generations to come.

HIS MONUMENTS

Annually, especially during the mid-winter months, can be seen in the drowsy little harbor of Cape Haitien many private yachts and tourists' ships having on board people who have travelled hundreds of miles to visit both Sans Souci and the Citadelle. Our Marines are stout admirers of the Black King and his accomplishments, and have sung his praises the world around. Even our famous Charles Lindbergh on his South American flight passed over and circled the Citadelle; and so struck was he by its gigantic and imposing dimensions that he called it the Eighth Wonder of the World.

A New Naval Policy

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN H. RUSSELL, U.S.M.C.

■ "Hello Marine!" General X, of the *Leathernecks*, sitting in a comfortable chair in an obscure corner of the Army and Navy Club, looked up from his book to see his old friend and shipmate Admiral Y.

Admiral Y had graduated from the Naval Academy a few years before General X, but in their early life they had been thrown closely together on a three-year cruise on the old *Swastika* and had become fast friends. The Admiral was on the retired list after a brilliant career. He was in a talkative mood.

After a hearty handshake and the usual inquiries as to health, family, and whatnots, Admiral Y sat down in an easy chair next the General.

"Well," he remarked, "I see that Congress maintained the strength of your Corps for the next fiscal year."

"Yes," replied the General, "after an educative process that brought out more clearly than ever the relation and value of the Marines to the naval service and the strength required for their war and peace missions with the Navy." Pushing the button for a boy, Admiral Y said:

"Since I heard of that proposed cut from 15,343 to 13,600, and which I am glad to say was never made, I have been thinking over the question of the Marines and the entire subject of the necessity for them."

"Strength, necessity, and missions, all seem wrapped up together," interjected General X.

"Quite right you are, but nevertheless, I sincerely believe that the Line of the Navy, as well as the Marines, have been exceedingly remiss in not emphasizing the necessity for a stronger Marine Corps."

"Good for you," responded General X. "We Marines are an important branch of the naval service and you and I are not the only famous ones who have thought so. Did you ever read what Lord St. Vincent said about our British cousins the Royal Marines?"

"Not that I recall right now, what did he say?"

"Well, in 1797, and you will remember that was the year of the notorious mutinies in the British Navy, he remarked that he hoped to see the day when, with the exception of the King's Guard and artillery, there was not another foot-soldier in the Kingdom, in Ireland and in the Colonies, except Marines."

"There is a whole lot in that remark and it corroborates the very idea I have been mulling over in my mind about you Marines," replied the Admiral. "Those British Marines are stout fellows. I remember reading that our gallant Admiral Charles Stewart—"

"He commanded the frigate *Constitution* in her victories over the *Levant* and *Cyane*, if my memory is true," broke in General X.

"Yes, the the very same old salty seaman," answered the Admiral. "Admiral Stewart wrote that as Napoleon viewed the Marines of H. M. S. *Bellerophon* he exclaimed—'What might not be done with a hundred thousand such men.'"

"Mickey Cochrane, of our Corps, quoted him on that

in his article in the Naval Encyclopedia," added General X. "But with reference to your idea about the strength and status of the Corps, perhaps you did not read all that was published about us recently. The necessity of the Marines with the Fleet seems clearly established."

Admiral Y pulled out his old briar pipe, filled it deliberately with an evil type of tobacco he had used since the days of the Academy, lighted it, took a long pull and said:

"Marine, most of us when we think of a Navy visualize only ships. There are, however, many other elements such as personnel, supplies, communications, and BASES, and when I say BASES I mean BASES with capital letters, and—"

"Hey, wait a minute, we have been preparing the Corps for advanced base duties for over thirty years, and have made considerable progress," intervened General X. "The Commandant of the Marine Corps has often set forth that our main job has been to maintain expeditionary forces to seize advanced Bases and perform other land operations for the Fleet."

"Yes, I know that," explained the Admiral, "but you have not sold the idea one hundred per cent to the Navy or to your own Corps. It is one thing to write canned articles, make an occasional address, refer mechanically to them in a dry report, and all that sort of thing, but where can you point out any serious naval thesis that places the Marine Expeditionary force on transports with the fleet as an equal of a, say, a division of battleships, or a squadron of destroyers? Gad, Marine, you want to burn 'em up with the idea. Sweep them off their feet. Just like the crossword puzzle craze, or technocracy or jig-saw puzzles, or President Roosevelt's optimism, did. Make 'em consider your Expeditionary Forces just as they do a division of ships—an essential and intimate part of the fleet."

That stopped General X in his tracks. He thoughtfully replied—"Maybe you are right, at that. We write stuff and maybe nobody even reads it."

"I know I am right," continued Admiral Y. "To say that one Navy is stronger than another because it has a superiority in all classes of vessels is not necessarily true. Right today, even though the United States and Great Britain were on an exact equality with reference to ships, personnel and all that sort of thing, the British would lead by a decisive margin in naval strength because of the existence of naval advanced bases, or sites for them, all over the world, such as those at Gibraltar, Singapore, Bermuda, Halifax, Trinidad, etc. Take those bases away from the British Navy and the power of its fleet would be greatly reduced. Give those same bases to the United States and the strength of our fleet would be proportionately increased."

"There is not the slightest doubt about what you have said," commented General X. "The Major General Commandant in a recent Army and Navy Journal

wrote that Marines could be defined in terms of American trade for they are instrumental in securing the advanced bases which enable the Fleet to protect such trade. He also asserted that Marines are the equivalent of warships because advanced bases enable more ships to be maintained on the scene of operations than would be possible without the bases. Here, let me read what some of the leading naval lights told a House Committee last December. The then Secretary of the Navy testified that the Navy must have outlying bases if it is to protect American commerce and otherwise operate at a distance from the home coast, and that without such bases the number of ships which can operate in a distant locality is immensely reduced. The Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics of the Navy, wrote that the Marine Corps provides an expeditionary and advanced base defense force which is essential to the operations of the Fleet in time of war. He further wrote that the Marine Corps Aviation is a part of the Naval Aeronautic organization of the Navy and in addition to its functions with the Marine Corps in expeditionary work, it is trained aboard our aircraft carriers, operating daily with the naval aircraft units. A recent C in C of our fleet stated that the Marine Corps is the sole land force held in constant readiness for service with the Navy to increase its mobility, its power to act quickly in national emergency by assisting it in the establishment and defense of suitable bases of operation in an operating area. Another high ranking naval officer said that in overseas landing operations the Marines are relied upon and have been utilized to seize and to hold the bridgehead. They constitute the point of the spear first thrown to the front by the Navy when amphibious work is undertaken. A former Secretary of the Navy stated that in a very real and practical sense, bases are an equivalent of ships, and the Navy needs Marines for bases. And when they got done the House and—

"What do you want?" inquired Admiral Y of a boy who appeared.

"You rang, sir?"

"Too late, I found a match," replied the Admiral, and then General X resumed:

"The Senate refused to cut down the enlisted strength of the Corps."

"Yes, I followed the whole thing," submitted Admiral Y. "The Navy did a good job for you there. But I will admit that you Marines must have done something to the naval-mind to get such testimony from it."

"We have a few officers in the Corps who understand the subject practically and historically," drawled General X. "Our Historical Section has developed much material which has cleared the channels of thought."

"Whoever is responsible, did a good job, anyway," said Admiral Y. "At any rate, not only has this attack on your strength developed a naval defense for you, but it has made many of your officers to think, to study, and to learn more about themselves than ever before. And you have developed a true character of publicity. Truthful information sent out that tells Americans why the Navy needs Marines."

"I am glad you referred to publicity," spoke up the General earnestly, "because it always has been a misconception on the part of everybody. Some people

think we have a high-powered publicity system, while as a matter of fact we have received very little publicity except that which comes from our active status—something happening every day you know."

"Well, to hark to the statements of your Commandant and the other officers. Every one of them were absolutely correct," emphatically agreed the Admiral. "There is connected closely with the strength of a nation's Navy and Marine Corps, its foreign commerce. To preserve its foreign trade a nation must not only possess an adequate fleet but adequate bases. That combination of naval factors will make our fleet capable of crippling the sea power of its enemies. One way of accomplishing such a result is to take away from it the bases from which its naval forces may operate."

"For want of some Marines an advanced base was lost," quoted General X; "for want of an advanced base a campaign was lost; for want of that victory a war was lost; and for want of winning a war all was lost." Admiral Y laughed at the General's paraphrastic humor, and said:

"Of course there is nothing new about my ideas but it does seem to me that neither the Navy nor the Marines have done much more than talk about them. They should put them into effect in the fleet. Great Britain has, during a course of many years, added to the Empire many minor possessions not because it desired them as colonies but to refuse them to a possible enemy."

"That reminds me of the possible reasons why we acquired the Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1916," suggested General X. "Many people think that the \$25,000,000 paid for them was wasted; but the ordinary man does not understand that a perfect national defense for the United States would include the possessions of everyone of the Greater and Lesser Antilles, including Bermuda, even though we did not put up defenses or do more than merely deprive a potential enemy of their possession during a period of peace."

"I think you are again right," asserted Admiral Y. "Of course fleet bases must be adequately defended and provide the necessary port facilities and supplies. The United States has but one such naval base, at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands, unless the Panama Canal Zone is included."

"But our Marines at Pearl Harbor are doing merely guard duty," broke in the General. "They are not in any sense advanced base troops; but there should be a force there, or at least the nucleus of one."

"Panama can hardly be construed as an advanced base because for all intents and purposes the Panama Canal Zone represents our domestic national defense frontiers," decided Admiral Y. "In recent years our country has expanded, become a world power. Our foreign trade is now a factor of tremendous importance in our nation's economic life, and it must be protected. To properly protect it we must have fleet bases in all prospective operating areas. Look at that naval base your Marines acquired at Guantanamo Bay in the Spanish War. Dewey said that the capture and occupation of Guantanamo during the Spanish-American War, gave the fleet a base, without which the difficulties of blockading and capturing Santiago would have been immeasurably increased."

"Admitting all that, the question arises as to who

should man such advanced bases, if we possess them, in time of peace, and who should acquire and defend them if such is necessary in time of war? The bases are solely for the fleet. In fact as I have pointed out to you they are one of the component parts of a well balanced fleet; they are as necessary as ships, or seamen, or supplies. The command and defense of those bases should be under our Navy—our Marines. To place them under the command of our Army is to take away from our Navy one of its vital factors that go to make up the whole. Moreover the proposition that the Marines are not the permanent garrisons of advanced bases but must give way to the Army is poppycock. A base is always naval. If Army personnel stops there enroute to their battle-fields they should have nothing to do with operating or defending the base. I know you will say that the question can be solved by placing the supreme command in that arm of the service having the paramount interest at the time but that is not true and you know it is not true. In a question of bases the Navy always has paramount interests. Seldom, in the history of the world, have the Army and Navy worked together efficiently and without friction. Just recall Shafter's landing near Santiago de Cuba and Miles' Expedition to Porto Rico. Read any British book on Gallipoli. You will see what happened. Take even our combined manoeuvres in peace time and you will learn the fallacy of paramount interest, divided responsibility, and authority. Unity of Command is a fundamental principle and cannot be obtained without perfect and premeditated arrangement."

"There is no question but what you are right, Admiral, about the necessity of unity of command," said General X. "During the Middle Ages, during Tudor Days, and up to about 1664 in England there was never any doubt about unity of command for the Commander-in-Chief was a combination Admiral-General. But when the cleavage came between the land and sea command, each with its independent commander, then came trouble. I cannot but recall the horrible conditions of affairs in 1741 when Admiral Vernon and General Wentworth failed to agree during the attack on Cartagena and in Cuba. While there may have been a few instances, such as the Siege of Havana in 1761 where the Army and Navy cooperated smoothly, there is no doubt but that the chances are against such ever happening. Look at Penobscot Bay in 1779. The Army under General Lovell and the Navy under Captain Saltonstall were hopelessly chaosed. I remember one Army officer, no doubt recollecting the precedence-dispute between an Admiral and a General in Honolulu, who said that during a war in the Pacific the Army would first have to capture Honolulu from the Navy before engaging the enemy. Yet, look at the perfect cooperation Commodore Daniel Todd Patterson gave General Jackson at New Orleans in 1814 and 1815."

"Yes, illustrations might be given by the score," agreed Admiral Y. "Take the Asiatic Station at the present time as an example of divided authority. The Admiral commands the fleet from Vladivostok down to Hong Kong and Canton, the Marine guard at Peiping, and the reinforced Marine regiment at Shanghai, but he has no authority over the Army forces at Tientsin. Their supreme command is at far distant Manila."

"There was one marvelous illustration of cooperation and coordination among the Army, Navy and Marines," suggested General X. "It was in the supervision of the Nicaraguan elections in 1928. The possibility for discord and failure was present. There was no one American official responsible for coordinating all their efforts. There was no unity of military command of the naval forces and Guardia Nacional. A rear admiral of the Navy was responsible for naval affairs afloat and ashore. A brigadier general of Marines commanded the Marine brigade. The Guardia Nacional, formed of enlisted Nicaraguans, commanded by Marines, was not under the senior naval officer nor under the Brigade Commander, but was controlled by an Army officer. All in all these Americans gave a wonderful example of American teamwork."

"I hope you are not arguing for the amalgamation of Army and Navy," remarked Admiral Y, "that would ruin both of them and with them our national defense."

"Far from it," replied General X. "The Army has the clear cut responsibility for defending the home land against invasion or depredation, the Navy to assist the Army in a subordinate and incidental capacity. For all maritime and overseas interests this responsibility is reversed in favor of the Navy, including the Marine Corps."

"Let's stick to naval bases, this time," said Admiral Y. "Some day the Navy will wake up and demand that all its bases be placed under its command. That means Marines would man them. The Army would then confine its activities to the continental limits of the United States, which after all is its true mission in our National Defense scheme."

"Admiral, it seems to me that you are giving good reasons for increasing the Marine Corps to at least 30,000 men. We would need at least that number but I am sure that the job in the Far East would be much more economically and efficiently performed by an All-Navy-Marine Team than by the use of American Army and Navy personnel, under a divided command as at present."

"You ought to have 30,000 Marines in your Corps, General. Some of those dollar a day workers in the proposed national reforestation plan, could well be used. Naturally we would need more Marines and it certainly would form an excellent study for the General Board to decide just how many would be required for the Navy and the Marines to relieve the Army of all duty in the Philippines, China, and Hawaiian Islands, with an additional study as to the number required if the Navy took over the Panama Canal Zone."

"What a rumpus that would cause among our brothers-at-arms of the Army," laughed General X.

"Naturally, every organization is trying to sell itself, that is secure new jobs as well as to retain the jobs that they are performing at present," agreed Admiral Y. "But we have heard a great deal about overlapping, paralleling, duplicating and all that sort of thing, so that it is an excellent thing to bring up the subject of whose jobs all the jobs are, and who can do them most efficiently and economically."

"All that I can say," said General X, "is that I hope the Navy brings up the subject we have been discussing and puts it over."

"To return to the subject of bases," resumed the Admiral, "of course our fleet must have an adequate number of strategically placed and properly defended bases. We must defend the Panama Canal. Our trade routes and commercial ships must be guarded in peace and war. The naval policy calls for the Marines to maintain expeditionary forces to serve as *part of the fleet* to help the Navy carry out her missions. We have our war college, our strategic games, and our game boards, and we indulge in drafting all sorts of plans, but they are solely paper plans and consequently work well."

"The policy of Headquarters," said the General, "that is of the Corps, fits in with this naval policy and—"


"Are you sure all your people outside understand that," queried the Admiral, "and further that they are well versed in the methods to carry out plans and methods under that policy? Are they really educated practically as well as theoretically?"

"I hope so, but very little can be done practically without men," responded General X. "Down in the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico the Marines have

been planning and studying this very subject, but as you say it is just on paper. Our Headquarters Division of Operations and Training have been doing fine work. What we really need, though, is more maneuvers with the fleet such as we used to have at Culebra, and like those in Hawaiian waters about 1925. We also need money with which to procure material, such as special boats and other equipment, and for the carrying out of experiments, to develop the material things involved in the mission."

"Some day we will realize that a Navy is not merely ships," said Admiral Y. "Then, you Marines, will come into your own. It may take a war to do it or it might come from such an organization as that Policy Board you used to dream about, when we were shipmates on the old *Tiddle-dy-Winks*. I believe that when the Marine Corps itself is completely saturated with the subject, as it should be, and eats, sleeps, dreams, thinks, talks, acts and exudes advanced bases, there will be marked advancement. My advice is to make advanced bases and shore operations for the fleet your Bible." With that the Admiral got up and walked off leaving General X in a contemplative mood.

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR MARINES, HOME FROM CUBA, 1898



OFFICERS OF THE GUANTANAMO BATTALION

After the return from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, at the close of the Spanish-American War, 1898. Photograph taken at the country home of Lieutenant R. M. Appleton near Ipswich, Mass. From left to right: First Lieut. W. N. McKelvy, Second Lieut. E. A. Jones, Second Lieut. P. M. Bannon, Captain G. F. Elliott, First Lieut. C. G. Long, Second Lieut. S. D. Butler, Captain M. C. Goodrell, Second Lieut. R. M. Appleton, Colonel R. W. Huntington, Commanding, First Lieut. W. C. Neville, Captain B. R. Russell, Captain C. L. McCawley, A. Q. M., First Lieut. H. L. Draper, Adjutant, Captain F. H. Harrington, Second Lieut. L. J. Magill, Surgeon J. M. Edgar, U. S. N., First Lieut. J. E. Mahoney.

The Education of a Marine Officer

BY BRIGADIER GENERAL DION WILLIAMS, U.S.M.C.

II. THE MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS

■ The temporary increase in strength of the Marine Corps for service in the World War from 640 officers and 14,981 enlisted men in 1916 to a maximum of 2,882 officers and 75,101 enlisted men in 1918 made necessary a new system of training of newly appointed officers. For this purpose Officers' Training Camps were established to give the candidates from the non-commissioned ranks and from civil life a course of from ten to twelve weeks instruction in theoretical and practical exercises to fit them in so far as was possible in such a short period for their wartime duties as troops leaders. The major part of these courses consisted of practical drills, exercises and instructions and such preliminary instruction was supplemented by further instruction in wartime duties at instruction camps and schools in France. These schools and training camps were temporary war measures and the end of the war and the return of the Marine forces to their regular duties resulted in a reduction from the war-time strength to a permanent strength of 1,096 commissioned officers, 100 warrant officers and 27,400 enlisted men, by Act of Congress under date of July 6, 1918.

Several months were occupied in demobilization from the war-time strength and reorganization at the permanent peace time strength and it was not until January, 1920, that a regular officers' school was re-established. By this time it had been decided to establish the permanent base of the Marine Corps East Coast Expeditionary Force for duty with the Fleet and for other naval requirements at the new post at Quantico, Va., where it was planned to build a fully equipped Marine Corps station with all of the necessary facilities for maintaining such


a Force. Having in view the urgent necessity for giving a course of schooling to the officers who had recently joined the Corps from selections from the war tested groups of officers which would tend to fit them for their future duties, the Major General Commandant on January 12, 1920, established at Quantico the Marine Officers' Infantry School. The first class consisted of seventeen officers, eleven of whom completed the course and eight of whom were given certificates of graduation.

Taking a leaf from the experience of the Naval War College and the Army schools at Leavenworth, the conference system, supplemented by lectures, practical problems and exercises, was adopted as the means by which instruction was given in the several departments of this school. A system of marking to determine efficiency and class standing was adopted and from these marks the proficiency of the students was judged and certificates given.


In the summer of 1920 the Infantry School and the Training School at Quantico were combined and the Marine Corps Schools were established as a permanent institution for the education of company and field officers of the Corps in the theory and application of

military science as directly applicable to the duties required of the Marine Corps in peace and war. These schools embraced two general courses, a Field Officers' Course and a Company Officers' Course. The first session of the schools was from October 1, 1920, to June 30, 1921.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools was charged with the details of administration and policies, methods of instruction and the coordination of each course under an officer designated as the Director, while under each Di-



Brigadier General Dion Williams awards diploma to 2nd Lt. Ellsworth N. Murray, following closing exercises at Marine Corps Basic School, Philadelphia, June 6. Left to right: Colonel Frank E. Evans, Commanding Marine Barracks; Lt. Murray, who achieved highest standing among the 28 graduates; General Williams, presenting the diploma, and Captain S. E. Loomis, USN, Acting Commandant of the Navy Yard.



FIELD OFFICERS' CLASS, 1931. MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS, QUANTICO, VA.

Seated: Captain T. P. Cheatham, Captain J. M. Bain, Major T. E. Trasher, Major R. H. Davis, Major G. S. Clarke, U. S. A., Captain J. T. Moore, Captain T. E. Bourke, Captain R. Winans. Standing: Lieut. W. C. Ansel, U. S. N., Captain J. L. Perkins, Captain D. E. Campbell, Captain A. B. Hale, Captain J. H. Platt, Captain L. R. Jones, Captain J. P. McCann, Captain R. E. West.

rector there were assigned assistants as Heads of Departments. The Departments at first established were: Department of Tactics, Department of Topography, Department of Law, Department of Administration and Department of Engineering. The courses of study and instruction were prepared to follow similar lines to those in use at the Army School of the Line at Leavenworth adapted to meet the peculiar requirements of the Marine Corps service.

In 1921 it was decided to add to the Marine Corps Schools a Basic Course for the preliminary instruction of all second lieutenants newly commissioned in the Corps from the Naval Academy, from civil life, and from the ranks of the most deserving noncommissioned officers. Thus at the beginning of the school year 1922-23 the Marine Corps Schools consisted of three established courses, the Basic Course, the Company Officers' Course and the Field Officers' Course, to which was added a correspondence course with field problems for solution.

This system of military schooling for Marine officers was designed to insure that each officer of the Corps would receive the necessary schooling to fit him for the duties of his grade and also for the duties of the next higher grade prior to promotion thereto up to and including the grade of major. The system was also designed from a consideration of the fact that the necessary schooling for grades above that of major would be provided by detailing officers when appropriate as students at the Naval War College, the Army General Service Schools, and the Army War College. A recognized part of the educational system thus adopted consisted of the detail of selected officers to take the courses provided at various specialists schools and post graduate courses in the Army and the Navy. The general educational plan of 1921 envisioned a system that would put every

lieutenant through the schooling that would fit him in this respect for his duties as a captain, and likewise every captain in turn through the schooling to fit him for the duties as a major; with higher schooling later to fit the officers for higher command and staff duties.

In the early years of the Marine Corps Schools one difficulty encountered which had some adverse effect upon the results of the schooling was the lack of suitable buildings and quarters at Quantico to properly house the schools and their equipment. In 1924 several of the wooden buildings originally of wartime construction for barracks were adapted for the use of the schools and used to contain the Company Officers' Course and the Field Officers' Course and the Basic Course was moved to the Marine Barracks, Philadelphia, Pa., where one of the modern barracks building was refitted to house the activities of the school and also to provide bachelor quarters of the students assigned to the course. This move was necessary from the fact that there were not sufficient permanent and temporary officers' quarters at the post in Quantico to house all of the officers regularly detailed to the organizations of the Marine Expeditionary Force, the Post and the Schools, and there was also a dearth of suitable quarters for rental in nearby territory.

At the time of the removal of the Basic Course to Philadelphia it was stated that the assignment of the school and its classes of second lieutenants to that post was temporary in its nature and that when the development of the new Quantico had progressed until suitable buildings would be available to house all of the Marine Corps Schools the Basic Course would be returned to Philadelphia. However, the buildings at Philadelphia have proved quite suitable for the school and for quarters for the student officers and the conduct of the school there has met with so much encouragement and assistance from the Commandants of the Navy Yard within the limits of which the school is located and it is

not probable that a change will be made in the near future.

In the annual report of the Major General Commandant for 1925 the following pertinent paragraph appears:

"The Marine Corps Schools at the marine barracks, Quantico, Va., have been conducted along lines similar to previous years. A change was made, however, in that the Basic School was transferred to the marine barracks, navy yard, Philadelphia, Pa. The class which attended the Field Officers' School consisted of field officers and senior captains, who were due for promotion within a very short time. The class attending the Company Officers' School was composed of captains and senior first lieutenants who were due to promotion to captain within a very short time. The newly appointed second lieutenants in the Marine Corps attended the Basic School at Philadelphia. The purpose of these schools in the Marine Corps is to give the officers of various grades thorough education in professional subjects suitable to their rank. The methods followed have been those which have been approved by both the Army and the Navy and with modifications have been adapted to meet the requirements of the Marine Corps. Upon completion of the courses in these schools, officers with satisfactory marks in all subjects are awarded certificates of graduation. Those who fail in any subjects are given certificates covering the subjects in which passing grades were made."


In the annual report of the Major General Commandant for 1926 it is noted that, "An overseas Expeditionary course has been added to the curriculum of the Field Officers' School." This is interesting as show-

ing the increasing tendency in the Marine Corps to get away from the strictly Army courses of study at the schools and to embark upon a study of the subjects applicable to the primary mission of the Corps as an integral part of the Naval Establishment, namely, "to support the Fleet or any portion thereof in the execution of its mission" by the organization and employment of Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces for overseas Advanced Base duties with the active Fleet.

Since that date there has been a steadily growing interest in these strictly naval subjects in the Marine Corps education and training and the present Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools and the Staff assisting him are striving to build up at the Quantico schools a curriculum which will tend to educate the officers of the Corps in these important naval subjects and indoctrinate them with necessary basic thought thereon.


In 1926 the correspondence courses of the Marine Corps Schools were extended and their advantages brought to the attention of the officers of the regular and reserve establishment of the Corps. In the annual report of the Major General Commandant for 1927 the following paragraph appears in reference thereto.

"The Marine Corps Correspondence School conducts instruction in military subjects for regular and reserve officers; 334 officers were enrolled during the school year 1926-27, distributed in twenty separate courses. The courses offered have been prepared for the most part by the Army, but have been modified where necessary to meet the special needs of the Marine Corps. The Correspondence School has made great progress during the past year and has proved a valuable part of the educational system of the Marine Corps."



COMPANY OFFICERS' CLASS, 1931. MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS, QUANTICO, VA.

Seated: First Lieut. F. L. Buchanan, Captain G. T. Hall, Captain J. P. Adams, Captain W. K. McNulty, Captain M. Corbett, Captain C. E. Rice, Captain R. Dubel, First Lieut. G. W. Walker. Center Row: First Lieut. C. D. Hamilton, First Lieut. E. U. Hakala, First Lieut. L. A. Haslup, First Lieut. H. H. Hanneken, First Lieut. B. L. Vog, First Lieut. P. R. Cowley, First Lieut. E. P. Snow, First Lieut. C. W. Meigs. Top Row: First Lieut. F. W. Bennet, First Lieut. G. H. Towner, First Lieut. W. A. Wachler, First Lieut. T. H. Cartwright, First Lieut. C. C. Jerome, First Lieut. I. W. Miller, First Lieut. H. C. Bluhm, First Lieut. W. Ulrich.



BRIGADIER GENERAL BRECKINRIDGE WITH STAFF AND STUDENTS, MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS, QUANTICO, 1933

Left to right, seated: Major T. E. Trasher, Major John Marston, Colonel E. B. Miller, Brigadier General James C. Breckinridge, Commandant, Lieut. Colonel H. H. Utley, Major H. L. Parsons, Major J. C. Smith. Standing in first row: Majors S. N. Raynor, C. D. Barrett, L. B. Stephenson, D. Peck, Lieut. Commander J. H. Falge, U. S. N., Majors G. C. Hamner, R. Blake, P. A. Del Valle, and S. A. Woods. Standing in second row: Captains O. P. Smith, R. M. Montague, N. M. Marshall, A. E. Cressy, R. E. West, R. E. Knapp, V. H. Bleasdale, C. C. Gill, B. A. Bone, and H. D. Campbell. Standing in third row: Captains F. E. Stack, D. E. Campbell, G. M. Sturgis, D. J. Kendall, H. W. Whitney and W. Ulrich, First Lieut. G. T. Cummings, Marine Gunner A. D. Ryan, First Lieuts. E. A. Pollock and J. A. Bemis. The remaining are students whose names appear under the other illustrations.

During the school year 1927-28 the courses at the Marine Corps Schools were interrupted by the necessity of taking the student officers therefrom for assignment to the Expeditionary Forces sent to China and Nicaragua. During the school year 1928-29 the absence of a large proportion of the officers of the Corps on expeditionary duty in China and Nicaragua resulted in the suspension of the Company Officers' Course for the year and in a considerable reduction in the number of students in the Field Officers' Course, but later the full courses were resumed, there being 54 second lieutenants in attendance at the Base School at Philadelphia in 1929-30, with 34 officers in the schools at Quantico, 17 in the Field Officers' Course and a like number in the Company Officers' Course.

By the date of the opening of the schools for the year 1930-31 the courses had become to a considerable degree standardized. The courses covered in that year a period of thirty-nine weeks from September 5, 1930, to June 19, 1931.

The character and extent of the curricula of the schools at this date may be seen from the following synopses of the various courses.

ADMINISTRATION

- | | |
|------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. Muster rolls. | 5. Clothing. |
| 2. Pay rolls. | 6. Equipment. |
| 3. Property. | 7. Service record book. |
| 4. Surveys. | 8. Post Exchange regulations. |

ANIMAL MANAGEMENT, AND EQUITATION

1. Anatomy and physiology.
2. Age determination.
3. Stable management.
4. Feeds and feeding.
5. First aid and treatment.
6. Normal shoeing.
7. Conditioning.
8. Care of animals in the field.
9. Types and breeds of horses and mules.
10. Nomenclature.
11. Adjustment of horse equipment.
12. The seat and hands.
13. The gaits.
14. Application of aids.
15. Clearing obstacles.
16. Controlled rides.
17. Individual rides.

DRILL REGULATIONS

1. Instruction of the soldier.
 - a. Dismounted without arms.
 - b. Dismounted with rifle and automatic rifle.
2. Drill and combat signals.
3. Drill, close order.
 - a. General introduction.
 - b. Rifle squad, platoon, and company.
 - c. The infantry battalion.
 - d. The infantry regiment.
4. Drill, extended order.
 - a. The rifle squad, section, and platoon.
5. Ceremonies, inspections, review and parade.
6. The manual of the sword.

FIELD ENGINEERING

1. Trenches and traces.
2. Obstacles.
3. Roads, bridges, and demolitions.

FIRST AID AND HYGIENE

1. Wounds and hemorrhage.
2. Fractures.
3. Shocks, fainting, poisoning, drowning, and suffocation.
4. Sunstroke and burns.
5. Foreign bodies in the eye, ear, nose and throat.
6. Epileptic fits and states of unconsciousness.
7. Methods of removing wounded.
8. Personal hygiene.

MARKSMANSHIP

1. Rifle marksmanship.
 - a. Nomenclature and care of rifle.
 - b. Positions and trigger squeeze.
 - c. Use of sights and scorebooks (application of rules).
 - d. Range procedure and organization.
 - e. Range practice.
2. Pistol marksmanship.
 - a. Nomenclature and care.
 - b. Safety precautions.
 - c. Positions, aiming, and trigger squeeze.
 - d. Range procedure and organization.
 - e. Range practice.

MILITARY TOPOGRAPHY

1. Map reading.
 - a. Conventional signs.
 - b. Coordinates.
 - c. Distances and scales.
 - d. Direction.
 - e. Elevation, ground forms, and slopes.
 - f. Visibility and defilade.
 - g. Map reading in the field.
 - h. Use of compass in running course. (Day and night).
2. Aerial photography.
 - a. Aeroplane mosaic.
 - b. Interpretation and restitution of aerial photographs.
3. Sketching.
 - a. Standardizing strides and scales.

- b. Logical contouring.
- c. Running a traverse.
- d. Position sketching.

MUSKETRY

1. Range estimation.
2. Target designation.
3. Rifle fire and its effects.
4. Fire discipline.
5. Fire control.
6. Practical demonstration and exercise applying the principles of musketry.

NAVAL AND MILITARY LAW

1. The Constitution of the United States.
2. Rules of land warfare.
3. Naval law—definition and sources.
4. Military government and martial law.
5. Delivery of men to civil authorities.
 - Habeas Corpus* proceedings.
6. Charges and specifications.
 - a. Manner of preferring.
 - b. Rules for drawing.
 - c. Essential elements of particular offenses.
7. Rules of evidence.
 - a. Nature of evidence.
 - b. Proof in general.
 - c. Relevance of evidence.
 - d. Competence of evidence.
 - e. Attendance and examination of witnesses.
 - f. Weighing evidence.
8. Instructions for courts-martial.
 - a. Jurisdiction.
 - b. Preliminary investigation.
 - c. Procedure prior to trial.
 - d. Organization.
 - e. Procedure during trial.
 - f. Limitations of punishment.
 - g. Action of convening and reviewing authorities.
 - h. Record of proceedings.

NAVAL ORDNANCE

1. Naval ordnance.
 - a. Naval rifled guns.
 - b. Naval gun mounts.



FIELD OFFICERS' CLASS, MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS, QUANTICO, 1933

Left to right, Seated: Majors R. W. Voeth, J. C. Fegan, H. W. Weitzel, F. S. N. Erskine, Lieut. Commander C. G. Richardson, U. S. N., Captains Peter Conachy and J. M. Tildsley. Standing in first row: Captains T. B. Gale, W. J. Green, Otto Salzman, H. V. Shurtleff, F. C. Cushing, E. L. Mullaly, C. B. Hobbs, W. C. Barnaby and F. D. Creamer. Standing in second row: Captains T. F. Joyce, A. T. Lewis, E. M. Spencer, G. W. Spotts, and C. D. Sniffin, and Lieutenants A. B. Kerr, U. S. N., and P. R. Sterling, U. S. N.



COMPANY OFFICERS' CLASS, MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS, QUANTICO, 1933

Left to right, seated: Captains T. F. Blanton and John Kaluf, First Lieutenants T. J. Cushman, J. D. O'Leary, James Ackerman, T. J. Crawford and A. H. Fricke. Standing in first row: First Lieutenants J. N. Frisbie, G. W. McHenry, W. L. McKittrick, E. A. Robbins, D. A. Stafford, R. W. Conkey, W. W. Wensinger, E. R. Whitman, and H. E. Rosecrans. Standing in second row: First Lieutenants C. F. Schilt, H. T. Nicholas, F. S. Chappelle, J. N. Smith, L. E. Marie, S. W. King, R. P. Coffman, J. C. McQueen, O. H. Wheeler, R. P. Ross, and G. J. O'Shea.

- c. Service explosives.
- d. Breech mechanisms.
- e. Naval gun sights.
- f. Firing attachments and gas expelling devices.
- g. Projectiles.
- h. Ammunition.
- 2. Naval gunnery.
 - a. Training.
 - (1) Gunnery drills.
 - (2) Principles of training, organization and battle exercises.
 - (3) Fire control.
 - (4) Types of fire.
 - (5) Spotting.
 - b. Gunnery exercises.
 - (1) Material used.
 - (2) Short range battle practice.
 - (3) Long range battle practice.
 - (4) Night battle practice.

PACK TRANSPORTATION

- 1. Marine Corps use of pack transportation, and evolution of pack equipment.
- 2. Salient characteristics of efficient pack equipment.
- 3. Saddling pack animals, forming, slinging, and adjusting packs.
- 4. Packing rations, galley equipment, ammunition, weapons, clothing, medical supplies. Care of animals and equipment in the field.
- 5. Packing, forming the pack train, handling the pack train on the march.
- 6. Marching with the pack train.

TACTICS

- 1. Scouting and patrolling.
- 2. Organization of infantry units.
 - a. Rifle company.
 - b. Machine gun company.
 - c. Infantry battalion.
 - d. Howitzer company.
 - e. Infantry regiment.
 - f. Infantry brigade.
- 3. Marches and shelter.
- 4. Technique.

- a. Infantry staff.
 - (1) Battalion.
 - (2) Regiment.
 - (3) Brigade.
- b. Combat orders.
- c. Infantry signal communication.
- d. Combat intelligence.
- e. Regimental supply.
- f. Infantry supporting arms and services.
 - (1) Aviation.
 - (2) Artillery.
 - (3) Cavalry.
 - (4) Combat engineers.
 - (5) Medical service.
 - (6) Tanks.
- g. Chemical warfare defense.
- 5. Tactical principles.
 - a. Principles of war.
 - b. Combat principles.
 - (1) Security.
 - (a) Advance guard.
 - (b) Rear guard.
 - (c) Flank guard.
 - (d) Outposts.
 - (2) Offensive combat.
 - (3) Defensive combat.
 - (4) Special operations.
 - (a) Meeting engagements.
 - (b) River crossings.
 - (c) Combat in woods.
 - (d) Night operations.
 - (e) Passage of defile.
 - (f) Passage of lines.
 - (g) Relief of front line units.
 - (h) Raids.
 - (i) Withdrawal from action.
 - (j) Pursuit.
 - c. Estimate of the situation.
- 6. Landing operations.
 - a. Embarkation.
 - b. Landing on hostile shores.
 - c. Defense of an advance base.
 - d. Withdrawal of landing force.

- e. Occupation of an area.
 - (1) Establishing initial base.
 - (2) Seizure and defense of cities, towns, and villages.
 - (3) Control of an occupied area.
 - (4) Conduct of operations in an occupied area.

WEAPONS

1. Automatic rifle.
 - a. Mechanical training.
 - (1) Stripping and assembling.
 - (2) Functioning.
 - (3) Immediate action.
 - (4) Stoppages.
 - (5) Care and cleaning.
 - b. Range practice.
 - (1) Preparatory range training.
 - (2) 1000" range practice.
 - (3) Known distance and record practice.
2. Machine guns.
 - a. Mechanical training.
 - (1) Stripping and assembling.
 - (2) Immediate action.
 - (3) Functioning.
 - (4) Stoppages.
 - (5) Care and cleaning.
 - b. Machine gun drill.
 - (1) Elementary.
 - (2) Advanced.
 - c. Marksmanship.
 - (1) Preparatory range training.
 - (2) 1000" range practice.
 - (3) Known distance range practice.
 - (4) Record practice.
 - d. Direct laying.
 - (1) Classes of fire.
 - (2) Targets and fire distribution.
 - (3) Overhead fire.
 - (4) Fire control and target designation.
 - (5) Fire orders.
 - (6) Range cards.
 - e. Instruments, machine gun characteristics, mathematics.
 - f. Direct laying.
 - (1) Single gun. Map and ground methods.
 - (2) Battery. Map and ground methods.
 - (3) Night firing and barrage fire.
 - g. Combat practice.
3. Thompson sub-machine gun.
 - a. Mechanical training.
 - b. Field firing.
4. 37mm Gun.
 - a. Mechanical training.
 - b. Stripping.
 - c. Assembling.
 - d. Gun drill, (service of gun).
 - e. Technique of 37mm gun fire.
 - (1) Direct laying.
 - (2) Indirect laying.
 - f. Field firing.
5. Trench mortar.
 - a. Mechanical training.
 - b. Drill, (base plate pit construction).
 - c. Technique of 3" trench mortar.
 - (1) Direct laying.
 - (2) Indirect laying.
 - d. Field firing.
6. Grenades
 - a. Hand grenades—theoretical and practical instruction.
 - b. Rifle grenades—theoretical and practical instruction.
 - c. Throwing and firing live hand and rifle grenades.
7. Bayonets.
 - a. Bayonets.
 - (1) Requirements of good bayonet work.
 - (2) Special features of bayonet training.
 - (3) Bayonet training and combat practice in detail.
 - (4) The qualification course.

FIELD OFFICERS' COURSE, 1930-1931

EXPLANATORY NOTES

The several different types of exercises employed in the course of instruction may be defined as follows:

LECTURE: A formal talk on a subject, frequently illustrated by moving pictures, lantern slides, charts or blackboard diag-

rams. No preparation of the subject is required of members of the class.

CONFERENCE: A discussion by the class, under direction of the instructor, to develop the subject of a text previously assigned for study.

CONFERENCE PROBLEM: A situation illustrating certain tactical principles is issued for study. The solution is discussed in class in CONFERENCE.

MAP PROBLEM: A written exercise in which a military situation is stated with reference to a map: i.e., the map is the only guide as to terrain, distances, character of roads, etc. The students' solutions to the requirements are written.

MAP EXERCISE: Similar to a MAP PROBLEM, except that a general discussion, directed by the instructor, is held during the progress of the exercise.

MAP MANEUVER: An exercise in which a military situation is worked out on a map. The exercise is conducted by one or more instructors and student officers are assigned command and staff functions.

TERRAIN EXERCISE: An exercise in which a military situation is laid and solved on the ground. Troops are imaginary. The solution is in writing.

TACTICAL WALK: An exercise similar to a TERRAIN EXERCISE, except that the solution is usually oral. Instruction is imparted by a discussion of each successive phase at its conclusion.

HISTORICAL RIDE: A study of a battle or campaign is prepared by an instructor who explains the details of the operations to the class in a series of talks on the ground on which the action took place.

PRACTICAL EXERCISE: An exercise in which, after the details are explained to the class, the student officers perfect themselves by the actual execution of the tasks involved.

HOURS OF INSTRUCTION: Except when otherwise indicated on the schedule, the length of periods is as follows: CONFERENCES and LECTURES are one hour periods. There is a ten minute intermission between such periods. EQUITATION periods are one hour and a half. MAP PROBLEMS, TACTICAL WALKS and TERRAIN EXERCISES are four hour periods. Fifteen minutes of the period between 10:40 and 11:00 is devoted to physical exercise.

PROBLEMS

Series	Number	Weight	Total
Map Problems, Series I.....	12	7	84
Map Problems, Series II.....	17	20	340
Map Problems, Series III.....	8	18	144
Map Problems, Series IV.....	3	12	36
Map Problems, Series V.....	4	22	88
General Terrain Exercises, Series VI	12	24	288
Problems in International Law.....	1	20	20

Total Points 1000

DISCUSSION OF MAP PROBLEM

Sixteen problems are selected from the entire series, for analytical discussion after solution by the class. In the first eight the analysis is prepared by the instructor. In the final eight the analysis is prepared by committees of the class.

TOTAL HOURS 16

ANIMAL MANAGEMENT

Topic	Hours
The Horse; Regions, Colors and Markings.....	1
The Horse; Age Determination.....	2
The Horse; Faults and Examination for Soundness.....	1
Diseases of the Horse.....	1
Stable Management.....	1
Feeds and Feeding.....	1
Care of Animals in the Field.....	1
Shoeing.....	1

TOTAL HOURS 9

COMBAT ORDERS

Topic	Hours
Combat Orders; Details and Technique.....	1
Special types of Orders; Formal written Field Orders.....	1

Annexes; Dictated and Oral Orders.....	1
Map Exercise: Drafting a Formal Field Order from a Detailed Plan.....	4
Forms; Annexes and Abbreviations.....	1
Map Exercise: Drafting a Formal Order from a Situation Map (offensive).....	4
Map Exercise: Oral and Dictated Orders.....	8
Map Exercise: Drafting a Formal Order from a Situation Map (defensive).....	4
Administrative Orders.....	1
Map Problem No. 1, Series I.....	1
Map Exercise: Drafting an Administrative Order from a Detailed Plan.....	4
Map Problem No. 2, Series I.....	4

TOTAL HOURS 37

COMMAND STAFF AND LOGISTICS

Topic	Hours
Supply in the Theatre of Operations.....	1
Combat Zones; Corps and Army.....	1
The Division Commander and his General Staff.....	1
The Technical Supply and Administrative Staff.....	1
The Technical Supply and Administrative Staff.....	2
G1 and G4 Sections, Division General Staff.....	1
G2 and G3 Sections, Division General Staff.....	1
Transport.....	1
Division on a March and Halt.....	3
March Graphs.....	1
March Tables and March Graphs (Conference Problem).....	1
Division Movements by Motor Transport.....	1
Movements by Motor Transport.....	1
Movements by Motor Transports (Conference Problem).....	1
Troop Movements by Motor Transport (Conference Problem).....	1
Troop Movements by Rail.....	3
Troop Movements by Rail (Conference Problem).....	1
Map Problem No. 2, Series III.....	4
Administrative Details, Division in Attack.....	1
Administrative Details, Division in Attack. (Con. Prob.).....	1
Map Problem No. 3, Series III.....	4
Administrative Details, Division in Attack (Con. Prob.).....	1
Administrative Details, Division in Defense.....	1
Administrative Details, Division in Defense (Con. Prob.).....	1
Division in a Rest Area.....	1
Map Problem No. 4, Series III.....	4
Relief of Units in Battle.....	1
Retirements.....	1
Map Problem No. 6, Series III.....	4
Map Problem No. 7, Series III.....	4
Marine Corps Administration.....	1
Tactical Walk No. 12: Supply.....	4

TOTAL HOURS 55

EQUITATION

The Course includes eighteen periods devoted to Practical Exercises in Equitation. Twelve periods of one hour and a half and six two-hour periods.

TOTAL HOURS 30

FIELD ENGINEERING

(Includes Map Reading)

Topic	Hours
Introduction to Map Reading & Field Engineering Courses.....	1
Map Reading; Coordinates.....	1
Map Reading; Distances and Scales.....	1
Map Reading; Direction.....	1
Principles of Organization for Defense.....	1
Tactical Walk No. 1; Use of Compass.....	4
Map Reading; Elevation.....	1
Employment of Weapons in Defense.....	1
Organization of a Defensive System.....	1
Map Exercise; Map Reading; Visibility and Defilade.....	4
Construction of Defensive Works (Conference Problem).....	1
Organization of a Defensive System.....	1
Tactical Walk No. 2; Map Reading.....	1
Field Fortifications.....	4
Map Problem No. 1, Series IV.....	4
Construction of Defensive Works.....	1
Hydrographic Charts and Tide Tables.....	1

Organization of Regimental and Battalion Sectors (Map Exercise).....	4
Map Problem No. 2, Series IV.....	4
Aerial Photography.....	1
Tactical Walk No. 3; Orientation.....	4
The Mechanics of Preparing a Mosaic.....	1
Map Exercise; Restitution of Aerial Photographs.....	1
Tactical Application of Aerial Photography (Map Exercise).....	4
Map Exercise: Restitution of Aerial Photographs of a Beach Line.....	4
Map Exercise: Selection of a Defensive Position from an Aerial Mosaic.....	3
Tactical Walk No. 11: Location of a Position on an Aerial Mosaic.....	4
Map Problem No. 3: Series IV.....	4

TOTAL HOURS 63

GENERAL TERRAIN EXERCISES

The Course terminates in a series of twelve General Terrain Exercises. The solution of these exercises may require the application of any of the principles taught under the various sub-courses during the term.

TOTAL HOURS 48

HISTORICAL RIDES

Supplement the Course in Tactical Principles and Divisions

Topic	Hours
Historical Ride: The Battle of Fredericksburg.....	8
Historical Ride: The Battle of Chancellorsville.....	8
Historical Ride: The First and Second Battles of Bull Run.....	8

TOTAL HOURS 24

LANDING OPERATIONS

Topic	Hours
The Navy Missions and General Functions.....	1
The Marine Corps in Landing Operations.....	1
U. S. Navy Policy; effect of Naval Armament Limitations.....	1
Organization and Composition of the U. S. Navy; Functions of Naval Bases.....	1
Naval Consideration for an Overseas Expedition, Selection of Advanced Bases.....	1
Boats.....	1
General Discussion of Defensive in Landing Operations.....	1
General Discussion of Offensive in Landing Operations.....	1
Signal Communications in Attack of Advance Bases.....	1
The Engineers in the Attack and Defense of Advance Bases.....	1
Infantry Weapons in Attack and Defense of Advance Bases.....	1
Artillery in Attack and Defense of Advance Bases.....	1
Naval gunfire in Attack of Advance Bases.....	1
Anti-aircraft in Defense of Advance Bases.....	1
Air Force in Defense of Advance Bases.....	1
Aid Force in Attack of Advance Bases.....	1
Chemical Warfare Service in Attack and Defense of Advance Bases.....	1
Orders for Landing Operations.....	1
The General and Special Situation. Tasks Assignments, Requirements.....	1
Naval War College Problem (Z Problem).....	80
Tactical Walk No. 13; Regimental and Battalion Sectors.....	4
The Z Problem: Preparation for and rehearsal of discussion of Z Problem (LO-20).....	4
Discussion of "Z" Problem (LO-20).....	2
Discussion of "Z" Problem (LO-20).....	2
Tactical Walk No. 14; Artillery and Chemical Warfare.....	4
Special Boats for Landing Operations.....	1
Demonstration: Special Boats.....	4
Map Maneuver No. 5: Landing Operations. Preparation of Plans for MM-5.....	4
Map Maneuver No. 5: Landing Operations. Completion of Plans for MM-5.....	1
(MM-5) Map Maneuver No. 5: Landing Operations.....	4
Critique of Solution to (LO-20) by members of the staff of the Naval War College.....	8
The Influence of the Terrain on Attack and Defense in Landing Operations; Waves.....	2
Defense of Coast Lines (Beach Defense).....	1
Advance Base Defense; Selection of Force.....	1
Conference Problem: Advance Bases (Defense) Intelligence.....	1
Advance Base Defense (Con. Prob.).....	2

Advance Bases; Artillery in Defense (Con. Prob.).....	2
Advance Base Defense (Chemical Warfare) Conference Problem	1
Advance Base Defense. (Local Naval Defense Forces) (Conference Problem)	1
Advance Base Defense, Sector. (Conference Problem).....	1
Advance Base Defense (Aviation) (Conference Problem)....	2
Advance Base Defense. (Anti-aircraft) Conference Problem	1
Advance Base Defense (Subsector) (Con. Prob.).....	1
Advance Base Defense.....	1
Advance Base Defense (Signal Communication) Con. Prob.	1
Advance Base Defense. (Engineers). (Conference Problem)	1
Defense of Coast Lines. (Conference Problem).....	1
General Discussion of Forced Landings.....	1
Information and Security by supporting Naval Forces; Convoys	1
Battalion Landing against opposition. (Conference problem)	2
Battalion Landing against opposition. (Conference Problem)	1
Map Problem No. 7, Series II.....	4
Continuation of LO-50 Battalion Landing against Opposition. (Conference Problem)	2
Regiment Landing against Opposition (Conference Problem)	1
Advanced Bases; Beach and Shore Parties.....	1
Offense, Basic Problems for attack series (Conference Problem)	1
Naval Gunfire Support.....	1
Advance Bases; Air Forces. Naval & Marine (Con. Prob.)	3
Division in a Landing Operation (Conference Problem).....	2
Brigade in a Landing Attack (Conference Problem).....	2
Chemical Warfare. Offensive.....	1
Map Problem No. 9, Series II.....	4
Regiment in a Landing Attack. (Conference Problem).....	2
Artillery in Support of a Landing Operation (Con. Prob.)	2
Advanced Bases; Offense. Naval Gunfire Support (Con. Prob.)	2
Tank Support in a Landing Attack (Conference Problem).	1
Advanced Bases Offense. Communications, Naval and Marine	2
Advanced Bases, Offense, Engineers. (Conference Prob.)	1
Advanced Bases, Offense, Supply and Evacuation. Shore and Beach Parties. (Conference Problem.)	2
Preparation of Order for Landing.....	1
Landing Schedules.....	1
Boat Schedules. (Conference Problem.).....	2
Map Exercise: Preparation of Formal Order for the Landing of the 4th Division on Oahu.....	2½
Map Exercise: Preparation for Schedule for Landing.....	3½
Map Exercise: Preparation of an Administrative Order for a Landing Attack.....	2
Map Problem No. 13, Series II.....	4
Map Problem No. 15, Series II.....	4

TOTAL HOURS 216

Organization; Tactics & Technique of the Corps.....	1
Army & Group of Armies & Army Headquarters.....	1
Tactical Principles of the Army and Corps in the Advance	1
Strategic Covering Forces.....	1
Tactical Principles of the Army and Corps in the Attack.....	1

TOTAL HOURS 5

LECTURES

Topic	Hours
Lecture by the Major General Commandant, U. S. Marines.....	1½
Outline of the Course.....	1
Infantry Combat.....	1½
Mechanization, its effect upon mobility of combat units and upon Combat Tactics.....	1½
Army Ordnance.....	1½
Mobilization.....	1½
Lecture.....	1½
Signal Communications in Combat.....	1½
Field Artillery.....	1½
The Combat Engineer Regiment in Campaign.....	1½
Anti-Aircraft Artillery.....	1½
Chemical Warfare.....	1½
Military History. The Battle of Fredericksburg....	2
The Army Air Corps.....	1½
Naval Air Service.....	1½

Cavalry	1½
Why the Germans Lost the First Battle of the Marne	1½
Gallipoli; The Naval Operations.....	1½
Gallipoli; Landing Operations.....	1½
Gallipoli; The Withdrawal.....	1½
Strategy of the Pacific.....	1½
Strategy of Central American Waters.....	1½
Operations at Zeebrugge.....	1½
Naval Intelligence	1½
Strategy of the Atlantic.....	1½
Naval Operations and the War Plans Division.....	1½
German Landing on the Russian Islands in the Baltic in 1917.....	1½
Operations of the Marine Combat Patrol on the Coco River, Nicaragua in 1928.....	1½
Naval Gunfire in Support of Landing Operations....	1½
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921.....	1½
The Battle of Chancellorsville.....	2½
Coast and Harbor Defense.....	1½
Naval Tactics in Operation in Support of a Forced Landing	1½
The United States Navy and the Monroe Doctrine	1½
The Status of Pan-Americanism.....	1½
Marine Corps Operations and War Plans.....	1½
U. S. Fleet Operations and Naval Staff. Functions of the offices on Staffs of Flag Officers..	1½
The First & Second Battles of Bull Run.....	2

TOTAL HOURS 58

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Topic	Hours
Elements of International Law.....	1
Sovereignty; Boundaries; Three Mile Limit.....	1
Ship Canals; Servitudes; Extraterritoriality.....	1
Extraterritorial Protection: Monroe Doctrine; Right of Asylum	1
Citizenship; Naturalization; Domicile.....	1
Ambassadors and Consuls.....	1
Treaties; Mediation; Arbitration; Retortion; Reprisal; Pacific Blockade	1
The League of Nations and International Court.....	1
Problems in International Law.....	4
Laws of War on Land; Hostility; Armed Forces of Belligerents; Prisoners of War.....	1
The Sick, Wounded and Dead; The Conduct of Hostilities	1
Intercourse between Belligerents.....	1
Military Authority over a Hostile State; Treatment of Enemy Property	1
Penalties for Violations of Laws of War; Neutrality; Automatic Contact Mines.....	1
Contraband of War.....	1
Map Problem No. 11; Series II.....	4
General Study of Military Government.....	1
Military Government in Germany; Comparisons of different systems in Germany.....	1
Recapitulation of important points & principles; Establishment & Administration of Military Government.....	1
Marine Corps Situation in Occupied Territory.....	1
Military Government (Conference Problems).....	6
Map Problem No. 16, Series II.....	4
Federal Troops in Aid to U. S. Civil Authorities.....	3
Map Problem No. 17, Series II.....	4
The Legal Duties of a Marine Officer attached to the Staff of a Flag Officer.....	1

TOTAL HOURS 44

MAP MANEUVERS

Unit or Staff Group	Hours
Infantry Regiment	4
Infantry Brigade	4
Infantry Division	4
Infantry Division	4
Landing Operations	4
G1 and G4 Sections, Division General Staff.....	8
G2 and G3 Sections, Division General Staff.....	4
The Division Commander & his General Staff.....	8

TOTAL HOURS 40

METHODS OF TRAINING

Topic	Hours
General Principles of Training.....	1
Preparation and Conduct of Map Problems, Terrain Exercises.....	1
Preparation of a Training Program.....	1
Preparation of a Map Problem.....	1
Map Problem No. 8, Series III.....	8

TOTAL HOURS 12

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Topic	Hours
Military Intelligence: Collection, Evaluation and Dissemination.....	1
Battalion Intelligence Platoon.....	1
Training of Intelligence Personnel.....	1
Intelligence Documents: The G2 Annex.....	1
Intelligence Documents: G2 Journal.....	1
Intelligence Documents: G2 Work Sheet.....	1
G2 Reports and Special Intelligence Reports and Studies.....	1
Military Intelligence (Conference Problem).....	1
Map Problem No. 5, Series III.....	4

TOTAL HOURS 12

MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Topic	Hours
Infantry Battalion; Organization.....	1
Infantry Regiment; Organization.....	1
Organization, Employment of Tables.....	1
Infantry Brigade; Organization.....	1
Infantry Division; Organization.....	1
Field Artillery Units; Organization.....	1
Cavalry Units; Organization.....	1
Command & Staff Organization.....	1

TOTAL HOURS 8

PACK TRANSPORTATION

Practical

Topic	Hours
Pack Transportation; Care and Adjustment of Harness; Equipment and Vehicles.....	1
Care of Animals; Pack Sores, Wounds and their Treatment.....	1
Pack Equipment; Various Saddles; Nomenclature and Adjustment.....	3
Packing.....	3

TOTAL HOURS 8

SMALL WARS

Topic	Hours
Small Wars: Introduction & Intelligence.....	1
Small Wars: Tactics. Landing & Occupying a Town.....	1
Small Wars: Tactics. Movements.....	1
Small Wars: Tactics. Attack & Defense of a Position.....	1
Small Wars: March of a Column (Conference Problem).....	1½
Small Wars: Occupation of a Country (Conference Prob.).....	1½
Small Wars: Plans for Training (Conference Problem).....	1½
Small Wars: Committee Report. Fourth Section of the Staff in Small Wars. (Conference Problem).....	1½

TOTAL HOURS 10

SOLUTION OF MAP PROBLEMS

Topic	Hours
Solution of Map Problems.....	1
Hints on the Solution of Map Problems.....	1
Estimate of the Situation.....	1
The Army Estimate of the Situation.....	1
Estimate of the Situation.....	3
Estimate of the Situation (Army Form).....	1
Map Exercise: Estimate of the Situation.....	4
Estimate of the Situation.....	1
Review of Estimate of the Situation.....	1
Map Problem No. 11, Series I.....	4
Solutions of General Terrain Exercise Problems.....	3

TOTAL HOURS 20

TACTICAL PRINCIPLES AND DECISIONS

Topic	Hours
Marches.....	1
A March toward the Enemy.....	1
A Night March.....	1
Formation & Duties of an Advanced Guard.....	1
Advance Guard Action.....	1
Formation; Duties of a Rear Guard.....	1
Artillery in Rear Guard Actions.....	1
Division in Development.....	3
Flank Guard Actions.....	1
Change of Direction of March (Conference Problem).....	1
Flank Guards (Conference Problem).....	1
Halts and Security at a Halt.....	1
Development for Combat.....	1
General Discussion of Offensive Combat.....	2
Meeting Engagements.....	1
Meeting Engagements.....	2
Defense in a Meeting Engagement.....	1
Attack against and Defense of Positions.....	3
Attack against a Deployed Defense.....	1
Defense of a Position.....	1
Defense of a Position. Organization of a Brigade Sector.....	1
Defense of a Position: Artillery and Signal Communications.....	1
Defense of a Position.....	1
Attack against a River Line.....	1
Defense of a River Line.....	1
Attack against a Zone.....	2
Attack against a Zone. Artillery Support.....	1
Attack against a Zone. Air Service & Chemical Warfare.....	1
Attack against a Zone. (Conference Problem).....	1
Defense of a Zone.....	1
Defense of a Zone. Artillery & Air Service.....	1
Defense of a Zone. Infantry Weapons.....	1
Defense of a Zone. Signal Communications. Medical Service.....	1
Supply Service in Defense of a Zone.....	1
Relief of Units in Battle.....	1
Counterattack.....	1
Map Problem No. 1, Series II.....	4
Relief to Maintain Defense.....	1
Delaying Action.....	1
Withdrawal from Action.....	1
Map Problem No. 2, Series II.....	4
Withdrawal from Action during Daylight.....	1
Map Problem No. 3, Series II.....	4
Withdrawal from Action during Daytime.....	1
Map Problem No. 5, Series II.....	4
Pursuits.....	1
Map Problem No. 4, Series II.....	4
Defense of Defiles.....	1
Passage of Defiles.....	1
Map Problem No. 6, Series II.....	4
Retirements.....	1
Map Problem No. 8, Series II.....	4
Map Problem No. 10, Series II.....	4
Maneuvering the Enemy out of Position.....	1
Convoys.....	1
Night Operations.....	1
Map Problem No. 12, Series II.....	4
Map Problem No. 14, Series II.....	4
Protection of Supply Routes.....	1

TOTAL HOURS 96

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE OF THE VARIOUS ARMS—AIR SERVICE

Topic	Hours
Air Corps Organization.....	1
Characteristics of Aircraft Air Combat.....	1
Observation Aviation, Airplane and Balloon.....	1
Observation Aviation Corps and Division Aviation.....	1
Pursuit Aviation.....	1
Attack Aviation.....	1
Bombardment Aviation.....	1
Combined Aviation.....	1
The Air Division Operations against Hostile Air Force.....	1
The Air Division. Attack on lines of communication and troop concentrations.....	1
The Air Division in Defense of a Coast Line.....	1
Map Exercise: Combined Aviation.....	4

Map Problem No. 8, Series I.....	4
Aviation in Support of an Army on the Defense.....	4

TOTAL HOURS 23

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE OF THE VARIOUS ARMS—ARTILLERY

Topic	Hours
Artillery Weapons & Transportation.....	1
Artillery Reconnaissance & Occupation of a Position.....	2
Artillery Signal Communications.....	1
Artillery Liaison.....	1
Artillery Fires.....	1
Artillery Fires.....	1
Map Exercise: Artillery Fires.....	4
Artillery, Plans and Orders.....	2
Anti-aircraft Artillery.....	1
Artillery Ammunition Supply.....	1
Tactical Employment of Artillery.....	1
Anti-aircraft Artillery.....	1
Tactical Employment of Field Artillery.....	1
Artillery in Offensive Combat (Conference Problem).....	1
Tactical Walk No. 8: Artillery in Attack.....	4
Artillery in Defensive Combat.....	1
Artillery in a Meeting Engagement.....	1
Artillery Information Service.....	1
Anti-aircraft Artillery (Conference Problem).....	1
Map Problem No. 4, Series I.....	4
Map Problem No. 6, Series I.....	4
Map Problem No. 9, Series I.....	4

TOTAL HOURS 39

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE OF THE VARIOUS ARMS—CAVALRY

Topic	Hours
Cavalry, Characteristics and Functions. Marches.....	1
Cavalry, Reconnaissance and Counter-Reconnaissance.....	1
Cavalry, Security.....	1
Cavalry Combat.....	1
Cavalry Combat (Conference Problem).....	1
Cavalry Action (Conference Problem).....	3

TOTAL HOURS 8

CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Topic	Hours
Organization and Function of the Chemical Warfare Service.....	1
Chemical Agents.....	1
Chemical Warfare, Organization and Equipment of the Chemical Warfare Regiment. Weapons & Ammunition. Smoke Tactics.....	1
Protection and Tactical uses of Agents.....	1
Chemical Warfare in the Defense.....	2

TOTAL HOURS 5

ENGINEERS

Topic	Hours
Engineers; General Principles.....	1
Engineer Reconnaissance and Engineer Operations.....	1
Engineer Operations.....	1
Engineer Supply.....	1

TOTAL HOURS 4

HOWITZER COMPANY

Topic	Hours
Organization and Characteristics of the Howitzer Company 37mm gun and 3 inch mortar.....	1
The Infantry Howitzer Company in Attack, Defense and Special Operations.....	1
The Infantry Howitzer Company (Conference Problems).....	1

TOTAL HOURS 3

INFANTRY

Topic	Hours
General Characteristics of Infantry.....	1
Infantry Offensive Combat.....	1

Security and Reconnaissance.....	1
Offensive Combat of Infantry.....	1
Security (Conference Problem).....	1
Offensive Situations.....	1
Infantry Defensive Combat.....	1
Division in Attack.....	1
Assembly Areas, Boundaries and Lines of Departure.....	1
Headquarters Companies. The Infantry Brigade, Regiment and Battalion.....	1
Determining the time to Attack.....	1
Service Company.....	1
Infantry Regiment in Attack (Conference Problem).....	1
Infantry Regiment in Defense.....	1
Infantry Brigade in Defense.....	1
Infantry Brigade in Attack (Conference Problem).....	1
Infantry Division in Defense.....	1
Map Exercise: The Infantry Division in Attack.....	4
Tactical Walk No. 4; Security.....	4
Tactical Walk No. 5; Infantry Regiment in Attack.....	4
Tactical Walk No. 6; Infantry Battalion in Attack.....	4
Tactical Walk No. 7; Infantry Brigade in Attack.....	4
Tactical Walk No. 9; Infantry Regiment as part of a Brigade in Attack.....	4
Tactical Walk No. 10; Infantry Regiment in Defense.....	4
Map Problem No. 3; Series I.....	4
Map Problem No. 5; Series I.....	4
Map Problem No. 7; Series I.....	4
Map Problem No. 1; Series III.....	4
Map Problem No. 12; Series I.....	4

TOTAL HOURS 65

MACHINE GUNS

Topic	Hours
Machine Guns; Organization and Characteristics.....	1
Machine Gun Fire; Machine Guns in Attack.....	1
Machine Guns in Defense.....	1
Machine Guns in Security Detachments.....	1
Machine Guns with Cavalry.....	1

TOTAL HOURS 5

MEDICAL SERVICE

Topic	Hours
Medical Service, Missions, Functions, Operation in the Division.....	1
Medical Service in Combat.....	1
Veterinary Service Plans and Orders.....	1

TOTAL HOURS 3

MUSKETRY

Topic	Hours
General Consideration, Range Estimation, Target Designation. Rifle Fire and its Effect.....	1
Musketry.....	1

TOTAL HOURS 2

SIGNAL COMMUNICATION

Topic	Hours
Signal Communications.....	1
Signal Communications. Wire System.....	1
Signal Communications Radio System. Agencies in Combat.....	1
Signal Communications Messenger and Visual Systems.....	1
Signal Agencies in the Marine Corps.....	1
Signal Communication Between Aircraft and Ground Troops.....	2

TOTAL HOURS 7

TANKS

Topic	Hours
Tanks; History and Development.....	1
Tanks. Tank Movement into the zone of action.....	1
Tank Tactics. Tactics of Leading Tanks. Accompanying Tanks. Cooperation with Tanks.....	1
Tanks, Tank Combat Orders. Special Tank Operations.....	1

TOTAL HOURS 4

TROOP LEADING

Topic	Hours
Introduction to Troop Leading Course.....	1
The Infantry Division in Attack.....	1
Artillery Brigade in Attack.....	1
Signal and Medical Troops in Attack.....	1
Infantry Brigade in Attack.....	1
Artillery Regiment in Attack.....	1
Infantry Regiment in Attack.....	1
Infantry Division in Pursuit.....	1
Infantry Division in Defense.....	1
Artillery Brigade in Defense.....	1
Administrative Arrangements in Defense.....	1
Signal and Medical Troops in Defense.....	1
Infantry Brigade in Defense.....	1
Artillery Regiment in Defense.....	1
Infantry Regiment in Defense.....	1
Infantry Division in Counterattack.....	1
Air Service in Combat.....	1
Infantry Division in Development for attack (Conference Problem).....	1
Field Artillery Brigade in Support during Development (Conference Problem).....	1
Infantry Brigade in Attack (Conference Problem).....	1
Infantry Regiment in Attack (Conference Problem).....	1
Map Problem No. 1; Series V.....	4
Map Problem No. 2; Series V.....	4
Map Problem No. 3; Series V.....	4
Map Problem No. 4; Series V.....	4

TOTAL HOURS 37

GRAND TOTAL HOURS 1,016

BASIC COURSE 1930-1931

For the year 1930-1931 the Basic Course at Philadelphia began September 15, 1930, and was completed June 26, 1931. The subjects covered and the assignment by hours was as follows:

GENERAL SUBJECTS

	Hours
Administration	60
Naval Law	110
Topography	150
Drill and Command.....	127
Field Engineering	20
Hygiene	5
Signal Communications.....	78
Boats and Seamanship.....	30

SUB-TOTAL 580

WEAPONS

	Hours
Rifle and Pistol Marksmanship.....	114
Automatic Rifle.....	50
Musketry	20
Machine Gun.....	130
37mm Gun.....	33
3-inch Trench Mortar.....	8
Thompson Sub-machine Gun.....	10
Bayonet	20
Grenades	10
Naval Ordnance and Gunnery.....	40
Individual Combat	105

SUB-TOTAL 540

TACTICS

	Hours
Scouting and Patrolling.....	20
Organization	2
Combat Principles: Rifle Squad, section, platoon and company in attack and defense; machine gun section, platoon and company in attack and defense; howitzer platoon in attack and defense.....	89
Security	15
Bush Warfare.....	4

SUB-TOTAL 130

Total time assignment, 1,250 hours.

Five weeks to be spent in camp at Mount Gretna, Pa., in May and June, 1931, firing all weapons and engaging in tactical exercises and instructions in practical topography.

During the school year just completed (year of 1932-33) changes have been made in the courses of the Marine Corps Schools to adapt the system of education more fittingly to naval requirements rather than strictly army or military requirements in the restricted sense, which it is expected will tend to make the officer personnel of the Corps better able to carry out expeditionary duties with the Navy including all classes of landing operations with the Fleet.

On June 6, 1933, twenty-eight second lieutenants who were commissioned in June, 1932, completed the course at the Basic School in Philadelphia with satisfactory averages and received diplomas of graduation, of these twenty-two were members of the Class of 1932 at the Naval Academy and six were appointed from the ranks in the Marine Corps.

On May 31, 1933, 29 graduates of the Company Officers' Course and 19 graduates from the Field Officers' Course were given their diplomas by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Colonel Henry L. Roosevelt. Included in the graduates of the Field Officers' Course were three officers of the U. S. Navy.

During the month of March, 1932, the students of the Basic Course, through the courtesy of the Governor of Pennsylvania, were permitted to camp at the Pennsylvania State Rifle Range at Mount Gretna, Pa., for the purpose of receiving practical instruction in the use of infantry weapons, minor tactics and topography.

During the month of March, 1932, the students of the Company Officers' Course attended a series of demonstrations and lectures on naval ordnance and gunnery at the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., through the courtesy of the Superintendent of the Academy, Rear Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. N.

Since the establishment of the Marine Corps Schools at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va., in 1920, the following officers have served as Commandant of the Schools:

Lieutenant Colonel John C. Beaumont, 1920-1922,
Colonel Ben H. Fuller, 1922-1924,
Colonel Robert H. Dunlap, 1924-1927,
Colonel James C. Breckinridge, 1928-1929,
Brigadier General Randolph C. Berkeley, 1930-1931,
Brigadier General James C. Breckinridge, 1932-1933.

From 1920 to 1933 inclusive the names of 1,120 officers of the Marine Corps have been borne on the students roster of the Marine Corps Schools, 488 in the Basic Course, 374 in the Company Officers' Course, and 258 in the Field Officers' Course. This tends to show very graphically the importance of these schools in the indoctrination and education of the officer personnel of the Corps to fit them for the duties of leadership required by the Mission. The present policy of the Major General Commandant requires every second lieutenant upon receiving his commission to take the Basic Course, this to be followed later when appropriate by a tour in the Company Officers' Course, and still later in his career by a tour in the Field Officers' Course. Such a system of education will fit officers for courses at the War Colleges and other post-graduate institutions to prepare them for special duties and for higher command and staff duties.

The Far Eastern League

BY CAPTAIN DUDLEY W. KNOX, U.S.N.

■ The formation of a "Far Eastern League" comprising Japan, Manchukuo, China, Siam, Soviet Russia and the Philippines is advocated by Professor Kamikawa of the Tokyo Imperial University in the April 15th issue of the practically official Diplomatic Review of Japan. This must be regarded as highly significant of the current policies of the Japanese Government and as furnishing an important index to many puzzling developments in the Orient within the last two years.

The proposed League is suggested by Professor Kamikawa as the natural outcome of the Manchurian dispute resulting in the Japanese withdrawal from the League of Nations. The Far Eastern League, the Pan-American Union and the League of Nations are pointed to as logical sub-divisions of the world into regional organizations, with the body at Geneva perhaps having a more world-wide scope than the other two.

The purposes of the new consortium of Oriental nations are defined as first, and foremost, the establishment of Far Eastern peace and the prevention of war among Far Eastern states; second, the realization of peace in the Orient through the cooperation of the states comprising the new League; third, the promotion of commerce and prosperity in the Far East, and fourth, the development of Far Eastern social elements and culture. The new League is thus projected as a peace organization, an economic combine and a cultural and social organ, which are regarded as paralleling the salient features of the League of Nations.

The region comprised within the term "Far East" is defined as having China as a center and including Eastern Siberia on the north, Indo-China and part of the South Seas on the south, and Japan on the east.

While the immediate cause of initiating Japan's new foreign policy in the recent dispute with the League of Nations it is claimed that the effect of such new policy will not be contrary to, but actually in keeping with the purposes of the League of Nations. Peace will be preserved in the Orient more effectively by Oriental methods than by the actions of a western body which cannot sufficiently understand Far Eastern conditions and psychology. The change is one of machinery rather than of purpose and principle.

A cardinal condition of membership in the new League will be that States must have their political headquarters in the Far East, no matter how great their other interests in that region may be. Thus England and France, each of whom possess immense interests in the Orient, would be excluded from membership, as would necessarily be the United States also, with her substantially lesser interests.

Soviet Russia is regarded as an exceptional case because the wide extent of her Oriental domain, directly connected by land with European territories, makes it virtually impossible to leave her out. The eligibility of the Philippines is also affected by the special cir-

cumstance of their independence being merely partial at present. Their sovereignty would have to be completed before admittance. Soviet Russia and the Philippines are therefore not placed in the category of original member states, like Japan, China, Manchukuo and Siam, but are considered as likely subsequent accessions.

It is proposed that the organization machinery of the new Far Eastern League should consist merely of a Council with headquarters at Tokyo. Thus its procedure would be much simpler than the League of Nations, with its Council and Assembly and other organs. On the other hand the administration of the Tokyo body would be more elaborate and effective than that of the Pan American Union which has merely a Conference of representatives meeting every few years.

The general idea of a "Monroe Doctrine of Asia" or a Pan-Asiatic movement in some form has been under discussion in the Japanese press for many years and has found numerous adherents. It received renewed and more serious attention after advocacy in an article by Viscount Kaneko which was published in "Contemporary Japan" last September, almost coincident with the official recognition of the State of Manchukuo by Japan. The almost official standing of the Diplomatic Review in which Professor Kamikawa develops the general thought of a "Monroe Doctrine of Asia" into a concrete proposal for a Far Eastern League must be assumed as giving such proposal great significance.

A principal obstacle to any such development has heretofore been the antipathy of China, including Manchuria, to Japanese dominance. With the creation of Manchukuo under virtual Japanese control a state was formed which presumably could be counted on as certain to join a Pan-Asiatic movement, and the importance of this in Japanese eyes may well be much greater than Japan's membership in the League of Nations.

Her withdrawal from the League of Nations has the result of giving greater force in arguments in favor of forming a Far Eastern League. It also offers a greater reason for penetration into China beyond the confines of Manchuria proper. The steady advance of Japanese troops seems to indicate other Manchukuo's in the making. The Japanese Army did not stop with the conquest of Jehol, claimed to be properly a part of Manchuria and thus belonging to Manchukuo. It has already advanced into two other provinces. It pushed forward into Hopei Province, in which Peiping is situated, and into Chahar, a country of the Mongols rather than the Chinese or the Manchus.


There remain vast territories of Mongols and Chinese still further west and south out of which many new semi-independent states, suitable for joining the Far Eastern League, could be created. Whether or not this will be done is purely a question of what policy in that regard Japan may have adopted, or will decide upon in the future.

The Siege of Nanking

BY MAJOR JOHN A. GRAY, U.S.M.C.

■ Nanking, ancient capital of China and seat of the present kaleidoscopic government, has through the centuries set the stage for many of the country's most poignant dramas. Twenty years ago at Nanking was enacted a prelude to the more serious incident which occurred there in 1927. Before giving an account of the siege of Nanking in August, 1913, it may be well to relate briefly the events which led to that epic of Chinese military history.

October 10, 1911, signaled the outbreak of the revolution which resulted in the proclamation of the Chinese Republic at Nanking on January 1, 1912, with Dr. Sun Yat Sen as provincial president, and in the abdication of the Manchu Dynasty on February twelfth following. The leading political figure in Peking at



U. S. S. Saratoga, Flagship, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, 1913

this time was Yuan Shih Kai, who was manoeuvring with all the adroitness of oriental diplomacy to grasp the reins of power. The selection of the representatives of the new republic at last completed, Parliament was opened at Peking on April 7, 1913, with a huge southern majority and great hopes of a solution to the deadlock between reactionary factions and the new idealistic groups whose most prominent leader was Sun Yat Sen. These hopes were not to be realized. Yuan Shih Kai, inherently a despot and hoping perhaps to be Number One in a dynasty founded by himself, was antagonistic to the democratic ideas which were being promulgated in the south. Marshaling his powerful political forces he was enabled to secure the sanction of what was known as the great Reorganization loan of twenty-five million pounds sterling, negotiated through the financial agents of six foreign powers. To its everlasting credit may it be said that the United States was not one of them. For most of this money never reached China but went back into the coffers of the nations financing the loan for alleged debts owed them by the old regime. Sufficient funds from this source, however, were placed at the disposal of Yuan Shih Kai to enable him to push forward his ambitious plans for the establishment of a dictatorship. Exasperated to the point of despair the southern and central provinces began openly to arm.

On July 10, 1913, the first guns of the so-called

Second Revolution were fired from the Hukow Forts in Kiangse Province by the provincial troops under General Li Lieh Chun. The south, ill furnished with munitions and practically penniless, was opposed by the six well trained divisions raised and organized by Yuan Shih Kai, which had proved themselves invincible only eighteen months before, and was never a menace to the northern forces chiefly because of the lack of cooperation between the various southern leaders in the field. The troops under General Li Lieh Chun, who numbered at most twenty thousand men, were gradually driven back from the river into the mountains of Kiangse. At Nanking, Huang Hsin assumed command of the Nanking garrison which had revolted to a man. He attempted a march up the Pukow railway in the direction of Tientsin but saw his effort break down from lack of organization and fled to Japan. The Nanking troops, although deserter by their leader, offered a magnificent resistance to the capture of the southern capital. This was effected only after a siege by an army of fifty thousand men commanded by the redoubtable general, Chang Hsun, operating in conjunction with General Feng Kuo-chang and a force of picked men dispatched from Peking. It was at Nanking that the south made its last stand in the brief revolution of July-August, 1913. When the plucky garrison was finally conquered the Second Revolution virtually ended and the way was clear for the autocratic rule of Yuan Shih Kai which followed.

On board that old war horse of the American Navy, the U. S. S. Saratoga, veteran of the Battle of Santiago and Flagship of the United States Asiatic Fleet, midsummer, 1913, was unusually trying. The disturbed conditions in the Yangtse Valley had necessitated the retention of the flagship on the river instead of the customary annual cruise north to the cooler and more salubrious climate of Chefoo. The sun beat down from a sky of brass and the intense humidity wore on the nerves of officers and men alike. The weeks dragged by with the ship surging on her anchor chains in the rushing yellow waters off Kiukiang, Chinkiang, or Wuhu. On the morning of August seventeenth while anchored at Chinkiang, our lethargy vanished like river mist before



Outer Wall of Nanking. Lion Hill in left background.



On the city wall after the bombardment.

the rising sun with the news that the ship was getting under way immediately for Nanking where all hell had broken loose. Nanking is situated on the right bank of the Yangtse River, forty-seven miles above Chinkiang and two hundred and eight miles from Shanghai. When we stood in and anchored astern of the *U. S. S. Cincinnati* a small international fleet lay above the line of fire from northern field batteries located across the river from the city at Pukow. Six war vessels representing four nations were here present and several deserve more than passing mention because of the historic roles they were destined to play in the cataclysm so soon to engulf the world.


The six ships were anchored in column of two ships, abreast. The *Saratoga* lay directly astern of the *Cincinnati* in the column nearest Pukow. An armored cruiser of eight thousand two hundred tons normal displacement, the *Saratoga* was laid down in Cramp's Ship Yard, Philadelphia, in 1890, and was placed in commission in 1893. Jayne's Fighting Ships, 1912, rates the *Saratoga* "a good sea boat," and not one of her complement of four hundred and eighty-two officers and men but heartily concurred in this opinion. Forty years from the date she joined the Navy as the *U. S. S. New York*, this staunch vessel was back on the Asiatic Station as *U. S. S. Rochester* doing her bit along the troubled China coast. The story of her long service on the Seven Seas is worthy of a Conrad. Immediately to port of the *Saratoga* lay the Japanese cruiser *Suma* and inboard of the *Suma* in relation to the city the sun glistened on the light grey paint and shining bright work of as smart a ship as ever breasted the Yangtse current, the German cruiser *Emden*. A brief space and she would part these waters on a mission of destruction to enemy commerce. Her task accomplished soon this proud vessel would lie a mass of shell torn steel, twisted and broken on the reefs of Keeling Island in the far South Pacific. In the line ahead of these three ships, on the port hand of the *Cincinnati*, was *H. M. S. Hampshire*. This gallant cruiser was fated to plunge to her grave off the Orkney Islands, carrying with her that famous soldier, Field Marshal, Earl Kitchener. To port of the *Hampshire* and forward of the *Emden* was the German gunboat *Luchs*. The *Saratoga* and *Cincinnati* were commanded respectively by Commanders Henry A. Wiley and Jehu V. Chase. Both of these officers later attained to the highest command afloat in the United States Navy as Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, before retiring for age from active service.

The city of Nanking covers an area roughly quadrilateral in shape, enclosed by one of those great crene-


lated walls that are the most picturesque and distinctive feature of some two thousand Chinese cities. The periphery of Nanking's outer wall is said to measure twenty-five miles. It is pierced by ten cavernous gaeways closed by huge gates of iron. The western wall of the city closely skirts the Yangtse River and in the northwest corner partly encircles Lion Hill. On this hill were mounted a number of guns which with a large gun on Fukweishan Fort, a hill inside the eastern wall near the Tai Ping gate, were the rallying points for defense within the city. Near the river and within artillery range north of Lion Hill, were forts held by the southern troops on Tiger Hill. A small fort at the foot of Tiger Hill guarded the approach to these works. Eastward from the city walls a plain extends several miles to low hills which are dominated by Purple Mountain, the key to the defense of the capital. On the far side of the plain near the hills are the great tombs of the Ming Emperors who once ruled China from this ancient city.

At ten o'clock on the morning of August 14, 1913, General Chang Hsun took the southern forces by surprise and captured Purple Mountain and another fort nearer the eastern wall. From this point of vantage he was driven back by the southern troops who by noon had reestablished themselves on the crest of the mountain. A desperate engagement for possession of the mountain followed and all that afternoon the Northerners clung to the ridge from which they were finally forced at about six p. m. During the first day of fighting at Purple Mountain, guns rushed up by the Southerners to Tienpaochen, the peak nearest the city, and the large gun on Fukweishan Fort inside the eastern wall, were used to great effect against the northern troops clinging to the ridge. The initial attack by way of Purple Mountain had completely failed and the defenders of Nanking were confident of their ability to hold the city.

Fighting continued all day of August fifteenth on Purple Mountain. The southern troops controlled all but Maoshan, the most easterly hill of the group. The Northerners, driven back the day before from Tienpaochen and the crest of the mountain, made a determined stand at Maoshan. Field guns at Tienpaochen and the gun at Fukweishan bombarded Maoshan throughout the day. At shorter ranges between the crest of Purple Mountain and Maoshan rapid fire guns were employed by both sides with no advantage to either during the day, which closed with the de-



S. M. S. Emden



S. M. S. Emden on rocks 200 yards from beach.

fenders still in control of the mountain and the red flag of the Northerners waving from Maoshan. At ten o'clock that night Chang Hsun's troops made another effort to advance but were repulsed with heavy losses. A fight occurred also at the foot of Tiger Hill near the river between troops of General Feng Kuo-chang from Pukow and the garrison of the small fort guarding the approach to the defense on the hill. A detachment of four hundred Northerners attacked this fort but were repulsed. In the afternoon, however, the Tiger Hill Forts raised the "red flag," thereby declaring allegiance to the government.

Continuous fighting on August sixteenth ended with neither side gaining an advantage. But within the city treachery developed. Wu, Hsu, and Wang, three southern officers, issued a proclamation on the afternoon of the sixteenth vowing loyalty to the government. On the same afternoon merchants of the city sent on demand seventeen thousand dollars to Colonel Wu's yamen. That night about two hundred southern soldiers attempted to loot the Prefectural Yamen occupied by Wu. Having suspected trouble Wu was prepared and his troops killed sixteen and captured one hundred and twenty of the looters. At six o'clock the following morning Wu had the unfortunate captives beheaded and their heads displayed above the walls of his yamen. In order to give foreigners an opportunity to leave the city promises were obtained on the seventeenth that all firing would cease until two p. m. But at ten o'clock Lion Hill and the batteries on the Pukow side of the river began exchanging shots. It was at this juncture that the U. S. S. *Saratoga* arrived from Chinkiang. Shortly after our arrival fighting was resumed on Purple Mountain. The northern troops advancing made a determined assault on the mountain crest and drove the Southerners to Tienpaochen where hard fighting occurred. Here Chang Hsun

succeeded in driving out the enemy and for a time again controlled Purple Mountain. But not for long did he retain his advantage, as at five p. m. the Southerners counter attacked and succeeded with a loss of about two hundred and thirty men killed and wounded in regaining Tienpaochen. There was fighting also within the city during the day when the Northerners made two unsuccessful attempts to reach the Chao Yang Men, the gate immediately south of the Tai Ping Men. Across the river at Pukow the northern batteries were particularly active and continued their bombardment of Lion Hill up until sunset.

At one o'clock in the morning of August eighteenth officers of the *Saratoga* trying to win a few hours' sleep in the humid heat on cots placed end to end on the quarterdeck were roused by the rumble of shells overhead from a renewal of shelling from the Pukow batteries which continued until nearly four a. m. At ten o'clock that morning General Chang Hsun ordered a bombardment of Tai Ping Men. There was no reply from the city and Chang Hsun believing the way was clear marched up and forced the gate. A portion of his troops had passed through when there was a terrific explosion from a mine inside the gate which killed a number of men and resulted in a retreat beyond the walls. At two o'clock a red flag was observed flying over the Tai Ping Men. Chang Hsun who was directing the attack from the Yao Hua Men took this as a signal of surrender and advanced to take the city. As his men reached the city walls they were met by rifle fire which inflicted heavy casualties. On the opposite side of the city at Lion Hill the guns of the defenders had been silenced by the Pukow batteries. As evening approached the Northerners having captured Tienpaochen were fighting their way into Nanking and the fall of the capital appeared imminent. Just before daylight on August Nineteenth Chang Hsun succeeded in finally clearing Purple Mountain. The Northerners now had Nanking completely invested. West of the city General Feng Kuo-chang and about eighteen thousand men held Pukow. Tiger Hill and the country north of the river, Purple Mountain and the Plains east of the city, the country south of the river, all were in Chang Hsun's hands. Inside the walls at Fukweishan Fort a desperate band of Southerners still held out. For twenty-four hours longer they repelled every attempt to overwhelm their brave defense but their doom was sealed. Surrounded and vastly outnumbered they fought on until the waves of Chang Hsun's turbaned warriors rolled over them and the dripping heads of the survivors looked down upon the looting and destruction that followed in the time honored Chinese way the final capture of the city.



Behind the Record

BY COLONEL H. C. REISINGER, U.S.M.C.

■ "Murdered on the morning of the 22nd by natives near Dinalupidan, P. I., while absent without leave."

Thus does the muster roll of Company G, 2nd Regiment of Marines, for September, 1902, write "Finis" to the careers of three privates within the first year of their service. Behind this laconic muster roll record lies a story.

"Papa" Fletcher, famed of the Philippine Scouts in the Southern Islands, sang with more truth than poetry:

"Oh, there's many a man been murdered
In Luzon, in Samar, in Mindanao!
Oh, there's many a man been murdered in
the Philippines
And lies sleeping in some lonesome grave."

That the disappearance of these men of Company G is not still shrouded in mystery, that they do not lie sleeping, unburied, in the forests of Luzon is due to the efficient work of one diminutive Filipino "Secreto" and the dramatic ability of an elderly captain of native constabulary.

September, 1902, found Company G assigned to garrison the town of Subig at the head of Subig Bay in Luzon. The late Major General Eli K. Cole, then a captain, commanded the company. We were a new outfit, having reached the Islands in the middle of February. After a few months' service in Olongapo we had been sent to Subig the first of August. The town was much the same as hundreds of other coastal settlements of the Islands—built of nipa, straggling along sandy streets, shaded by thousands of cocoanut trees. There were a few frame buildings but the town afforded little in the way of diversion for the men. The swimming was fine and there were some deer in the high savannas across the bay. Our camp, which consisted of nipa shacks roofed with cogon, was located on a sandy spit, lying between the bay and a bayou, which separated us from the town. Across the Bay, Cincos Pecos raised its massive head to afford a wonderful setting for the magnificent sunsets for which this land-locked harbor is celebrated.

Shortly after our arrival, cholera broke out in Subig. Then for several months the garrison lived under rigid restrictions while we conducted a campaign of sanitation, which finally resulted in stopping the plague. It was uphill work, for at first we received no cooperation from the natives. Some of the more ignorant of the townsmen believed that we brought the disease with us.

After the usual excitement of shaking down in our new camp, time began to hang heavy on our hands. The monotony of our existence made itself felt and nostalgia became a problem. In such an isolated post, homesickness frequently developed into melancholia, which, in turn, results in a mild form of mental derangement. The Foreign Legion of France has a name for it; "La Cafard," the cockroach that eats the brain. We did our best to occupy ourselves and the men by a varied program of drill and exercises and by frequent hiking trips into the adjacent country. Some types of men lack the resources to amuse themselves.

The city bred, used to noise, bustle and cheap diversions, go to pieces silently and unexpectedly in the quiet monotony of a small tropical station. Back in 1902 we did not have the movies to lighten the dull hours that come between dark and "lights out," to send men to bed with the laughter of a comic or the thrill of a drama lingering in their hearts.

Lieutenant Pickering, with thirty enlisted men, was detached from the Company shortly after our arrival in Subig and sent to Moron, north of the Merivales range. Early in September, Captain Cole was injured by a fall, which resulted in his transfer to the hospital at Cavite, leaving me in command of the Company.

It was quite a responsibility for a youngster, and a lonely detail. "Lonely" is a mild word for the isolation that surrounds an officer under such circumstances. To eat alone, to walk alone, to lack any congenial contacts, to have only ones' self to fall back upon socially; that was my life. By nature I am gregarious—I like people. My days were deadly in tedium and enforced silences. The existent regimental orders required the presence of one officer on the post at all times. Being the only officer with the company, I was out of luck. A ride to Castellejos and a monthly hike to Olongapo was about the limit of my peregrinations. My only companion was First Sergeant Nau, a fine old soldier, long since retired. I have always felt a deep gratitude for his unfailing efforts to lighten my evening hours with the color of his reminiscences which covered a wide field of varied service. At one time he had been a cavalryman of the old style and possessed, as a souvenir of that experience, a pair of marvelous mustachios, second only to those of the famous Colonel Tommy Tompkins of the 7th Cavalry. Somehow the hours dragged through to days and the days to weeks. Occasionally some friend would drop in for the night, making a red letter day in the calendar of monotony.

After the pay day in September, Privates Smith, Jones and Robinson went absent without leave. These names are, of course, fictitious. Eventually the three were dropped as deserters. We made every effort to find these men for several reasons. Desertions were rare amongst the Marines in the Islands, and further, the personal effects of the men left behind in quarters did not indicate a preconceived plan to desert. They were unarmed and had taken no changes of clothing. Lastly, these men were of average dependability, had clear records, and were not rated as persistent gamblers. Gambling is likely to become prevalent in isolated posts and be prolific of assorted trouble. Through our investigations we were able to trace them to Olongapo, but beyond, their movements were lost in silence.

Along in January, 1903, we received the welcome orders to transfer to Olongapo. Five months of such duty was a liberal dose. We were relieved by the Constabulary Detachment under the command of Captain Gwynn. This was part of the program involved in the transfer from the military to the civil govern-

ment of the islands. Later, I was given command of Company "A" and remained in Olongapo when my old company was transferred to Cavite.

Nothing further was heard about Privates Smith, Jones and Robinson of "G" Company, until sometime during the next rainy season. One tempestuous day, when we were feeling the edge of a typhoon that swept on to Formosa, my Filipino house "boy" ushered a native Tao into my quarters. The man was drenched to the skin. In every outward detail, he appeared to be one of the poorer class of natives, small farmers and fishermen, who eked out a precarious living in the barrios around Subig Bay. This man said he wished to speak to me, and in so saying his eyes flicked toward the Filipino servant, an almost imperceptible motion of his head accompanying the glance. I told Benigno, my "boy," to clear out. When we were alone, the Tao lifted his rain-soaked camisa and turning back the rag which he wore as a belt, displayed the badge of a "Secreto," the detective force of the Constabulary. I was wondering which particular crime I might be involved in when he told me that he was on the trail of a rumor that three marines had been murdered near Olongapo some months before. They had been seen, he said, to leave Benictican, a small barrio of Olongapo, in company with several Filipinos. Later these natives had returned to the barrio and displayed considerable money. Under the influence of strong drink, there had been some boasting, which led to the belief that they had murdered the men whom they were supposed to guide. It did not take much to connect the rumor with the disappearance of the men of Company "G." Captain Gwynn, who knew of the disappearance of my marines had sent this man to me. We checked dates and data, while I gave him the story of the disappearance and furnished such detailed description of the men as was possible. After urging me to say nothing whatsoever of his visit, he stepped into the murk of the storm to take his life in his hands while living amongst the suspected ones during his investigations. His was a dangerous assignment, a false move and he would have been mincemeat.

Several times after this interview, I hiked to Subig to spend a day with Captain Gwynn. Although I usually have a fine time with this old timer, I got nothing out of him about the murders except that the secreto was on the job and lying low. How he communicated with Gwynn without arousing suspicion was a mystery. Gwynn's soldiers, being natives, were not to be trusted with the secret of this little Tao's identity. However, I am sure he kept touch constantly with the Captain. So the matter stood until early in February, 1903. One day I suddenly was ordered by the commanding officer of Olongapo to go at once to Subig to view the remains of some men recovered near the Dinalupidan trail in the forest east of Olongapo. I set out immediately over the trail. I got there in the afternoon to find in Captain Gwynn's quarters a miscellaneous collection of bones together with three skulls, all viciously hacked and split by bolo cuts. The native has his own technique in handling a bolo; he rarely thrusts but delivers his blow with a drawing swing, productive of the maximum damage. There was but little doubt that these men had met death at the hands of natives.

Three wooden coffins had been sent from Olongapo and set on tressels in the room. It became my sad task to sort out these skulls and bones and secure

them by tape and tacks in the coffins in preparation for burial. I had known the men quite well. They were of marked characteristics, not only in build but in facial contour and each possessed some outstanding physical quality. For these reasons my last service to the dead was not so difficult as might be supposed.

Four Filipinos had been arrested under suspicion of connection with this murder. Gwynn was taking no chances with them, and, to prevent their escape, kept them secured in improvised stocks in his bamboo jail. It was his habit, not only to keep them separate, but to examine them individually and at night.

Captain Gwynn, alone in command of his dusky detachment, always welcomed company, and at his request I stayed on in Subig. Through this arrangement I was present when one of the suspects, a comparatively young man, broke down under questioning. The scene and circumstances of his confession still remain vividly in my recollection.

Gwynn was somewhat of an actor. During his roving life in the West and in Latin America, he had been a soldier of fortune as well as seeing service in the police and detective forces. He was well equipped for the job that confronted him. To procure from a Filipino any sort of admission against his interest is a colossal undertaking for a white man, for they carry a strong strain of Chinese blood in their veins; to seek such damaging evidence as of murder, seemed wholly futile. Gwynn knew all this as well as any one, and I was to discover he had laid his plans accordingly.

There was a full moon that night which shone with such yellow brilliance that one could read by its light. There is a soft mysterious, pulsating quality to the tropical nights. Nothing moves but the fronds of the palms, shadows seem to harbor unseen life within their dark hearts, outlines grow dim and a light mist walks wraithlike through the cocoanut and banana groves. The white man feels the eerie quality of the beauty of such a night, but the native sees his world peopled by evil spirits and demons. Captain Gwynn knowing the awe such a night would inspire, decided to question the prisoners. When the first suspect was brought into Gwynn's quarters, his whole bearing expressed dread and fear, more of the supernatural than of the white officer he was to face. There was no lights in the room. The dim, half light within came solely from the infiltration of the moonlight. In one corner, barely distinguishable, were the coffins containing the remains of the murdered men. No word was spoken while the prisoner was led to a seat against one wall and placed facing the coffins. A Filipino priest, who accompanied him, took a chair by his side. In the corner, away from the coffins, sat a native stenographer. Thus the scene was set. Then Captain Gwynn, dressed entirely in white, entered. As he was a tall, thin man with a luxuriant growth of white hair, he made quite a ghostly figure. I heard a sharp intake of breath from the prisoner as the Captain halted, rigid, erect, by one of the windows. Silence for a few minutes. Gwynn waited for the scene to sink into the dull brain of this Tao. On signal the priest in the local dialect, began. In a low, earnest tone he implored the prisoner to save his soul by cleansing it of his criminal knowledge. The harsh, guttural, monosyllabic Tagalog of the priest's exhortation was the only sound within the dim room for a quarter of an hour. Finally he ceased talking. Then, after a moment's oppressive silence, Gwynn took up the ex-

amination. As he spoke he moved constantly, noiselessly through the filtering moonbeams, his eyes always on the prisoner. He was fluent in either Spanish or Tagalog. He would gradually increase the tempo of his voice; it would rise and then modulate. He spoke in a sort of monotonous singsong. Minutes passed, he talked on, the modulations of his voice, the ceaseless motion, quiet, cat-like, became fatiguing even to my clear conscience. All this time the prisoner watched his every movement, his eyes following the tall white figure, fascinated, fearful, uneasy but helpless to break the spell. Then after seeming hours of harangue, Gwynn gradually achieved a crescendo as he arrived in the corner by the coffins. Here, facing the suspect who was now muttering incoherently, he crouched forward, speaking rapidly and with a peculiar intensity. Gwynn held the man as a snake holds a bird, hypnotized. Now he was ready for the climax he had planned. As his voice snapped accusation at the trembling, shrinking native, like the rattle of a machine gun, Gwynn moved directly in front of him and suddenly, leaning forward, uttered a wierd cry and thrust before the terrified eyes of the prisoner, a skull which burned green in the eerie light.


I must confess that my own hair stood on end. I had not been forewarned, but doubt if that would have made much difference. The culprit's scream startled the night; for a second the flimsy walls of the house shook with sound. There was agony in that cry, horror and, it seemed to me, release. A soul, black but uncomprehending, spoke! The man slid out of his chair onto his knees, and began to babble the story of the treacherous murder. In a torrent of words, rushing one upon the other, the story was told, every word that he uttered to be taken down by the stenographer. Captain Gwynn wearily sank into the nearest chair—the play was done and well done.

The ravings of this murderer lasted fully three quarters of an hour. It was a period of such hysterical intensity, that when the broken man was led away, I walked out on the beach before the house to fill my lungs with fresh clean air, for it seemed to me that I had been living in a strange, evil, oppressive cavern peopled by tortured shapes. After a while Captain Gwynn joined me. He explained that he had made a phosphorous paste from sulphur matches and had covered the skull with this gruesome mixture. He was tired and subdued. His role in the drama had cost him heavily, mentally and physically.

The end is told in the record. These three marines had gone without permission to the town of Olongapo, and then to the barrio of Benictican. Bored with the limitations of Subig, they were looking for entertainment and refreshments. In Benictican, the plot was hatched to lure them out on the trail and murder them. The people were poor in that barrio and the marines had incautiously displayed much wealth. The conspirators told of the greater pleasures to be found in the towns on upper Manila Bay, just a short hike across the neck of land to the east. The marines, unarmed, left with two Filipinos as guides. They were set upon when crossing a small stream by at least four men and were literally hacked to pieces. Their bodies were dragged into the brush and when arms or legs restricted the advance of the murderers, they were lopped off and left on the trail.

It was not a pleasant story, this confession. To avoid possible difficulty with the enlisted men of the regiment, the prisoners were not brought to Olongapo until the conclusion of their trial and their sentence by civil authorities. Later they were hung in execution of their sentences.

That is the story behind the record now thirty-one years old.



Should the Marine Corps Use Chemical Agents in Guerrilla Warfare?

BY FIRST LIEUTENANT E. E. LINSERT, U.S.M.C.

■ Many discussions have been held among the officers of the several services relative to the advantages and disadvantages that the use of chemical agents might have in guerrilla warfare, and in this article an attempt is made to weigh both sides.

The use of chemical agents in any war is still viewed with alarm, if not downright terror, by a large proportion of the citizens of the United States, and though the recent use of tear gas on the Bonus Expeditionary Force in Washington did much to educate the public, there can be no doubt that the moment press agencies had spread the information that the Marines were using chemical agents, all such articles being headed, "Marines Slaughter Defenseless People, Marines Kill Bandits with Poison Gas, Innocent Citizens of Costaragua Gassed by Marines," etc., the editorial writers would take up their virtuous (sic) pens and start a tirade against "gas". It would matter not at all that most of them would not even know where the country was located in which the chemical agent was reported to have been used, would have no accurate report of how or why it was used, and would not believe any honest, conservative reports of the matter. Newspapers are a business, and if more papers can be sold by wild headlines and sentimental ramblings of ignorant editorial writers, then no one can blame the papers for taking advantage of that fact. But such writings quickly arouse public opinion in this country, and if chemical agents were used in guerrilla warfare it would be absolutely necessary to release accurate and detailed information of their use to the press each time our forces found occasion to utilize them.

Foreign powers would scarcely bother to mention the use of chemical agents by our troops, except in an attempt to embarrass our government. The guerrilla forces might be expected to contribute exaggerated stories of the killing of innocent women and children by the chemical agent, but they will always be careful to refrain from describing the brutal butchering of any of our forces unfortunate enough to fall into their hands. The governments in power which are being supported by our forces will be in favor of any method taken to rid the country of guerrillas but, though an intimate knowledge of the humane efficacy of chemical agents will impress them, they may be expected to give little vociferous support to their use unless such use of chemical agents appears beneficial as a means of keeping them in power.

At the present time there is a convention, dated February 7, 1923, in effect among Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, in which the five republics agree that they "consider that the use in warfare of asphyxiating gases, poisons, or similar substances, as well as analogous liquids, materials, or devices, is contrary to humanitarian principles, and to international law, and obligate themselves by the

present convention not to use said substances in time of war."

A resolution was adopted at the Fifth International Conference of American states in Santiago, Chile, in 1923 in tenor similar to the foregoing, and was adopted by the United States and most of the republics of Central and South America. It is interesting to note that Mexico, Panama, Bolivia, and Peru are the only countries that did not adopt this resolution.

As guerrilla warfare can not be classified as "warfare" within its accepted sense as between nations, and has as its object the extermination of murderous robber bands who use any means or weapons that they can devise for carrying on their pillaging, neither of the above agreements would appear to affect the use of chemical agents by forces of our country charged with their extermination.

If it has been decided to use chemical agents it is necessary to decide what weapons or what methods are suitable for their dispersion. Generally speaking, their dispersion may be considered under two distinct classifications, by ground troops and by airplanes.

Ground troops have available to them, at present, grenades, candles, mortars, and various other larger weapons for dispersion. As most of the units in guerrilla warfare are small, and since mobility is demanded at all times, even of the detachment that may be garrisoning a town or village, only grenades, candles, or mortars appear suitable. Even mortars are precluded from trail use by their unwieldiness and slowness in getting into action. When one considers that the average guerrilla contact is an affair of about five minutes it will be readily understood that mortars would be worse than useless. However, in stabilized situations mortars might be useful except for the fact that any band of guerrillas daring enough to attack a position held by Marines would be so constantly on the move as to offer no suitable target. It should also be remembered that no detachment is going to supinely and passively defend such a position. Marines can move too, and in the counter-attack which is sure to follow, the hasty effort of coordinating mortar fire would scarcely show worthwhile results. Mortars would appear to have value only as a threat in the defense of towns or villages. In bush warfare the target is seldom over 250 yards distant, and no one would recommend a cumbersome mortar for a target that close. In special situations such as in the attack of a strongly entrenched guerrilla position (seldom encountered) mortars would be of incalculable value, and a reserve supply might well be carried in stock by the Expeditionary Quartermaster so they may be readily available.

Chemicals in guerrilla warfare could be more conveniently used in the form of grenades or candles, carried by individual members of a patrol, but again the short duration of the average contact must be consid-

ered, as well as the irksome weight of the munitions. The average Marine would shortly lose (?) his heavy chemical grenades or candles on the trail unless he had cause to believe in their superiority over H. E. grenades or the rifle itself. The writer believes that there are times when both chemical grenades and candles would be of great value in guerrilla contacts on the trail, but such times are few and far between. Chemical grenades could be advantageously carried on pack animals, for use when a patrol is held up by guerrillas. Such grenades would be available for use of the main body in support of the attack, but unless the wind were in the rear or the entire patrol were equipped with gas masks their use would be as disastrous to our troops as to the enemy. They are suitable as to range, and judiciously used could be of value to any patrol in bush warfare.

Airplanes would find use for chemical agents in special situations, particularly in the attack of a guerrilla position that had been definitely located and which ground troops were attacking in conjunction with air support. Because chemical agents for airplanes may be stored at a landing field close to the shore or rail-head, a suitable supply of expulsion bombs with various fillers, could be kept on hand, as well as material and bulk gases for spraying from non-pressure wing tanks. Fuselage tanks are impracticable due to the possibility of a landing on a rough field away from the main airdrome. Either observation or attack planes could be used for chemical attack. The amphibian types would be suitable for bombing, but the bulky wing tank would not be suitable to this type of plane, as it would ship considerable water in landing and taking off and mal-functioning of valve equipment would be the natural result.

Transportation of chemical agents would offer no serious difficulty although it would be necessary to have all containers of munitions water-tight and moisture proof as streams will have to be crossed and torrential rains encountered. Once the munitions had arrived in the hands of the detachment that would actually use them they could be unpacked and kept available for use on short notice. The reserve supply would remain packed until required. Storage of chemical munitions would not be different from storage of any other munitions. Repairs to gas masks would very properly be made temporarily in the field but a repair section of the Service Company at the headquarters of the expeditionary force should be prepared to salvage masks and parts and re-issue these masks to the troops.

The tactical employment of chemical agents may be considered as offensive and defensive.

Offensive combat, in general, is conducted by small patrols (15 to 50 men), operating singly or in coordinated groups. This method appears to be the only one which promises any measure of success, as large patrols are slow and advance notice of their movements will be in the hands of guerrilla bands several hours or even days before the arrival of the patrol. It must be borne in mind that the great majority of guerrilla bands will fight only when cornered or when they have reason to believe they are numerically superior to a patrol. A guerrilla ambush is the answer in either case, although a village known to be weakly garrisoned may be attacked in exceptional cases.

In an ambush by guerrillas the first intimation the patrol will have of their presence is a violent burst of

fire. The patrol will immediately take cover and either rush or flank the guerrilla position. In such action, usually at point blank range, the use of automatic weapons such as the Browning light automatic rifle or Thompson Sub-Machine Gun is most efficacious. Chemical agents would only hamper mobility and restrict action. Tear gas candles (CN, fast) might be used if the wind were right or if the patrol were equipped with gas masks, but the occasion would seldom present itself.

In an ambush laid by our own patrols chemical agents might be used to advantage. Here again tear gas would be the only efficient chemical agent and could put an entire guerrilla outfit out of action in short order. But our own troops would need gas masks in order to carry the action to a successful conclusion. Vesicants and screening smokes would only hinder the mobility of our patrols.

Against a guerrilla position, which is usually on a mountain top, the ground patrols are at a considerable disadvantage. The most efficient method of attack is to use the airplane, loaded with expulsion type bombs. Spray tanks might be used, but the terrain is such that low flying would be not only less efficient but also unnecessarily hazardous. Any chemical agent might be used but mustard, tear gas, and white phosphorus, would be effective in the order given. Ground patrols would block the trails leading from the position and destroy the guerrillas in small groups as they vacate the position. The more persistent agents might be used, as there would be little necessity to occupy the position at once, and there would be no need for gas masks for patrols except for such troops as might later inspect the position. If the position were definitely located the chemical mortar could be used to advantage in conjunction with the airplane attack.

In defensive combat chemical agents would be an ideal weapon. Defensive action is not, however, the accepted method of exterminating guerrillas, and is used only when the patrol or garrison is so reduced in fire power as to make mobility impossible. For garrison defense in a town or village a supply of chemical grenades and candles would add just that much more to the defense and all garrisons could be so supplied. Tear gas would probably be the most efficient agent. Landing field defense positions could be supplied with the same weapons.

In the defense of a pack train the use of chemical agents would be of little value. The guerrilla attack takes the form of the usual ambush and there is no time to use chemicals until the contact is over. In cases where the guerrilla attack is determined a supply of chemical grenades carried by one of two members of the convoying patrol might be of assistance in breaking up the attack.

As guerrilla warfare is usually carried on in tropical countries and over broken, mountainous, and wooded terrain, in intense heat, dampness, and by means of independent patrols, it would be well to consider the types of chemical agents suitable for such use.

Vesicants would be suitable for airplane bombs and chemical mortar shells. Lung irritants necessitate a definitely located occupied target to be effective and would have very little application. Lacrimators would be the ideal filling for all types of candles, grenades, airplane bombs, or chemical mortar shells, as the harassing effect would be sufficient to disorganize any guerrilla effort. The guerrilla will not be equipped

with a gas mask and a touch of tear gas would put him out of action immediately. Sternutators might be used but would be very little more efficient than lacrimators, and might involve our own troops. Screening smokes would have no application, as there would be occasion only seldom to screen an advance or flanking movement as natural cover is practically always available.

Protection against chemical agents required by Marine Corps personnel would probably be a few gas masks for special operations of ground troops and impermeable clothing as well as masks for personnel at the base airdrome who might have use for such when handling bulk chemicals. Personnel engaged in patrolling would be issued gas masks only when the situation demanded. Ordinary wear would quickly render the mask unserviceable under field conditions in the tropics, and to burden the individual with extra weight (the patrol can not always ride horses or mules) would only wear him out just so much sooner. He has enough to carry already, rifle or automatic rifle, extra ammunition, etc., over terrain which is almost always mountainous with trails knee-deep in either mud or dust, depending on the season of the year.

Individual men should be given instruction in the use of candles and grenades before being permitted to go on the trail equipped with them. Such training could best be carried out at the headquarters of an area or district where facilities could be made available. Most important item in instruction should be the effect of weather on chemical cloud travel. In-

struction in protection could be limited to identification by smell of the agents used so areas affected by them might be avoided. The use of the gas mask could be covered by less than an hour's instruction.

Personnel charged with the firing of mortars would require extra instruction, and this could be done by training a squad for each gun. Here again the effect of weather on cloud travel should be emphasized.

The disadvantages arising from the use of chemical agents appear to be that complaints may be expected by sources both at home and abroad, that our own troops must carry gas masks under conditions arduous enough already or take chances on lacrimating themselves, and that a supply of sufficient size to be effective will mean added weight to be carried either by men or animals.

The advantages are considerable. Positions known to be held by guerrillas could be reduced by airplanes and ground troops with practically no casualties to our own personnel. The fact that he knows you use chemical agents would be sufficient to make the guerrilla form larger bands and take defensive positions, which could be readily reduced, or might break his spirit so that the guerrilla bands would disintegrate entirely. Chemical munitions would require no more care in handling and use than other munitions and the containers are of such size that they can be easily transported over rough country. Expulsion type bombs and spray tanks require no modification of the present type of bomb racks used on airplanes. A few well placed grenades or candles could neutralize a guerrilla ambush in a few moments with less casualties among our own forces.



Observations in Jehol Province

BY CAPTAIN E. G. HAGEN, U.S.M.C.

■ On March third of this year I had the good fortune to be ordered to Cheng Te, capital of Jehol Province, along with Captain Arcadi Gluckman, U. S. Army, who was attached to the M. A. office. We left Peiping at one a.m. on March fourth, travelling in the Dodge car belonging to the M. A. office. Many people who have been stationed in Peiping will remember that old car, but true to its old Dodge

spirit, it carried us up and back without a hitch. Captain Gluckman, the Chinese chauffeur, a boy and I piled into and around the car with our bedding, two weeks food supply and forty gallons of gasoline. The chauffeur had never driven this Dodge but he made up in nerve anything that he lacked in experience, but even at that only on one occasion did we come near meeting the angels. That was at night, when we were coming out of a cut on to a fill at about thirty miles an hour, the road made a ninety degree turn and the chauffeur thought for about one tenth of a second that it went straight ahead. We hit both sides of the road and we do not understand why we did not roll over the bank. After that, the driver was more careful. The road was extremely rough having been cut up by the narrow-wheeled wagons the Chinese always use and then having frozen solid. The wind was cold and I was glad that over my uniform overcoat I had a dog-skin lined long Chinese overcoat; a fur hat and a fur collar turned up around my ears made me feel quite comfortable in spite of the baggage that was in the way. During the night we saw only one truck and that was stuck in a brook, which we crossed without trouble.

At daylight we reached Ku Pei Kou which was the first real test for the car. She went up that pass as though it were nothing. We stopped in the town in order to re-adjust some of the gasoline tins which had started to leak and to eat some sandwiches and to enjoy the fire in a near-by blacksmith shop. We noticed from the condition of many of the gasoline tins, that it was a poor way to carry them as about one half of the tins leaked during the trip, due, no doubt, to the roughness of the road. After being warmed through, we moved on. From the time we left the town of Ku Pei Kou until we met the first of the retreating soldiers, we were constantly passing camel trains moving towards Cheng Te. The camels all had ammunition of various types evidently for the troops on the eastern Jehol front. Moving south along the same road we met many mule litters, carts and even some auto trucks all



Chinese trenches at Yeh-Po-Shou. The road by which the Japanese had to advance runs between the trenches and the hill across the valley.

piled high with household goods, women and children so we knew that some of the Chinese officials considered it time to evacuate their families. It must be understood that at this time we were under the impression that the Chinese troops were still holding the Japanese in the vicinity of Chih Feng, Ling Yuan and Nan Yuan, a distance of at least forty miles from Cheng Te. How incorrect this idea was we soon

found out. We saw occasional stragglers moving south but it was not until about ten miles from Luan Ping the retreating soldiers were met in great number. We stopped the car and spoke with one lad who informed us that he was one of a group of Peking College volunteers and that they were going back to the old capital. We asked about conditions in Cheng Te and he answered in English that conditions there were very serious, that the Japanese had taken the town. This was about 11:30 a.m. and we were thirty or more miles from that town. The Japanese admit that they arrived the first time at noon so these volunteers must have had some rumors and just left whatever town or place they were in. We went on and met hundreds of soldiers, some carrying their arms openly, some even carrying two or three rifles and some carrying their arms hidden under their long coats. While none of these men were running it was evident that there was no control, that whatever force it once been, it had simply disintegrated and every one was on his own. These men were later found to be Tang Yu-lin's men and volunteers. In as much as Tang had left on Friday night, his men, no doubt, felt that they also could leave. When we neared Luan Ping, a Japanese plane could be seen circling over the town and a few minutes later a heavy report was heard which bore out the statement of one of the soldiers that the town was being bombed. When in sight of that town we saw a long camel train, cart trains and many mounted men clearing the town. The plane had accelerated their movements, but no matter how the camel-pullers pulled they could not get their charges to move fast. Those camels decided to go only at their own rate and it was funny watching their pullers trying to make them hurry.

Passing through and leaving the town behind we suddenly heard many rifle reports near us. Then we noticed that the Chinese were firing at a plane. We got out to watch the fun. A few seconds later a bomb, not very large, exploded about 500-600 yards away. Although there was an anti-aircraft machine gun on a



What the transport system looked like. Many of the animals were almost worked to death.

truck nearby, no attempt was made to use it. The crew was at lunch or had gone away. The plane continued on its way and so did we. Arrived at the last pass outside of the capital, we reached the top to find that the narrowest part was blocked by a horse-cart which could not be moved. So we watched three planes flying over the city and then heard three double reports. The planes then moved off to the east. We went down the pass on foot and watched the efforts of the soldiers assisted by farmers trying to get the carts up that pass. It was a conglomeration of camels, mules, horses, donkeys, oxen and carts and although there was lots of first class shouting, nothing seemed to move until a Lieutenant-Colonel came up the pass from the city. He wanted his Dodge car to get through and since he seemed to be in a great hurry he had the carts moved so he could drive through. We came down through the hole he left. That officer showed clearly that he did not care to be encumbered by any animals. We arrived near the bottom of the pass but just before reaching the river bed we encountered a mounted detachment. Because the horses were frightened we stopped the car and the men dismounted. One of them came over to our car and when we noticed that he was a Brigadier General we both saluted. He asked us where we were going and then told us that the Japanese planes had dropped bombs, killed two men and as he had only thirteen hundred soldiers, it was just "mei yu fatze" and he had to leave. Riding rapidly he could have made the bottom of the pass in just about half an hour which was about the time that we had seen the planes and heard the report from their bombs. This man was one of Tang's generals. He was quite old and was jitterish from the planes' bombs. He looked anything but military. When one realizes that at two p.m. the Japanese had only one hundred twenty-five men in Cheng Te, the value of Tang's soldiers is clearly seen. We went down the valley and suddenly passed two rickshas with their pullers lying in front of their vehicles. Captain Gluckman looked them over and said that one had been shot through the head, the other had been burned as his clothes were still smoking and his body badly charred. The only inference was that these two poor men had not desired to pull some of the retreating soldiers or their property and on refusal had been killed.

We came in sight of the town and as there was no wall or gate to stop we went right into town. Practically all the houses and stores had Japanese and Manchukuo flags flying and every one seemed to be happy. Officials were standing outside of their yamens waiting for the Japanese to come. It was just two p.m. when a policeman asked us to pull over to the side of the road as the Japanese motor column was coming right then. We did that and got out of the car to watch the column go by. We stood in uniform on the sidewalk and as the Japanese went by many of them waved and some shouted "Hello." The column consisted of an armored car and eleven or twelve trucks. Two of the trucks carried light mountain guns, one had a heavy machine gun and a one pounder and the rest contained infantry. Altogether said to be one hundred twenty-five men.

After the column went by we went to the Belgian Mission to stay. On the way there we stopped for a few minutes. Our Chinese chauffeur engaged one of the newly made citizens of Manchukuo in conversation about the turn over and wound up by saying, "Well, what is the difference? We all are still Chinese!" Landed at the mission we were told that there was a meeting going on between the Japanese and the town authorities and that Pere Conrad, the head of the mission, had gone to the meeting place. We also decided to go and although we went to all the places that they told us to visit we could not catch up with that meeting. So we returned to the Mission to find that Pere Conrad had already returned. We asked Pere Conrad many questions which he tried to answer. He told us that the Chamber of Commerce had prepared all the flags a day or so ago and on the disappearance of Tang and his soldiers the Chamber sold the flags to any person who brought the money for them. Since the sale of these flags proved very popular, the Chamber must have made some money, proving that it had some wide-awake merchants on the job who could even make money on the capture of their town by the "enemy." The Father said the people were extremely happy that Tang and his rapacious soldiery had left. From that it would seem that the people would welcome any party that could drive Tang from the area.

Captain Gluckman suggested that we call on General Kawahara who commanded the motorized column and we at once proceeded to the palace. We arrived there just too late to watch the entire motorized column come in as the men were already being quartered and the vehicles were lined up on both sides of the street in front of palace entrance. Every car or truck that I saw was American made. I do not know who made their armored cars. The complete detachment consisted of two armored cars and one hundred thirty trucks. The force itself consisted of six hundred men exclusive of specialists such as drivers, etc., and a band. One part of the equipment was four portee mountain guns.

The General had just arrived and we found Mr. H. R. Ekins of the U. P., General Sutton, who was Hearst's special correspondent, and Mr. Owen Lattimore, an American who is well known for his writings on Mongolia and Manchuria, had already preceded us. We all followed the General into the palace, which Tang Yu-

lin had left the preceding day, and a Major Kono of the Staff was detailed to tell us what he could but as his English was quite halting, a Japanese soldier who spoke Chinese was brought in. Mr. Lattimore translated the Chinese for the benefit of Messrs. Ekins and Sutton.

The Major said that the Kawahara detachment had left Chao Yang on the morning of the first of March and on arrival at Yeh Po Shou a nine hour battle ensued before they could clear away this Chinese detachment of some two thousand men. The Japanese used chiefly their artillery and planes against the Chinese and when the latter did leave they left about two hundred dead behind. (The Chinese trenches at Yeh Po Shou were very shallow and consisted of only one line with practically no traverses. The Chinese made no attempt to camouflage the trenches although time was available and very little overhead cover was provided except for a few machine gun positions. The trenches for some distance flanked the road that the Japanese column would have to use. The Japanese column rested here overnight and on the morning of the second they passed through Ling Yuan after a two hour engagement. This place had been taken about one half hour earlier by the southern column of Japanese troops. By the evening of the second the column had advanced to and occupied Ping Chuan. On this day alone the motor column had covered about eighty-eight miles. On the afternoon of the third they moved on, having had their supplies replenished, and that same evening they occupied LiuKow. The following morning the advance column set out and took Cheng Te at about 1:45 p.m. while the remainder of the column came in about 5:30 p.m. Prior to the arrival of the advance force in Cheng Te, Major Kono had proceeded there with the two armored cars. He went into the town, saw many Chinese soldiers, got out of the car, told them to drop their arms and shove off, which they did. So the town was actually taken by two armored cars and their crews at noon on the fourth, three and one half days after they had started. Their total casualties were three killed and five wounded. The Major stated that they had always tried to take the Chinese by surprise, hence if the Chinese believed that the Japanese could arrive at a given locality at H hour, the Japanese made a point of being at that place at H minus several hours or half a day or even a day, thereby throwing the Chinese into an unexpected predicament. They knew their opponents very well.

After the Major had finished a staff officer notified him that the General would like to speak with us for a few minutes. We all went to the General's room, where we were presented to him. He spoke through the interpreter for about ten minutes, his talk being taken down in shorthand by an adjutant. He stated that the Japanese were helping Manchukuo in accordance with the protocol the two countries had signed and that the Japanese desired only peace in the Far East. The Emperor had given orders that the military operations be conducted with as few people killed or wounded as possible, which order had been carried out to the

best of their ability by out-maneuvering their opponents whenever possible, thereby causing their retreat without great loss although at one place there had been quite a battle in which the Chinese had had many casualties. (It was noted that when coming into Cheng Te there was no attempt being made to pursue the Chinese other than by plane and they were doing no real strafing.) As far as they had been able to find out, they had not killed one civilian. When Major Kono came into the town he could have opened fire on the Chinese troops, but, as he said, many innocent people would have been killed, so he told the men to go away without their arms. When the General had finished his speech, we congratulated him on his success and returned to the Mission. We told Major Kono that we expected to leave town at six a.m. the following morning and he told us that the guards would be notified so that we could go through without stopping. So the next morning we headed for Peiping.

The first pass from Cheng Te was absolutely unguarded by Chinese soldiers. It was a free gift to the Japanese. All they had to do was to send their men to take it, but they left it open so that the soldiers could get away. They did not wish to feed several thousand more men, so they had not sent out any patrols to take the pass. After crossing over this pass, we suddenly spied a Chinese soldier carrying two rifles, walking down the road. He heard the car, saw Captain Gluckman in the front seat dressed in khaki, dropped one rifle and started out for a group of houses as fast as he could go. Then the other rifle was dropped and with added speed he increased the distance between us. Although we had an American flag flying and we shouted to him he paid no attention, just concentrated on increasing his speed. After we passed, he stopped to see what we were. All this time, the G. M. C. truck which was carrying the correspondents stuck as close to us as possible. We were approaching the second pass when, all of a sudden, we heard a trench mortar bomb explode near us. We stopped and got out, and a few seconds later the rifle firing also ceased. Later in conversation with a Chinese soldier he stated that they were not firing directly at us, but sometimes that is the danger of Chinese shooting. We could make out on the hill-tops several hundred soldiers standing and watching us. Captain Gluckman went on ahead. I fol-



A machine-gun emplacement with overhead cover at Yeh-Po-Shou.

lowed at several hundred yards. He spoke with the sentries and then waved to me to come ahead, which signal I passed back and our Dodge and the G. M. C. truck came up to the foot of the pass. There we found a barricade across the road which the Chinese did not wish to remove and which the Japanese would have removed in five minutes. The G. M. C. party included a second lieutenant adjutant who had been assigned to the correspondents by Tang Yu-lin. He climbed to the top of the mountain to get in touch with the C. O. of the troops, who proved to be seven hundred of Tang's men under a Lieutenant-Colonel. The colonel came to the foot of the pass and spoke with us. He did not wish to remove the obstacle because it was for use against the Japanese and they might come along when it had just been removed. Instead, he wanted us to go over the top of the cut and thus around the obstacle. We could do it with the Dodge but were afraid that the G. M. C. would turn over. So the Colonel wanted to dig away enough of the ground so that the truck could also go over, which would have taken an hour or so to do. We pointed out that all that was necessary was to swing the tree trunk around and lower the height of the stones so that we could get over so he finally agreed. It took about ten minutes for us to move the obstacle with the assistance of peasants and soldiers. It took about five minutes of talk before the soldiers would lend a hand and then it was usually to pick up a very small stone with one hand, slowly walk a few feet and gently lower it to the ground. I doubt of the Colonel realizes as yet that if our G. M. C. truck could get around the obstacle over the cut that the Japanese cars could have done the same. While talking with him, he stated that he and his men were going to die right at that pass but five minutes later a runner came up and said that orders had been received to move back. He waited not one second to issue the order to move back and when we reached the other side of the pass his troops were already loading their trench mortars on the horses. Another point that stuck out quite noticeably was that the colonel always carried his Mauser pistol in his hands and had another in his belt. No Japanese were around.

After leaving this pass we were constantly passing through retreating troops, although many of them now had on coolie blue cotton clothing, until we got within a few miles of Ku Pei Kou.

Half-way up the third pass we had to stop suddenly as there was a large truck overturned in the road. Forty or so Chinese soldiers under a 1st Lieutenant of the 107th Division (Chang Hsueh-liang) were standing around discussing what was to be done but no one was doing anything. After discussing for a few minutes what to do, Ekins, Sutton, Lattimore and I tended to the overturned truck while Captain Gluckman went on ahead, as the Lieutenant had told him there was an obstacle in the road at the top of the pass. About five minutes of time, some Q. M. quarter inch line, a little pulling and lifting together and the truck was on its wheels again. We went by to the top of the pass to find that the barricade, which consisted of small telegraph poles, had already been removed. Captain Gluckman said that the letter from the Peiping Branch Military Council helped very much in getting that obstacle out of the way.

From this time on, it was slow going. Horse transport was moving in both directions and the narrowness

of the passes made frequent long waits unavoidable. The horses frequently were done up, literally dead on their feet, and no matter how they were beaten they would not budge or simply weave from side to side to avoid the lash but not pulling an ounce. In these cases we simply put our shoulders to the wheels and moved the cart over to the side of the road so that our one way traffic could get by. Passing through the valley north of Ku Pei Kow we met part of the 107th Division moving northward to a position that would have to be prepared. At one place the Chinese military tried to stop us but because they could see our American flag and American Legation license plates, we kept right on. When we arrived at Ku Pei Kow pass we were held up for a short time and then got through the Wall and to the foot of the pass. The worst part of the trip was over. There were still many narrow places in the road but no more sections like what we had been through. We constantly met troops of the 107th Division and then some of the 106th Artillery Division. The artillery equipment looked to be in good condition. Most of it was light horse-drawn mountain guns, though we did pass six inch trench mortars in auto trucks and also some things that looked like land mines. The horses of this outfit seemed to be in excellent condition.

About one p.m. we waited for the G. M. C. truck to catch up to us and also to have some lunch, which we then found was all on the G. M. C. While waiting another regiment of the 107th started to pass us and its Colonel, who seemed to be about 28-30 years old, who spoke some English, came over to speak with us. He told us about the situation and drew a map in the sand, but from his location of the important cities I was forced to conclude that his map differed greatly from ours. We did find out that these troops were going north of the Wall to keep the defeated and fleeing remnants of Tang Yu-lin's forces out beyond the Great Wall. Later another Division came north to prevent these people from retreating south of the Wall and it is understood that the majority were killed.

When we arrived at Mi Yun Hsien Chinese troops stopped us. We had to stop anyway on account of the road being blocked. A lieutenant asked us if we were actually American Legation people and whether the truck belonged to us. As the truck was carrying half of our baggage we said yes to both questions. He then assigned a soldier to take us through town so no one else would stop us. They were commandeering just about everything on wheels. We got out of town but, unfortunately, on to the wrong road. We had not gone very far when we found we were fairly well stuck in soft sand. We finally got out of it and went back to the town, followed its walls to the south motor road and again headed for Peiping. We passed two more regiments of infantry, both of the 112th Division and both headed north for the pass. We arrived in town at 6:30 p.m.

The trip took only forty-two hours, but it was most interesting. Several points were the highlights. For instance, the complete lack of defensive preparations between the Wall and the provincial capital. The Chinese had had months to prepare for this campaign. The Japanese made no secret of the fact that operations would start in Jehol when they were ready to move. One of the best cartoons in reference to the campaign was in a Shanghai paper. It showed Japanese tanks and planes in the background moving forward to at-

tack; in the foreground was a lone Chinese soldier armed with a stalk of kao-liang. Just in back of the soldier was a loud speaker shouting "Resistance to the last man!" That cartoon summed up the situation perfectly. Taking the mountain passes could have been made very costly to the Japanese, and they could have been held with comparatively slight forces.

The roadways through the passes were frequently cut out of solid rock and it was these places that had room for but one vehicle at a time. There were many steep climbs and descents. One steep spot that was also covered with ice for a distance of thirty or forty feet took us about fifteen minutes to get over. It was at the steep and narrow places that we were held up. The Chinese carts if going down always had to tie their brake beam across the wheels and then release it when they reached the bottom and this all took plenty

of time. So many kinds of animals and wagons were used that one could see a thousand years of transport development pass in a few minutes.

One incident, which shows the feeling of the inhabitants of the province, may be well worth while telling. When Messrs. Ekins, Lattimore and Sutton were coming back to Cheng Te from the North, they passed a farm house which had been bombed by plane. The farmer was outside and asked them to come into his yard, which they did, not knowing what he was going to do or say. He pointed to the hole in the ground and said, "The Japanese dropped that bomb from the plane because some of Tang Yu-lin's men were in the yard. The bomb wounded a dog and broke the windows in my house but I do not mind that because it has driven Tang Yu-lin and his soldiers away."

WITH THE MARINES IN MEXICO, 1914



VERA CRUZ, MEXICO, 1914

Left to right: Captain F. H. Delano, Sergeant Major Quick, Lieutenant Colonel W. C. Neville, Colonel John A. LeJeune, Major Smedley D. Butler.

The Tactics and Technique of Small Wars

BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL HAROLD H. UTLEY, U.S.M.C.

PART II.—INTELLIGENCE

■ Before considering the subject of Intelligence in each of the phases into which, as we have seen in Part I*, Small Wars are divided, it might be well to refresh our minds briefly on the subject of Military Intelligence in general.

"Military Intelligence, in a broad sense, comprises the most complete and authentic information of a *possible, potential or actual* enemy or theater of operations that can be obtained and the strategic or tactical conclusions reached by a critical analysis of that information."

"The term specifically comprises all authentic information concerning the possible, potential or actual enemy's order of battle, activities, plans, organization, establishments, and resources; and all that relates to the territory controlled by him or subject to his influence."

(From *Notes on Combat Intelligence*, The General Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1924.)

Military Information after being successively: *Collected, Verified, Evaluated, Interpreted, and Distributed* becomes **MILITARY INTELLIGENCE**.

In most of our expeditions in the past there has been a most noticeable lack of Military Intelligence—at least so far as the officers serving with subordinate units were concerned—prior to the time of landing. What "Information" was available seems to have missed one or more of the "processes" enumerated above necessary to convert it (Information) into Intelligence.

Lieutenant Colonel W. P. Upshur, USMC, in his series of lectures on Small Wars gives an amusing account of one such instance of failure to verify information, of which the following is a condensed version:

En route to Haiti the officers of the Second Marines studied assiduously all that the ship's library contained about the Black Republic. Classes were held and the information obtained was passed on to the men by the company officers. Included in the information so obtained were the statements that the Haitians were devotees of Voodooism and past masters in the art of poisoning their enemies.

As soon as the regiment had established itself at Camp de Mars after disembarking at Port au Prince, a water detail was sent to a hydrant several hundred yards from camp. Quite a crowd of native men and boys followed the detail and remained with it until its return. It was gone some time, and on its return the Officer of the Day asked the sergeant in charge why it had been gone so long. He replied: "Sir, you know all we have been taught about these Voodoos and poison. I took no chances of us all being killed without knowing it, so when my detail got the water I grabbed a big 'spig' and made him drink a pail of the water, and the rest of the time was spent watching to see if he died, but we waited half an hour and he wasn't dead so I concluded the water would be all right to make coffee of for the Marines."

Also in the past there has been a shortage of maps. Insufficient copies of those on hand have been available for issue to the subordinate units, and what maps there were, were very, very inaccurate.

Shortly after the 11th Company Marines occupied Ouanaminthe, Haiti, in 1915, word was received late one night that La Salle Mount Organizie, an ungarrisoned town, had been captured by the Cacoets. This town had not then been visited by our patrols and the

map issued showed it to be near a small stream (the True Jean Des Nantes River) at the *near* foot of a high mountain range about 10 miles from Ouanaminthe. A combat patrol lightly equipped and supplied (two cooked meals were the only rations carried) was sent out at once to retake the town and with orders to return by nightfall the next day. The next afternoon nothing having been heard from the patrol and there being no signs of it returning across the plains, the company commander prepared for the worst and detailed and equipped a stronger patrol under his own command to leave immediately after supper to reinforce or rescue the first patrol. Just at suppertime, however, the first patrol was sighted and on its return it was learned that it had reached La Salle and reestablished the government officials without a fight, but that the town instead of being where the map showed it, was a short distance beyond the top of a very high steep mountain, accessible only by a precipitous narrow trail offering many opportunities for ambush. Had the bandits chosen to offer resistance along this trail a very difficult problem would have been presented the patrol commander, as anyone who has gone over the Ouanaminthe-Mt. Organizie trail (since much improved) will realize.

Such absence of military intelligence at the commencement of hostilities has not been confined to our own service by any means. The troops of all countries that have engaged in Small Wars have suffered from the same cause as the following typical historical examples will show.

During the Bhutan War in 1864 the British dispatched a column of 2,000 men with a large train which included 150 elephants a distance of 40 miles over a most difficult hilly country overrun with jungle, to capture a hill fort known as Bishensing. The march took several days, and on arrival at Bishensing the column discovered that the place consisted of a single stone house and that there was no fort. The place was without any importance whatsoever, military or otherwise.

In the campaign against Khiva in 1873, one of the Russian columns was forced to turn back before reaching its objective due to the fact that water was not available where it had been expected.

The French, in their campaign against Dahomey in 1893, were not prepared to find the enemy in possession of guns (artillery) and as the Europeans operated in compact formations, the hostile artillery proved rather inconvenient on several occasions.

In 1895 the French dispatched an expedition to Madagascar to subdue the Hovas and to capture the capitol. The War Office after a careful study, decided to construct a road from the point of debarkation to the capitol and to rely almost entirely upon wheeled transportation. It was not known that there were great engineering difficulties to be overcome in constructing this road nor that the work involved an immense amount of manual labor. This construction

* Part I was published in *The Marine Corps Gazette*, May, 1931.

work occasioned serious delays and required the retention of the troops in unhealthy localities for several months which resulted in heavy casualties from disease. Eventually the Commanding General abandoned the plan and accomplished his mission with small mobile columns equipped with pack transportation obtained locally.

The lack of Military Intelligence in Small Wars in the past is attributable to several causes. Small Wars break out suddenly and in unexpected places; often in countries only partially explored, if not wholly unexplored. But so far as we are concerned it seems reasonable to believe that the Theatre of Operations of our Small Wars of the future will be restricted to certain fairly well defined areas, and there appears to be no good reason why the Intelligence Files at our Headquarters should not be pretty accurate and up to date with respect to these areas and contain a portfolio of maps that would be reasonably accurate. It is to be hoped too, that the necessity of the last process in converting Information into Military Intelligence, i. e. Distribution, will not be overlooked.

So much for Intelligence Functions during the First Phase of Small Wars. During the Second Phase, the landing, Intelligence activities are purely Combat Intelligence activities normal to any operations of a small unit and do not require any discussion here. Aviation, if present and prepared to operate will be of great assistance for reconnaissance.

We come now to the Third Phase, Destruction of Organized Forces and Occupation of Vital Areas. However, when the operation ends with the occupation of one or more points on the coast but that occupation is protracted, many of the matters to be discussed apply to the latter portion of the Second Phase as well as to the Third Phase. It has been generally true in Small Wars that we must depend for the collection of information on inhabitants, either native or foreign, who are already in the country when our force arrives. Some information can be gathered by reconnaissance patrols and more by aviation, but in many situations the use of patrols presents great difficulties and in some cases it is entirely impracticable. Aviation may not be present in sufficient numbers to gather all of the information desired, but to the extent available, it is invaluable during this phase both in locating hostile concentrations and movements and in gathering information as to the terrain. It also permits the commander, his staff, and commanders of columns, to scrutinize the terrain and thereby gain first hand information of this important factor. Care must be taken, however, not to disclose the direction of the projected movement.*

Until the pilots and observers have had considerable experience in the particular locality in which they are scouting they will encounter many difficulties. Major Rowell, in his report referred to before,** comments as follows in this regard:

"No more difficult problem would be given the aviation observer than one involving the determination of the strength, movements and location of an enemy who is not uniformed, who is without a permanent base of any sort, who uses every known ruse to conceal himself, who seeks cover in the most remote wooded

wilderness and frequently mingles with people who are at least neutral. They move almost entirely at hours when the planes cannot reach them. They camouflage their camps and stables and confine their operations to terrain offering the best cover from aerial observation and never fire on the planes unless they find themselves discovered and attacked. Bursts of fire and occasionally bombs are employed near especially suspicious localities to attempt to draw hostile fire. The outlaws have been especially drilled and trained to take concealment from airplanes. Small groups frequently hide their arms and feign innocence. Some groups are provided with women and children who show themselves boldly while the men remain under cover secure in the knowledge that the women will not be attacked. However, the observers have gained greatly in skill and, in spite of all the ruses adopted by the outlaws, a good observer can usually state positively that any locality reconnoitered is either free from outlaws, contains outlaws, or is suspicious. The latter term is used to indicate a place that shows signs of containing outlaws but cannot be reported as containing outlaws beyond a reasonable doubt. The smallest signs are utilized in determining the character of any locality, such as the proportion of men to women, the amount of washing in evidence, the number and kind of domestic animals observed, etc. It is very important to distinguish between ignorant persons who run from airplanes through natural fright and those who have good reason to take cover. Signs that indicate the enemy in one locality may be entirely innocent and natural in another. Air reports must always be compared with local information and ground intelligence reports, which usually enables them to be properly evaluated."

The use of ground patrols to make any extended reconnaissance presents many difficulties. The enemy has every advantage as regards knowledge of our whereabouts at all times, the terrain usually offers many opportunities for him to lay an ambush, and time is often an important factor with us. It follows that our ground patrols must be strong enough to fight their way out of any situation they may get into, even though their mission is purely that of reconnaissance. A patrol of sufficient size for this may lose much in mobility, and by its movement prevent us from surprising the enemy in force. Also when such a patrol returns, even though it may have accomplished its mission, its return becomes known to the natives and in their minds is a retreat, thereby greatly raising the morale of those hostile to us, and lessening the willingness of peaceful or friendly inhabitants to aid us in the future.

Early in 1928 Captain Edson of the Marines led a reconnoitering patrol up the Wanks River in Nicaragua as far as Sang Sang, gained the desired information without making contact with the bandits and withdrew to Puerto Cabezas. On learning of Edson's withdrawal, Arguello, the bandit leader at Bocay, made a raid down the river as far as Waspue, looting and pillaging those inhabitants he suspected of having assisted Edson, and then returned to Bocay. Edson with a combat patrol returned to Waspue, which he occupied as a base for further operations, but the word had been industriously circulated that Arguello had driven Edson out, and Edson's previous efforts to win the confidence of the inhabitants were largely nullified.

Incidentally, had we possessed reliable maps of the river, or had airplanes been available to make an aerial reconnaissance, the first patrol would have been unnecessary, since the movement in force would have been planned from the map or air report.

Circumstances will often preclude making a thorough reconnaissance of routes our columns are to follow, but the lack of accurate and detailed information thereby procurable sometimes prevents our attaining complete success.

In November, 1915, Fort Capois, Haiti, was attacked and captured by Marines supported by naval landing

* This danger is not imaginary. In 1928, while a column of Marines was moving up the Prinzapolka River in Eastern Nicaragua against the bandits in the vicinity of the La Ruz Mines, two planes from Managua passed over and thoroughly examined the mines from the air. The bandit leader at once withdrew, informing some of the residents "Planes have flown over us. The Marines will soon be here."

** Annual Report of Aircraft Squadrons Second Brigade, U. S. Marine Corps, July 1, 1927-June 30, 1928, by Major R. E. Rowell, U. S. Marine Corps, published in *The Marine Corps Gazette*, December, 1928.

forces. Four columns, two operating from South Mountain Base and two from Le Trou via Ste. Suzanne converged on this mountain stronghold of the Cacos. A thorough reconnaissance of the trails over which these columns were to move was impracticable and reliance had to be placed on the best available map supplemented by such intelligence as could be gleaned from the natives. Both proved inaccurate, with the result that the force from Ste. Suzanne was—through no fault of its own—several hours late in reaching its jump-off positions. The columns from South Mountain Base delivered their attacks as scheduled and captured the fort, but the bulk of the garrison escaped by slipping down the uncovered faces of the fort and through the wooded ravines of the mountainside. Had there been sufficient information available to properly estimate the time and space factors, there is every reason to believe that this operation would have been as successful as that against Fort Riviere twelve days later, when the entire garrison was bagged.

Even if patrols are sent out, much of the information they gather must be obtained from inhabitants which brings up the difficulty of obtaining reliable information from inhabitants. They may be agents regularly employed, or employed for a special purpose; they may come to us for some reason of their own with some special information, or we may go to them for it; or they may be prisoners or natives picked up on the trail and questioned. But regardless of which category he comes under, several difficulties will be encountered in dealing with a native.

First *Inaccuracy* (to be polite about it). Callwell says* that the ordinary native found in the theaters of war peopled by colored races lies simply for the love of lying. He also has a tendency to try to guess what you want him to say and to be obliging about it. Even when he is trying to speak the truth his ideas of time, numbers and distances are of the vaguest. My own impression is that he will exaggerate numbers and minimize distances in nearly every case.

Lieutenant Colonel Heneker, British Army, comments as follows:**

"It is heartbreaking work dragging sensible replies from friendly natives, but when unwillingness to impart and to speak the whole truth is added to a natural inability to answer a question in a straightforward manner, the job is indeed a trying one, and the greatest patience is necessary."

In most of the countries in which we conduct our Small Wars, political differences are carried into business and social relations in a manner which it is difficult for us to understand. Parties are not formed on principles,—they have none—but on the personality of the leaders and on political geographical divisions. It is always necessary to consider the political relationship of the informant and the person or event being reported on, in analyzing information received, especially if the information is volunteered. And, in addition, many inhabitants will have personal enemies whom they wish to see discredited or to get into serious trouble.

Even in the case of foreigners who have lived long in the country, it is necessary to know them and their antecedents sufficiently well to form a good estimate of their character, before accepting their information at face value. They too, have their rivals and enemies, and in some cases fear reprisals (commercial or other-

wise) if it is known that they have been giving us valuable information. In many cases they will try to play both ends against the middle, and the information they give will be found to be accurate but too old to be of value. There are exceptions of course. Each individual must be studied and the probable worth of his information estimated.

We must always remember that information is not Intelligence. The two following minor instances of failure to properly evaluate information received from native sources may serve to emphasize this point and also to illustrate some of the difficulties encountered.

Colonel Upshur states* that in Haiti in 1916 he was receiving reports regularly from a native prisoner confined in the General Prison at Port au Prince. This man was considered to be "The National, if not the Olympic, Champion Liar." Everything he reported was false, except one item. Two weeks before Codio made his prison break with all of the convicts in the prison, this man reported the intended break, along with a mass of other information. Due to his unreliability no attention was paid to his report. The jail delivery took place as forecasted.

In Eastern Nicaragua in 1928 before sufficient radio equipment had been received to equip patrols, Captain Edson operating up the Wanks, based on Waspue, reported by runner his intention of making a reconnaissance with a single squad. Several days later Area Headquarters received four reports through four different channels of a fight in which Edson and nine men had been killed. These reports differed slightly in detail but the gist was the same. Coming, as they did, four ways and with Edson's intentions known, it was feared at Area Headquarters that Edson and his patrol had been wiped out. Reinforcements were promptly rushed to Waspue and aerial reconnaissance requested. For technical reasons the air mission had to be delayed, but within a few days Lieutenants Schilt and Guymon patrolled the area, located the ground patrol, made a difficult landing on a sandbar and talked to Edson. Their report was a great relief at Headquarters. Subsequently it developed that one man, a native, traveling down the Wanks River, had told the story of the mythical fight to a paid agent of ours, to a missionary, to a native civil official and to a party led by an American civilian. Each had transmitted it to Area Headquarters through a different channel as a fact and without giving the source of his information.

This latter case illustrates also, the necessity in transmitting information, of giving its source. Subsequently in the Second Brigade only information that had been personally verified by an officer was reported as "Fact". Everything else was a "Report" or a "Rumor" and these were further classified according to their source, as being "reliable", "doubtful" or "unreliable".

The second great difficulty encountered is the question of Language. As a nation we are not linguists, and the number of officers capable of really conducting the examination of a non-English speaking native, whether in Spanish or Chinese is limited and will continue so for many years to come. In the meantime we shall be forced to rely a great deal as we have in the past, upon interpreters. This course is fraught with many difficulties. The native who really wants to give us information, whether from greed, a desire for re-

*Small Wars, Their Principles and Practice, Colonel C. E. Callwell, British Army.

** Bush Warfare, Lieutenant Colonel W. C. Heneker, British Army.

* Condensed from the account given in Small Wars by Lieutenant Colonel W. P. Upshur, USMC., (unpublished).

venge, fear or other motive, will hesitate to do so when he knows that the fact that he is the informant must be known to another native. To this fact add the question of the honesty and reliability of the interpreter himself, and it will readily be seen that the average intelligence officer or detachment commander is frequently severely handicapped in his activities. The interpreter may wish to belittle the informant, or he may be merely ignorant himself. I have seen interpreters whose knowledge of colloquial Spanish seemed adequate, but whose knowledge of English was so limited that, even with my limited knowledge of Spanish, I knew they were hopelessly twisting the intended meaning.

Agents and interpreters should be carefully checked one against another, and if possible this should be done without their knowledge. An amusing instance of failure to observe this precaution is recounted of the intelligence personnel during the early days of an expedition several years ago.

The Squadron Marine Officer, who was also Squadron Intelligence Officer, employed a native agent who, in addition to his pay, received expense money daily for several days on the strength of reports he stated he was purchasing from another native. Meanwhile an agent of the Brigade Intelligence Officer was receiving funds for a like purpose. Neither officer communicated the information received to the other until the routine periodical reports were distributed. It was then discovered that each agent was using at least a portion of his expense money to pay the other agent for information he had gathered in the course of his work.

Another difficulty in using native agents regularly is the difficulty of keeping them under cover. They are prone to boast and to magnify their own importance. Even if he does not announce his connection with us, his frequent visits to the Intelligence Office may be noted. One method of avoiding this is to direct some selected member of the Intelligence Section or Military Police to arrest the agent on sight or on a prearranged signal from him and to bring him to the Intelligence office as a suspicious character. In this way his reports can be made without his being suspected of being the informant, and if he is clever, he will turn the fact of having been arrested to good account when dealing with our opponents.

In the employment of natives, either regularly or for a given occasion, money is usually the keynote of the Intelligence system. However, the tendency to use all the available funds in the hire of agents at the capitol must be guarded against. The commander of every column and of every detached post must be provided with intelligence funds or their equivalent. Under some circumstances local conditions may be such that some inexpensive commodity is more desired by the natives than money. This was the case in some parts of Nicaragua, where there was nothing the natives could purchase with any amount of money while ordinary salt was very difficult for them to obtain, and was correspondingly prized.

All in all, it will generally be found that the best agents in the countries in which we usually operate, are those English-speaking subjects of His Britannic Majesty who have lived long enough in the country to become familiar with its personalities, geography and language. But the fact that they are probably the best agents obtainable does not justify our failing to verify and weigh every report they make.

And above all, the necessity of fair dealing must be impressed upon all ranks.

Never make a promise to a native that you do not intend to keep and never make a threat that you have not the apparent means of carrying out.

Another factor with which the Intelligence Section must cope when considering probable hostile concentrations and movements is the extreme mobility of irregular forces, a mobility attributable to various causes, such as actual marching power, freedom from impedimenta, knowledge of the terrain, etc. This condition has been almost universal in past small wars. The British in their Afghan and Sudan campaigns, the French in Algeria, our own army in its campaigns against the Indians, to cite only a few examples, all suffered from this same cause.

It must also be borne in mind that the irregular forces usually have superiority over the regulars in the matter of obtaining information. Not only has he most complete first-hand information of the terrain,—every path, ford, rapid, and point where he can secure his few requirements are well known to him,—but he is generally aware of our movements as soon as they begin, if not before. He is operating in his own country, many of his sympathizers are about our camps in one guise or another; he can, and does, exact severe and painful punishment upon those who aid us or refuse him aid, punishments which we cannot resort to; and so camp gossip is overhead, the regular watched in all of his movements and the news thereof rapidly transmitted; and it is almost impossible to prevent much of this. The speed with which information travels in these countries, without the aid of radio or wire, is incredible to those who have not experienced it. The larger the regular force, the more complete will the hostile information of its movements be. When the military situation permits the use of relatively small patrols instead of the larger, slower columns, the comparative superiority of the irregular diminishes.

But the very fact that information of projected movements is fairly certain to reach the hostile force (in the absence of extraordinary precautions) can be turned to good account by the skillful dissemination of false information. It is remarkable that although the natives against whom the regulars usually operate in Small Wars are past masters in the art of military deception, crafty and cunning themselves; they are by no means so wary in avoiding snares as they are in setting them. When the plan of spreading false information of prospective movements is adopted, the enemy generally falls into the trap readily enough, if any degree of cleverness is shown in its execution. This device has been used by all nations on many occasions. One example may be cited when, during the British Expedition in Egypt in 1898, the British commander, Sir H. Kitchener, learned that the Khalifa intended making a night attack against his force. As, from the British point of view, this would be most undesirable, native allies were sent out to reconnoiter the hostile positions and to convey the idea that the English intended to make a night attack. The Khalifa were completely deceived and remained in position all night awaiting the British attack. In the morning the British attacked according to plan and were completely successful.

In the early phases of an expedition we are usually faced with a lack of up-to-date accurate maps. It may be noted that when a corporation establishes a

plant in a foreign locality, its engineers usually prepare detailed surveys and maps of the area, and frequently of quite an extensive outlying area as well. Copies of these maps are usually available, although they must frequently be dug up out of the files, and sometimes it is necessary to send to the home office for them. During the first part of the occupation, when the local officials of the corporation are still nervous, it is usually easy to obtain copies of these maps. Later, when less nervous, they are inclined to be over careful to safeguard commercial information contained thereon, but, properly handled, will usually permit tracings to be made omitting the secret commercial data, which is of no military value anyway.

We can also get considerable assistance from Aviation in the shape of aerial photographs and mosaics, if they are not worked to capacity on more important missions, and if flying conditions permit. In many of the countries in which we may expect to operate, an extremely low ceiling prevails during the greater part of the year which precludes the maximum effort being devoted to aerial mapping.

In connection with this question of map-making, it may well be pointed out that the commanders on the ground are less interested in knowing the actual distance between points than they are in knowing the time required to march from one to the other. Also in these countries the location of trails changes in a remarkably short space of time. Old ones fall into disuse and soon become grown over. A tree falls across a trail and the natives pass around it rather than clear it away.

For our purposes the system used by the army in the Department of Panama of making "Trail Reports" appears worth considering. It is an adaptation of the old "Road Reconnaissance" we had years ago. The compass course of each stretch of trail and the time required by the patrol to march over that stretch are noted together with prominent landmarks. If no landmarks exist the patrol makes them by blazing trees or other suitable means. Any three intelligent men can make one of these reports after very little instruction. One man reads the compass, one notes the time and the third acts as recorder. Reports on trails should be made both in the dry and in the rainy seasons,

those on river routes going up-stream and going down-stream and in both dry and rainy seasons. A more detailed description seems hardly necessary here. Full details can be found in the *Infantry Journal* of April, 1929.

The foregoing remarks regarding Intelligence are generally applicable throughout any Small War, but during the Pacification Phase, when organized resistance has been fairly well overcome and we are engaged in running down guerilla bands and more completely occupying the country, their application is more limited. Many sketches will have been made of certain areas and routes by the troops themselves. These can now be supplemented and hooked up. Much information of the terrain has been obtained even if it has not been mapped. The habits of the remaining leaders are fairly well known. Many natives will more willingly and openly assist us, some because they wish to be on the winning side, some because the increased tranquility means financial gain to them, and a few because they realize that the sooner we finish our job the sooner we will be gone and they in power. The reliability of our agents has also been tested. The military situation permits the use of smaller patrols which increases our mobility and the secrecy of our movements. All of these factors simplify the gathering of intelligence.

In executing Intelligence Functions, in whatever phase of the operations, the most difficult problem usually encountered is to force the Intelligence Personnel to realize that its mission is not to gather information of any and all kind, and place it on file, as has been too generally the custom, but to obtain Military Intelligence. not overlooking the last process, i. e. *distribution*. Distribution should not only be made up and down the chain of command, but laterally as well. And the distribution must be prompt. "Better late than never" does not apply to the distribution of intelligence. It would seem that we might well paraphrase a noted columnist and say: "Believe it or not, but report it".

To repeat, the aim should be to gather *pertinent* intelligence and place it in the possession of those who can use it to the best advantage; and to do this as *quickly as possible*. - *The files are the last place Military Intelligence should go.*



What The Marine Corps Reserve is Doing

BY COLONEL J. J. MEADE, U.S.M.C.

■ The Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General Ben H. Fuller, prescribed June 11-24, 1933, inclusive, as the period for the training of most of the organizations of the Marine Corps Reserve. June 18 to 28, 1933, was the period prescribed for the training of a special class of officers and noncommissioned officers at Quantico, Va. At the present time plans are being made to train the 24th Reserve Marines at the Great Lakes Training Station in August, 1933, the Sixth Marine Reserve Brigade at Quantico, Va., in August, 1933, and the Navy Yard Guard Reserve Detachment at the Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, N. Y., in August, 1933. The following information was taken from reports of Boards of Inspection, personal observation, etc.

QUANTICO TRAINING

Sixteen officers and 107 enlisted men of the 1st Battalion, 21st Reserve Marines (Artillery) travelled by rail from Philadelphia, Pa., to Quantico, Va., on June 11 for two weeks' intensive training in field artillery. With Major Robert C. Pitts in command, the Reservists began their schedule the next day. They were assisted by Captain James D. Waller, U.S.M.C., of the 10th Marines, Captain W. H. Harrison, U.S.M.C., and First Lieutenant Edwin C. Ferguson, U.S.M.C., regular officers who are on duty with the Reserve Artillery Battalion. The command was divided into two firing batteries and after preliminary instructions in gunnery, problems of fire data, and kindred subjects, target practice was held with sub-calibres mounted on .75 mm. guns. This practice was very successful.

The command was quartered in one of the new and commodious barracks of the 10th Marines. This latter Regiment is commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. B. Drum, who headed up the Board which inspected the Reserve Artillery Battalion, the other members of the Board being Major S. A. Woods and Captain James D. Waller. The officers of the Battalion were equally well provided for. All hands enjoyed free movie tickets to the nightly shows at the Post gymnasium, and baseball equipment was issued and a game played between the Reservists and the Quantico civilian team. Many of the officers and senior noncommissioned officers were given "hops" at the flying field. Toward the end of the period a smoker was held in honor of the visiting command. The new outdoor swimming pool, thoroughly equipped, was available every day, and all the other recreational facilities at the post were placed at the disposal of this Battalion.

Brigadier General Harry Lee, Commanding General of the Post, and Mrs. Lee held a reception to all Reserve officers and many courtesies were extended by other members of the garrison which the Reserve officers returned in a most creditable fashion.

Both the officers and men of the 21st Reserve Marines worked hard and well and made a very favorable impression upon the regular personnel associated with them in this important training.

On the day preceding their departure Major Pitts, in command, gave an excellent review of tractor-drawn artillery. Brigadier General Lee reviewed the command, and as well Colonel C. H. Lyman, commanding officer of troops, was present.

The last day the 21st marched to the station like veterans—many of them were indeed—and were bade bon voyage by the Commanding General, the Band, and many other well wishers. These patriotic Americans are doing a fine bit of constructive service in time of peace, and we appreciate how very valuable they will be to their country and Corps in an emergency. Good luck to them!

SEA GIRT TRAINING, JUNE 11-24, 1933

The 19th Reserve Marines (less Companies "A" and "D"), from New York and vicinity, Lieutenant Colonel James F. Rorke, Commanding, reinforced by the 1st Battalion, U.S.M.C.R., of New York State, Major George W. Bettex, Commanding, and the 3rd Separate Battalion, of Philadelphia, Pa., Major Howard N. Feist, Commanding, trained at the New Jersey National Guard Camp, Sea Girt, New Jersey. At this place there is one of the best rifle ranges in the country, and this force devoted much time to firing the rifle, pistol, and machine gun, and to combat problems in the surrounding country.

Sea Girt is located midway between New York and Philadelphia on the New Jersey Coast, and is convenient to both the New York and New Jersey Reserve units. This is a very well equipped camp with a certain number of permanent buildings containing galleys, mess halls, etc. The officers and men were quartered in 350 tents which were put up by the advance detail commanded by Captain John V. D. Young, the Regimental Quartermaster. There were 46 officers and 721 enlisted men of the Reserve present for this training.

Lieutenant Colonel James F. Rorke's staff consisted of Major Howard N. Feist, Executive Officer; Captain William P. Carey, Camp Adjutant; Captain John V. D. Young, Camp Quartermaster; First Lieutenant John J. Carter, Camp Commissary Officer; Captain John Dolan, Range Officer; First Lieutenant Edward F. Venn, Camp Maintenance Officer, and Lieutenant Commander Abraham Jablons, Camp Medical Officer.

The following regular personnel were on duty at the camp during this training: Colonel James J. Meade, Captain William M. Marshall, and First Lieutenant Harold E. Rosecrans, members of the Board of Inspection; First Lieutenant Augustus H. Fricke, instructor and advisor, 19th Reserve Marines; First Lieutenant Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr., instructor and advisor, 3rd Battalion, 19th Reserve Marines; Quartermaster Sergeant James W. Tenny, and First Sergeant John A. McBee, on duty with the 19th Reserve Marines; First Sergeant Jack Davis, on duty with the 1st Battalion, U.S.M.C.R., N. Y., and First Sergeant Frank Martz, on duty with the 3rd Separate Battalion.

An excellent training schedule had been prepared and

was carried out to the letter. This schedule consisted of close and extended order drills, combat drills, range work, and miscellaneous drills and inspections. Each battalion conducted a combat problem on suitable terrain located near the camp including battalion as advance guard, battalion in attack, battalion in defense, and a bush warfare problem. All men who had not fired the .22 calibre prior to coming to the range fired the prescribed course and all men who had fired with the .22 rifle fired the .30 calibre course. This command qualified 68% of those firing.

On June 17th Colonel J. J. Meade, Officer in Charge, Marine Corps Reserve, was the reviewing officer of the brigade. This was their first occasion for this formation and it was well done. Unfortunately a cloudburst occurred just as the troops were passing in review and drenched everybody to the skin. No mishaps resulted. The high spirit of the troops were displayed on this occasion as they were on all occasions. The personnel were remarkably cheerful, attentive, interested, and alert on all occasions.

Sunday, 18 June, 1933, was observed as Governor's Day. The Governor of the State of New Jersey, the Honorable A. Harry Moore, reviewed the troops at 4:00 p.m., on that date. About six thousand people from New York City, Philadelphia, and the adjoining country assembled to see the review. Governor Moore's summer residence is at the Camp. This followed a custom of having Governor's Day for each encampment.

On Wednesday, 21 June, 1933, the Officer in Command of the New York State Naval Militia, Rear Admiral Frank E. Lackey, reviewed the troops. Accompanying him were Captain William R. Sayles, U.S.N., Chief of Staff, 3rd Naval District; Commander Stephen Doherty, U.S.N., connected with the Naval Reserve Office, 3rd Naval District, and several junior Naval Reserve officers. All showed keen interest in the review and the work of the force, and their remarks were very complimentary. Admiral Lackey is greatly interested in promoting the welfare of the 1st Battalion, U.S.M.C.R., N. Y., which is a part of his State Militia Force.

A battalion sunset parade was held each evening. Two excellent bands were present, one from the 3rd Battalion from Philadelphia, the other from New York. On the brigade reviews these bands were consolidated and played well together. The spirit and morale of the men in camp was excellent. Sunday, 18 June, 1933, was visitors' day and the parents, wives, sweethearts, and friends of the men flocked to camp to see the boys under actual field conditions. Many civilians of prominence were most complimentary on the conduct of the men.

One of the high lights of the training was the especially well conducted battalion defensive-offensive operation of Major Krulewitch's Battalion and Major Grafton's Battalion. The two battalions were combined for the exercise, Major Krulewitch becoming Battalion Commander and Major Grafton the Executive.

The exercise was held on suitable terrain about three miles from camp. The troops were marched to a point near the combat area when the battalion commander assembled his staff and company commanders and went forward to reconnoiter. In well chosen words he gave these officers their orders, companies were conducted to

their positions, machine guns, howitzers, one-pounders, etc., being placed in position (these last listed infantry weapons were constructive). As well first aid stations were established, routes for runners marked out, contacts made with units on flanks, etc. In brief, very little was forgotten. The positions were then checked on the ground and errors pointed out. Following this the force was attacked, firing occurring, the troops in the front lines visualizing well what might be expected of them sent back many pertinent messages and decisions were promptly and soundly made. At one point the right flank company was driven back, the company in reserve moved into line, and the company driven out was reorganized and placed in reserve. Officers and men had as real a picture as can be expected in time of peace of what might occur under active service conditions. Following this exercise a critique was held. Major Krulewitch made a very fine presentation of the problem that afternoon to all officers at the daily conference. Such exercises as this train our Reservists in combat efficiency and bring them nearer readiness for an emergency. This exercise demonstrated the importance of preparation and study on the part of the officer personnel. Lesson learned: That all officers should take a correspondence course, thus laying the ground work for the practical work in the field during the summer training.

As a result of its observation at this camp one of the recommendations of the Board was that the Reserve should have a training objective.

The units marched out of camp with colors flying, bands playing, and entrained at the Sea Girt Station at 2:00 p.m., 24 June, 1933, expressing regret that their two weeks' training period was over.

CAMP BEAUREGARD TRAINING

Early in the morning, June 11, 1933, the First Battalion, 22nd Reserve Marines, marched from its armory at 829 Camp Street, New Orleans, La., to the Missouri Pacific Railroad Station, where a special train was waiting to take this organization to its annual training point, which this year was Camp Beauregard, located near Alexandria, La. Camp Beauregard was used as a training point during the World War and is now under control of the Louisiana National Guard. Camp Beauregard is a most satisfactory location from all standpoints for troop training purposes. The terrain is heavily wooded in places, rolling, with somewhat sandy soil. Adequate lighting, water, and sewage systems have been installed; further, once at Camp Beauregard there is little at hand to distract the attention of men from their first duty, which is training. It is too inconvenient to go to the nearest city, Alexandria, 8 miles distant, other than week-ends. The Battalion personnel undergoing training this year consisted of 10 officers and 144 enlisted.

Ordered by Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, a Board of Inspection, Major E. C. Long, and Captain G. R. Rowan, accompanied the Battalion into camp. This Board in addition to its duties to observe and report upon the training of the Battalion, also had orders to instruct and advise when practicable. This Board was one of several Boards ordered by Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, as observers of Marine Corps Reserve training this summer.

The Marine Corps Reserve camp was commanded by

Major Alfred A. Watter, F.M.C.R., who had prepared for his organization an intensive training schedule which was carried out with slight variations. The schedule consisted of rifle range firing, close order drills, extended order, mapping and sketching, interior guard duty, and combat training. Camp Beauregard, as previously mentioned, was most suitable for the Battalion to conduct combat problems. The Board of Observers especially mentioned the organization of a defensive position, stating that the outguards were well established for all-around defense, field of fire well selected and, in fact, all details well considered and rapidly executed.

One improvement noted was the percentage of qualifications on the rifle range compared with previous years, and this is ascribed to the very valuable prior range training given by the small bore rifle, .22 calibre.

Among other things considered by the Board of Observers at this encampment were two subjects considered of great importance. The first is the benefits derived by having an officer and one or two competent enlisted men of the regular service attached to each Reserve unit, not with the idea of taking over any of the responsibility and duties of organization officers but rather to establish a strong liaison between the regular establishment and the Reserves, to see that both speak the same language.

The second one considered was the question of instituting a progressive four-year training schedule for the Reservists. Under the present method of training, officers and enlisted men during the period prior to encampment attempt to cover all questions regarding the training of a soldier and an officer. It is needless to say that this cannot be accomplished in an armory or in the restricted limits of city streets. If each year an organization goes through such training as is possible in the armory then the two weeks' camp program cannot be made beyond a very limited objective. Tentatively the following might constitute an outline for this training:

First two weeks: the first two weeks' training would cover the following subjects:

- Close order drill.
- Military courtesy.
- Military hygiene and first aid.
- Interior guard duty.
- Second two weeks:
- Rifle marksmanship.
- Automatic rifle.

Preliminary and qualification firing to be in the last week.

Third two weeks: Training would come under the following subjects:

- Map reading.
- Extended order.
- Scouting and patrolling.
- Fourth two weeks:
- Musketry.
- Combat principles.
- Tactics.

In addition to better trained officers and enlisted men under the progressive training scheme, more interest for both will result. An officer in place of skimming important subjects of the military profession will go step by step over interesting ground until he reaches

a reasonably sound understanding of their meaning. The enlisted man in place of attending camp one year, doing a certain thing, returning the second year, doing the same thing over, learning no more, losing interest and probably finding an excuse not to return the third year, is every year under the progressive training scheme learning something new, maintaining sustained interest in his work and becoming much more of an all-round efficient soldier. It is recognized that certain difficulties will present themselves to carrying out the progressive scheme of training, but nevertheless, they are not considered insurmountable.

Returning to the organization under discussion, the First Battalion, 22nd Reserve Marines, the spirit and morale was excellent. The men were extremely interested and most willing to undergo rigorous training in very hot weather. The result of this two weeks' rigorous training can be summed up in the following which is a description of the events of the last day of the encampment, June 24, 1933:

Reveille at 4:45 a.m., after which the Battalion had mess, packed, moved and loaded stores and equipment, entrained and departed at 8:45 a.m. The method and expeditiousness of execution of all details connected with departure would be a credit to any organization. At 2:45 p.m., the Battalion detrained at New Orleans without incident. The men in marching away from the station had the bronzed faces and surety of movement of the seasoned veterans. Stores and equipment were unloaded and hauled from the station and unloaded and stored in the armory by 5:00 p.m., when the Battalion was permitted to fall out and the men go to their homes. To carry out the above movement in very little more than 12 hours demonstrated team-work which can only be done by an organization on which thought and effort has been displayed by every member.

MARINE BARRACKS, NAVY YARD, PORTSMOUTH, N. H., TRAINING

Company "D", 19th Reserve Marines, from Portland, Maine, Captain Park K. Rockwell, Commanding, with 31 enlisted men reported for active duty training on the 11th of June, 1933, at the Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N. H., and was relieved from this duty and ordered to return to its home station on June 24th, 1933.

Commencing on June 12th and continuing until June 20th a carefully prepared schedule of drills, instructions, and ceremonies was made out under the supervision of Captain Bailey M. Coffenberg, U.S.M.C. Company "D" progressed to a very high degree of efficiency during the short time that they were there.

On June 17th formal guard mount and a special drill was performed by this Company, Rear Admiral Clarence S. Kempff, U.S.N., Commandant of the Station, being the reviewing officer, and he was well pleased with the manner that they put on this drill and ceremony and so stated to the entire command in an address he gave at the end of the period.

From June 21st to 23rd, inclusive, the Company received instruction at the rifle range, Wakefield, Mass., in rifle and pistol marksmanship, returning from there to Portland, Maine, their home base.

The Commanding Officer of the Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N. H., Colonel Chandler Campbell, U.S.M.C., highly commended Captain Rock-

well and his men on the manner in which they performed their duties, their interest in their work, and their behavior at all times on the field and off which was beyond reproach.

SPECIAL CLASS IN TRAINING AT QUANTICO, JUNE 18-28, 1933

Forty-six officers and forty-six enlisted men of the Marine Corps Reserve, mostly from the vicinity of Washington (Sixth Brigade) and the Middle West (24th Regiment), were put through an intensive limited training course in infantry weapons at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, during the period June 18 to 28. Under the expert guidance of the regular officers and non-commissioned officers the Reservists fired the rifle, both .22 and .30 calibre, the service pistol, hand and rifle grenades, the Browning automatic rifle and the Browning machine gun, the Thompson sub-machine gun, the trench mortar, and the 37 mm. gun. In addition to the actual firing, each officer and man of the Reserve was required to take apart and reassemble the various weapons, naming each part as it was handled. Instruction in the care and use of the weapons was given by such experts in their line as Sergeant Major Morris Fischer and Sergeant K. E. Harker (rifle and pistol), Lieutenant Coffman and Captain Knapp (automatic rifle and sub-machine gun), Lieutenant King (Grenades), and Captain Ulrich (machine gun, trench mortar, and 37 mm.).

Daily routine: In the field 700 to 1145 and 1300 to 1645; lectures 1830 to 1930; breakfast at 630, dinner at 1200 and supper at 1700.

Ambush demonstration. On the afternoon of June 27 the regulars gave a very interesting demonstration of tropical bush warfare, the demonstration being put on in the woods of the reservation about 2 miles from camp. Major L. E. Fagan explained the purpose of the demonstration and gave instruction in dealing with natives, conduct on the trail, etc. The "bandits" were armed with rifles, machetes, Lewis machine guns and home-made dynamite bombs. A combat patrol of three squads of "Marines" proceeding along a trail seeking the enemy were informed by message dropped from an airplane in response to their identifying panel that the enemy, number undetermined, had been seen to the South, and the patrol at once proceeded in that direction in approved trail formation. They were ambushed by the bandits and gave fight, driving them off; then immediately hurried on along the trail to contact the main body before the survivors of the attacking party could inform them of the strength and disposition of the Marines. The contact with the main body resulted in considerable firing on both sides in the dense woods, the enemy suffering heavy losses. (As blank ammunition was used, the only real casualties suffered were those inflicted by the chiggers, who divided their attention impartially between participants and observers.) The Commanding General joined the Reserves in observing this splendid demonstration.

On June 27 Colonel James J. Meade, Officer on duty at Headquarters in Charge of the Reserve, visited the Reservists at Quantico and gave a talk to the enlisted men and later to the officers. After supper he also attended a lecture given by Sergeant Harker on "Coaching."

Quantico provided good weather for the camp (good and hot),—rain not interfering with the schedule—and with patient, efficient and painstaking instructors. The officers and noncommissioned officers went back to their units better qualified to coach and instruct them and feeling that the time and effort given to the course were well invested.

Sunday, June 18, was given over to reporting, assignment to quarters, etc. This year quarters were provided in one of the fine, new, modern and up-to-date barracks buildings, a welcome change from the war-time flimsy tarpaper-covered shacks that housed the Reserve camps of 1926, 1927, and 1928; and, although not so picturesque as the tented camps of later years (1929 on), for this limited training course Barracks "G" proved most convenient as well as comfortable.

In addition to the showers in Barracks "G", the new and elegant swimming pool was open to the Reservists, provided the schedule gave time for a swim. Tennis courts were also available for those with ambition to play after a morning on the rifle range and in the butts and an afternoon in the stadium firing the heavier weapons. Passes were provided by Major Peard, the athletic officer, for the 8 o'clock movies. These sound pictures were well attended.

On June 23 a dinner was given by the regular personnel to the visiting enlisted men. An excellent menu was provided, with music by the Post band, and a smoker followed.

The officers paid their respects to General and Mrs. Lee on June 20 in a body, and to the Commanding General in his office on June 28 individually.

The daily schedule follows in part.

Schedule of instruction:

- June 18. Reporting, assignment of quarters, etc.
- June 19. *Armory*. Issue of rifles, score books, dungarees and pads.
Instruction in care and cleaning of rifle.
School range. Sighting and aiming exercises.
Position exercises, slow fire.
Trigger squeeze.
Barracks "H". Browning automatic rifle, mechanics.
- June 20. *School range*. Position exercises, rapid fire.
Snapping in.
.22 cal. range. Instruction.
Firing (50 rounds).
Sick bay. Physical examination.
Rifle range butts. Hand grenades, firing.
Stadium. Browning automatic rifle, range firing.
- June 21. *School range*. Sight setting.
Instruction in keeping score book.
Effect of wind and light.
.22 cal. range. Instruction and firing (50 rounds).
Marsh. Rifle grenades, instruction, and firing.
Stadium. Browning automatic rifle, range firing.
- June 22. .22 cal. range. Sight setting, effect of light and wind.
Rifle range. Instruction practice, Special Course D (40 rounds).
Instruction in scoring.

Instruction in marking in the pit.

Barracks "H". Thompson sub-machine gun, mechanics.

Stadium. Thompson sub-machine gun, firing.

June 23. *School range.* Review.

Rifle range. Instruction practice, Special Course D (50 rounds).

Instruction in scoring, coaching, and marking in the pit.

Barracks "H". Browning machine gun, range firing.

June 24. *Rifle range.* Fire record practice, Course D (50 rounds).

Stadium. Browning machine gun, range firing.

June 25. Holiday routine (Sunday).

June 26. *Armory, school range.* Issue pistols. Instruction in nomenclature, safety precautions, assembly, etc.

1,000 yd. range. 37 mm. gun and trench mortar. Instruction and firing.

Barracks H. Review all weapons.

Barracks G. Lecture on coaching.

June 27. *School range.* Pistol instruction, position, aiming, trigger squeezing.

Pistol range. Fire short pistol course (30 rounds).

Armory. Care and cleaning of pistol.

Woods. Bush warfare—ambush demonstration.

Barracks "G". Lecture on Coaching.

June 28. Turn in equipment.

Clearance papers.

Physical examination.

Departure.

This class consisted of 6 majors, 9 captains, 13 first lieutenants, 17 second lieutenants, 1 marine gunner, 2 sergeants major, 1 quartermaster sergeant, 10 first sergeants, 10 gunnery sergeants, 16 sergeants, and 7 corporals.

TRAINING AT MARINE BARRACKS, NAVY YARD, BOSTON, MASS.

Company "A", 19th Reserve Marines from Boston, Mass., Captain W. J. McCluskey commanding, with one lieutenant and forty-six enlisted men, reported at Marine Barracks, Boston, Mass., on June 11th for training. A detailed report of this training has not yet been received but instructions were issued to the Commanding Officer of the Barracks concerned to detail an inspector-instructor to work with this company and to have the company fire on the range at Wakefield, Mass.

A schedule of training was prescribed. The company completed its training on June 24th.

TRAINING ON THE PACIFIC COAST, JUNE 11-24, 1933

The Commanding General, Department of the Pacific, Major General John T. Myers, issued instructions for the training at Marine Barracks, San Diego, Calif., of the 1st Battalion, 25th Reserve Marines, from Los Angeles, Calif., Major John J. Flynn commanding; for the training of the 2nd Battalion this regiment from San Francisco, Calif., Major F. M. Bock commanding, at Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, Mare Island, Calif., and the 3rd Battalion of this regiment from Seattle and vicinity, Major W. O. McKay commanding, to the Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, Puget Sound, Wash.

TRAINING AT QUANTICO IN AUGUST, 1933

The Sixth Reserve Brigade, from the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia, Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Staley commanding, will train at Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va., starting about August 6th. The brigade will spend ten days in training. The greater part of this time will be at the barracks, where this organization will undergo intensive training in infantry weapons, range practice, close and extended order drill, and combat principles. They will leave Quantico on about the seventh day, cross the Potomac at Quantico and march by easy stages up the Potomac on the Maryland side to Washington, holding maneuvers en route. The Brigade will travel light and simulate field conditions in their operations.

TRAINING AT GREAT LAKES STATION IN AUGUST, 1933

The 24th Reserve Marines, from Chicago, Detroit and Toledo, and vicinity, Major Chester L. Fordney commanding, will train at the Great Lakes Station, during August. One battalion of the organization commanded by Major Winder comes from the Chicago area, with the second battalion from Toledo, Ohio, Major I. C. Stickney commanding. All the officers of this regiment together with the principal non-commissioned have just undergone an intensive course of training at Quantico, and upon return to their organizations are preparing to teach up to date methods of leading and instructing combat units of the Marine Corps.

TRAINING AT NAVY YARD, NEW YORK, N. Y., IN AUGUST, 1933

The Navy Yard Guard Reserve Detachment of New York, N. Y., commanded by Captain B. S. Barron, will train at the Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, New York, during August. Captain Barron has just completed the special course at Quantico.

Notes and Comment

THE CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS

An Act duly passed by the 73d Congress in the special session recently terminated which was approved by the President March 31, 1933, reads as follows:

AN ACT

For the relief of unemployment through the performance of useful public work, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That for the purpose of relieving the acute condition of widespread distress and unemployment now existing in the United States, and in order to provide for the restoration of the country's depleted natural resources and the advancement of an orderly program of useful public works, the President is authorized, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe and by utilizing such existing departments or agencies as he may designate, to provide for employing citizens of the United States who are unemployed, in the construction, maintenance and carrying on of works of a public nature in connection with the forestation of lands belonging to the United States or to the several States which are suitable for timber production, the prevention of forest fires, floods and soil erosion, plant pest and disease control, the construction, maintenance or repair of paths, trails and fire-lanes in the national parks and national forests, and such other work on the public domain, national and State, and Government reservations incidental to or necessary in connection with any projects of the character enumerated, as the President may determine to be desirable: *Provided*, That the President may in his discretion extend the provisions of this Act to lands owned by counties and municipalities and lands in private ownership, but only for the purpose of doing thereon such kinds of cooperative work as are now provided for by Acts of Congress in preventing and controlling forest fires and the attacks of forest tree pests and diseases and such work as is necessary in the public interest to control floods. The President is further authorized, by regulation, to provide for housing the persons so employed and for furnishing them with such subsistence, clothing, medical attendance and hospitalization, and cash allowance, as may be necessary, during the period they are so employed, and, in his discretion, to provide for the transportation of such persons to and from the places of employment. That in employing citizens for the purpose of this Act no discrimination shall be made on account of race, color, or creed; and no person under conviction for crime and serving sentence therefor shall be employed under the provisions of this Act. The President is further authorized to allocate funds available for the purposes of this Act, for forest research, including forest products investigations, by the Forest Products Laboratory.

SEC. 2. For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act the President is authorized to enter into such contracts or agreements with States as may be necessary, including provisions for utilization of existing State Administrative agencies, and the President, or the head of any department or agency authorized by him to construct any project or to carry on any such public works, shall be authorized to acquire real property by purchase, donation, condemnation, or otherwise, but the provisions of section 355 of the Revised Statutes shall not apply to any property so acquired.

SEC. 3. Insofar as applicable, the benefits of the Act entitled "An Act to provide compensation for employees of the United States suffering injuries while in the performance of their duties, and for other purposes," approved September 7, 1916, as amended, shall extend to persons given employment under the provisions of this Act.

SEC. 4. For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby authorized to be expended, under the direction of the President, out of any unobligated moneys heretofore appropriated for public works (except for projects on which actual construction has been commenced or may be

commenced within ninety days, and except maintenance funds for river and harbor improvements already allocated), such sums as may be necessary; and an amount equal to the amount so expended is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the same purposes for which such moneys were originally appropriated.

SEC. 5. That the unexpended and unallotted balance of the sum of \$300,000,000 made available under the terms and conditions of the Act approved July 21, 1932, entitled "An Act to relieve destitution," and so forth, may be made available, or any portion thereof, to any State or Territory or States or Territories without regard to the limitation of 15 per centum or other limitations as to per centum.

SEC. 6. The authority of the President under this Act shall continue for the period of two years next after the date of the passage hereof and no longer.

Approved March 31st, 1933.

To carry into effect the provisions of this law an organization known as the Civilian Conservation Corps was set up to be under the control of the War Department working in cooperation with the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture.

The membership of this Civilian Conservation Corps at full strength will consist of 301,575 men in the following classes: 240,000 young unmarried men with dependents between the ages of 18 and 25 years, enrolled before June 7, 1933, and first sent to designated Army posts for organization into companies and preliminary conditioning and training before being sent to the Conservation Camps, most of which are in National or public forests and lands.

34,375 foresters of experience and training to be enrolled in the vicinity of the selected Conservation Camps before July 1, 1933.

2,200 veterans of the World War recruited from the Bonus Marchers at Washington.

25,000 veterans, seven per cent of whom may be Spanish-American War veterans.

These men are organized into companies of about 200 men each with three officers to the company.

For the purpose of supplying the necessary officers for the organization, training and control of the whole force the President has authorized the assignment of officers of the Army, the Navy and the Marine Corps to this additional duty. This duty for the officers of the regular services will be "Temporary" in its nature and the officers so detailed will continue to be carried on the rolls of their regular posts or stations. The total number of officers so far detailed to this duty is 4,250. Of this number 500 officers have been detailed from the Navy and Marine Corps, 91 of them from the Marine Corps, 170 of the naval officers from Medical Corps. The naval officers so detailed are chosen from the rank of lieutenant or lower and the marine officers from the rank of captain or lower. The naval and marine officers so detailed have been ordered to report to the Secretary of War for assignment to the duty with the officers of the Army so detailed.

The Secretary of War issued the orders for carrying out the details of the work to the Army Corps Area Commanders acting under the plan as shown by the following table:

CAMPS TO BE ESTABLISHED

Corps Area	Quota	Camps in Corps Area	Cos. to IX Corps Area	Cadres to IX Corps Area
I CA— Me., N. H., Vt., Mass., R. I., Conn.	16,750	91	None	None
II CA— N. Y., N. J., Del.	34,500	43	140 ²	5 ¹
III CA— Pa., Md., Va., D. C.	28,750	147	None	32 ⁶
IV CA— Tenn., N. C., S. C., Ga., Fla., Ala., Miss., La.	38,000	198	None	None
V CA— Ohio, Ind., Ky., W. Va.	28,750	73	85 ³	5 ¹
VI CA— Ill., Wis., Mich.	35,250	139	42 ⁴	5 ¹
VII CA— Minn., N. D., S. D., Nebr., Iowa, Kan., Ark., Mo.	27,000	154	19 ⁵	5 ¹
VIII CA— Ariz., Colo., N. Mex., Okla., Tex.	20,600	126	None	None
IX CA— Cal., Idaho, Mont., Nev., Oreg., Utah, Wash., Wyo.	20,400	459		

¹Cadres consist of 2 officers, 4 enlisted men, and 30 members of Civilian Conservation Corps.

²35 Cos. of 175 and 105 Cos. of 185.

³Cos. of 190.

⁴Cos. of 160.

⁵Cadres of 1 officer, 4 enlisted men, and 21 members of Civilian Conservation Corps.

The naval and marine officers detailed for duty with the Civilian Conservation Corps will continue to be paid while on such duty by their regular paymasters; the funds to be provided from the conservation appropriation by transfer of funds. This will effect an economy in the expenditures for pay of officers from the regular naval appropriations for pay of officers of the Navy and Marine Corps.

The men are procured for the Civilian Conservation Corps through the agency of the Army Recruiting service and they are taken in under a six months' contract somewhat similar to an enlistment contract after a physical examination to determine their fitness for the work. They are first assembled at selected Army posts for preliminary organization, outfitting and training and then sent by companies to the selected camp sites at the scene of their work. Each such camp has one company of approximately 200 men and three officers. The men are at first quartered under canvas but it is planned to build hutments later in time for cold weather. The camps are assigned to District Headquarters and these act in turn under Army Corps Area Headquarters. The organization, discipline and control of the companies is under the regular officers assigned to the duty but the determination of the work to be done and its methods are under control of the officials of the Forest Service and their representatives. The pay of the members of the Conservation Corps ranges from \$36 to \$45 per month, the higher rates being for certain leading men similar to non-commissioned officers of the regular services, these being by the officers of the companies according to fitness.

Officers assigned to this duty are directed to wear service uniform, winter or summer as suitable, and all officers are expected to provide their own field equipment. Marine officers and naval officers assigned to the Army for this duty will wear the distinctive badges, corps insignia and rank marks of their regular service.

Naval officers are expected to provide themselves with field uniforms of khaki or woolen material similar to those worn by Army and marine officers. Officers will subsist in their own camp messes.

It is expected that families of officers assigned to this duty will be permitted to remain in government quarters occupied by them at date of assignment or to remain on commutation status if they were on such status at date of assignment. The War Department has advised officers not to bring their families to the vicinity of the camps, owing to the hardships that would be incurred, there being no suitable living places near the camps in most cases.

Officers who prove unsuited to the duty will be returned to their regular organizations.

Medical service is available at the camps or at divisional stations within reach of the camps.

Discipline is placed under the control of the local camp officers; serious infractions of rules being punishable by immediate dismissal from the company and criminal cases being turned over to the proper local authorities for disposal.

It appears that the company officers have nothing to do with the kind of work to be performed by their men, this being as directed by the Forest Service representatives on duty at the camps. Some of the work laid out consists of construction of camps, quarters, mess buildings, construction of trails and roads and bridges, setting up and operating electric and telephone lines where required, resuscitation of certain kinds of trees, planting of certain trees in reforestation of areas, thinning out forests were required for good growth development or fire protection, replanting certain forest areas, work to lessen certain tree diseases and destructive insects, and erosion protective works.

Supplies of clothing, tentage, camp equipage, and rations are procured and distributed by the established Army agencies. Up to June 1, 1933, 300 ambulances, 2,775 trucks and 500 motor cars had been purchased for use at the camps and in supply lines.

The clothing furnished to the men enrolled for duty at the camps consists of underclothing of standard Army pattern, two suits of denim for working, in addition to an outfit of Army uniform consisting of hat, shirt, cravat, breeches, wrap puttees, shoes, and coat and overcoat where required by climatic conditions. Blankets are also provided with field cots. All of these articles are taken from Army reserve stock at the regular Depots, the cost thereof being defrayed by transfer of funds from the conservation appropriation.

The ration allowance has been fixed at not to exceed 50 cents per day and at present the regular Army ration is being issued to the men.

The whole scheme has been carried out by the Army authorities assimilating a mobilization project of men and supplies, and in this respect it is of distinct value to the services as a training exercise. The training that these 300,000 unemployed men receive while at this organized work will not only accrue to their advantage in giving them an income for the support of themselves and their dependents but will be of great value in building up their physical condition and general morale.

The officers detailed to this duty realize that it is "just another detail in the field" and that their commissions enjoin them to "perform all manner of duties thereunto belonging."

NAVY CROSS

■ The President of the United States has presented the NAVY CROSS to

CORPORAL BENNIE M. BUNN, U.S.M.C.,

for service in Nicaragua as set forth in the following: CITATION:

"For extraordinary heroism while a member of a patrol of Guardia Nacional in contact with a bandit group at Punta Pieles, Nicaragua, on 26 December, 1932. The patrol while on a train proceeding to El Sauce was attacked by a vastly superior force of bandits. Corporal Bunn, in command of the right flank, met an enveloping attack of the heavily reinforced bandit group, armed himself with a Thompson sub-machine gun, and by the effectiveness of his fire, personal bravery, aggressiveness and skillful leadership, repulsed the attack. During the entire engagement his conduct was outstanding, and beyond the ordinary call of duty. His efficient leadership and courageous action contributed largely to the success of the engagement."



Navy Cross

For the President.

CLAUDE A. SWANSON,
Secretary of the Navy.

NAVAL BASES AND THE MARINE CORPS

The following editorial which appeared in the Chicago Sunday Tribune of July 23, 1933, is of great interest to every officer of the Naval Service and especially to the officers of the Marine Corps, since the future of the Corps depends to a great extent upon its use in the Navy for the defense and attack of Bases for the Fleet.

■ In view of the President's evident intention to build up our naval defense, authoritative discussion of naval policy is not untimely. To such a discussion Captain Dudley Knox, one of the ablest of American commentators on naval affairs, has contributed to the July Naval Institute Proceedings an important article on naval bases. Captain Knox notes that this important element of naval strength has been and still is deplorably neglected in our planning, and we share his wish that it be given more serious if somewhat belated attention.

The fact is that not only the civilian public but even our professional navy men tend to think of naval strength only in terms of ships, their number, size and fighting efficiency. Yet every ship must have a base for refuge and repair. If a base is far from the field of any given operation more time must be spent upon going to and from it, and the actual fighting strength of any ship

or squadron must be discounted by this factor of absence. The strength of any naval force must therefore be calculated not upon the total number of ships in the establishment but on the number of ships it can muster and maintain at all times in the field of operations; that is, from the total of ships in being must be subtracted the number necessarily absent for refitting and repair.

It follows that the number, character, and location of bases are essential factors in the actual naval power of any maritime nation, and unfortunately they are factors in which the United States, through past neglect, is deplorably weak. Great Britain, which has been naval minded for centuries, is, on the other hand, very strong in bases, situated at strategic points of communication all over the world. Yet even Great Britain discovered in the late war that it was insufficiently provided in the principal theater of naval operations on her own east coast. This fact seriously affected her defenses and the efficiency of her operations in the North Sea.

This phase of naval strength must not be considered merely from the point of view of home defenses but also from that of the protection of our trade and communications. If our situation is one the whole favorable from the former point of view, it is not from the latter, for our lines of communication are very long and very poorly protected by bases. This diminishes our actual naval strength for commerce protection, as our public does not realize. Captain Knox estimates, for example, that "taking the treaty allowances of 8-inch gun cruisers and calculating the number of units which each nation can maintain in the China sea from its bases, we find that the relative strength is in the proportion of 37 for Great Britain, 25 for Japan, and only 18 for the United States." And he inquires: "Where is the 10:10:7 ratio of strength? For us it has vanished, because of the deficiency of bases, not ships. The ships with bases are the ships which count. Bases make ships."


But Japan is going to demand a parity of ships with Great Britain and the United States at the next blessed conference. If granted, it will not be parity of naval strength but a still greater superiority over us.

"If the American navy, says Captain Knox, 'is to fulfill its principal mission of defending the economic life of the country it cannot continue to think and plan exclusively in terms of ships. The importance of base, and with them obviously our marine corps, greatly need magnification in our vision.' We are wasting money on many unnecessary navy yards on our coast while lacking bases at points essential to the efficient protection not merely of our communications but even of our home shores. If we are not convinced that we have abolished war in the world we ought to do what we can to remove this weakness.

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RIGHT: Shotgun with Cutts Compensator and Pattern Control Tube. Shot column compact, unaffected by wad or gas pressure. Freedom from distorted pellets. Patterns always show even distribution of shot. No "breaks" or "blows." Killing velocities to outside edge of charge.

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Notice

IN the files of the Marine Corps Association at the Headquarters of the Marine Corps the following numbers of the Marine Corps Gazette are missing:

SEPTEMBER, 1916.

MARCH, 1917.

DECEMBER, 1916.

SEPTEMBER, 1918

The Association will be pleased to receive any of the above-mentioned numbers of the Gazette which members may have in their possession and desire to contribute to the Association to complete the files.

For the first of each of these numbers received

the sum of \$5.00 will be paid.

Communications regarding this subject are requested by the Editor, Marine Corps Gazette, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D. C.

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





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